Based on this reasoning, the county asserts R.P. was not entitled to the assistance of court-appointed counsel, even if she had demonstrated indigence, because the petition was brought by private parties under the Adoption Act. The county distinguishes an earlier case, In re Adoption of Sotelo, 130 Ill. App.3d 398 (1985), which held that although the Adoption Act contains no statutory requirement of representation by counsel, the respondent mother was entitled to court-appointed counsel. The county correctly notes that Sotelo was neither an equal protection nor a due process decision and can, therefore, be limited to its unusual factual situation-proceedings were brought concurrently under both the Juvenile Court Act and the Adoption Act and the appellate court found it impossible to determine which statute the trial court was applying and what grounds the court used to determine unfitness.
See, e.g., In re Fernandez, 155 Mich. App. 108, 399 N.W.2d 459 (1986) (court rules and supreme court precedent required that indigent parent should have had court appointed counsel to challenge petition to adopt filed by stepfather); In re Adoption of Sotelo, 130 Ill. App.3d 398, 85 Ill.Dec. 685, 474 N.E.2d 413 (1985) (statute provided right to counsel for indigent mother having her parental rights terminated pursuant to an adoption petition by adopting parents). Cf. Casper v. Huber, 85 Nev. 474, 456 P.2d 436, 437 (1969) (court refused to decide whether appointment of appellate counsel is required by the Nevada constitution or the federal constitution when terminating parental rights pursuant to a petition filed by the aunt and uncle to adopt because appeal was frivolous