Opinion
14-P-1893
10-05-2015
ADOPTION OF RAMSEY.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The mother appeals from a finding of parental unfitness and a decree terminating her parental rights to her son, Ramsey, by a judge of the Juvenile Court. See G. L. c. 119, § 26; G. L. c. 210, § 3. She asserts that the judge committed error in concluding that her mental health impairments prevented her from being able to care for the child, and in finding that she had failed to comply with the service plans formulated by the Department of Children and Families (department).
The judge made a total of 211 findings of fact based on two days of testimony by six witnesses and the introduction of forty-five exhibits. The evidence consisted both of first-hand observations by department and court-appointed witnesses and also reports containing statements by third parties including social workers and the child's foster mother. Hearsay statements contained in such reports are admissible if they bear the indicia of reliability. Brantley v. Hampden Div. of the Probate & Family Ct., 457 Mass. 172, 185 (2010). "Case work documents and court investigator reports prepared by department staff in the course of their work" bear such indicia. Ibid. (quotation omitted). We focus on the findings relevant to the issues raised on appeal, and on the findings pertaining to the best interests of the child.
The judge heard testimony from the mother, two department social workers, the court-appointed clinician Paul Hodlin, and a friend of the mother who testified on her behalf.
These included nine G. L. c. 119, § 51A, reports, of which six were substantiated as G. L. c. 119, § 51B, reports, a report pertaining to a court-ordered investigation, a clinical evaluation of the mother, a record of the mother's criminal offenses and seven exhibits introduced by the mother. The mother's exhibits consisted of correspondence with Children's Services of Roxbury and a social worker, as well as photographs of the mother with the child and of the mother's home.
The mother's history of mental health impairment. The judge found that two days after the child was born, a Cambridge Health Alliance psychiatry evaluation diagnosed mother as "mood disorder NOS, R/O PTSD. On Axis II [she was] diagnosed with clusters B (personality disorder evidenced by dramatic, erratic behaviors and includes histrionic, narcissistic, antisocial and borderline personality disorders) . . . No acute psychiatric care was needed at this point, but this may change." The report included a recitation of past suicide ideation and attempts, including an overdose of Celexa and a motorcycle crash.
The further evidence cited by the judge points to an extended history of noncompliance with medical treatment, failure or refusal to adhere to prescribed medication, "above average" mood disorder leading to inappropriate anger and impatience with the child, denial (stating "I don't need mental health treatment") and opposition because the "State" could not force her to take medication or go to therapy. In 2013, when the child was four years old, the mother indicated to Jennifer Diaz, a department social worker, that she was not taking her medications because she believed she did not need them and that the only thing the pills were doing was making her gain weight. When asked about attending therapy, the mother responded that she had not seen her therapist in one and one-half to two months, stating that the clinic was too far for her. She reported that she signed up for therapy services at the Saint Francis House but was unsure whether she was going to attend the intake as she did not believe that she needed therapy.
On one occasion during that time period, the mother appeared at the department office, complaining about Diaz and requesting a new social worker. Diaz's supervisor asked the mother about her mental health treatment, to which the mother responded, "I don't need mental health treatment." Furthermore, she requested proof that she needed treatment and asserted that the "State" cannot force her to take medication or go to therapy. The supervisor repeatedly tried to address the mental health concerns but the mother interrupted her consistently and repeatedly stated that she was fine and did not need mental health treatment.
The judge credited the testimony of the court clinician, Paul Hodlin, who met with the mother on three occasions in 2013. He testified that the mother exhibited a less stable life and mental state than she had in 2009 when the child was born, and that the child has suffered in her care. Hodlin testified to his consideration of the following: 1) that mother had been unable to maintain stable housing and had moved through a series of homeless shelters, where she demonstrated such threatening behaviors that she had been evicted, 2) that she did not appear any closer to establishing stable housing in the present than she did in 2009, 3) that her family is a source of stress and anxiety rather than of support, 4) that she had become increasingly indebted and her access to transportation had consequently become unreliable, 5) that she repeatedly had moved the child between several day care providers, had gotten into numerous disagreements with day care providers and was reportedly inappropriately verbally aggressive towards them in front of the child, 6) that she was very disorganized during the course of his evaluation, 7) that she became angry with staff members at the court clinic when she came on the wrong day or wrong time, 8) that she spoke in a pressured manner and was difficult to interrupt, 9) that she was somewhat tangential, moving from topic to topic, and appeared unable to focus on the child's functioning and needs, and 10) that she did not display an ability to empathize with the experience or emotions of others, including people in her own family.
The judge credited Hodlin's opinion with respect to a visit with child that occurred on April 7, 2014, characterizing the mother's actions on that occasion as reflective of a pattern of anger and emotion that could be very traumatizing for the child. The judge found that the mother might not be able to maintain a stable mood when visiting the child and that he might internalize the mother's anger and blame himself. The judge also accepted testimony to the effect that the mental health status of the mother is so severe, glaring and obvious that is it was not necessary for Hodlin to meet the child in order for him to formulate an opinion as to whether the mother's mental health status could impact the child.
Finally, Hodlin also testified that one of the concerns with personality disorders is that they are enduring, that it can be difficult to treat personality disorders and that the prognosis is generally poor for significant change of such disorders. The judge credited this testimony as well.
Service plan compliance. The department prepared service plans for the mother on an ongoing basis during 2013 and 2014; these were principally concerned with engagement in therapeutic and psychiatric services, anger management programming and cooperation with assigned mental health specialists. The judge found that the mother expressed unwillingness to comply with the service plans in two critical respects: 1) she was not willing to stay away from the child's father because their fighting was the "[father's] fault," and 2) she was unwilling to speak calmly, use coping skills and not threaten others because "that was just the way she acted" and "that was how Colombians acted."
The judge did not credit the mother's testimony that the department had not referred her to Parenting Journey, a provider of therapeutic services. The judge found that the mother's antagonism with respect to her service plan assignments were the cause of tension, yelling and swearing in her meetings with Diaz on several occasions.
History of the child. Nine G. L. c. 119, § 51A, "Child Abuse/Neglect Reports" were introduced in evidence; six of these were substantiated pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 51B, reports. Section 51A reports are "admissible to explain how the department became involved with the family." Adoption of Irene, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 613, 620 n.8 (2002). "Section 51B reports [are] admissible as official records and, thus, [can be] considered for statements of fact." Ibid.
The observations contained in the supported (51B) reports are focused on neglect and were accompanied by medical reports of significant speech delay (reports of 4/29/09, and 7/6/09). When the child was three years old, a department social worker reported that he was "nonverbal for the most part and threw frequent tantrums." The record also demonstrates a significant lack of stability in the care provided as the mother, after repetitive hostile interactions, placed the child with six different day care providers in a two-year period.
In January of 2013 the child was placed in the temporary custody of his father, with whom he had been living since the previous fall. In a relatively short period of time he was no longer using diapers, his speech had improved, he was reported to be much calmer and generally communicating with others. Several months later the department social worker noted continued speech improvement in the father's custody and that the father had learned how to let the child get over tantrums by himself.
The judge also credited a report by a department social worker that the child's behavior was materially adversely affected by visits with the mother. The foster mother reported that on one occasion after running into the mother by accident, the child "refused to change his clothes, take off his boots or coat and layed [sic] in bed awake until midnight stating that his mother was coming to get him." A court report contained identical information: "[F]oster mother continues to report that after visits with mother, [the child] regresses for approximately one to two days evidenced by oppositional behaviors, crying, and difficulty sleeping."
In considering the relevant factors enumerated by G. L. c. 210, § 3(c), the judge found six to be applicable here. We discern no abuse of discretion in his determinations, especially in the applicability of factor XIV and the finding that the "[m]other has demonstrated a prior pattern of parental neglect and that there is a likelihood of future harm to [the child] based on such prior pattern."
Conclusion. In sum, the record demonstrates that the judge was careful and conscientious in weighing the factors relevant to the decision, and that his exercise of discretion is fully entitled to the deference imposed by our standard of review. See Adoption of Hugo, 428 Mass. 219, 224-225 (1998). See also Custody of Eleanor, 414 Mass. 795, 799 (1993).
Decree affirmed.
By the Court (Berry, Grainger & Sullivan, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority. --------
Clerk Entered: October 5, 2015.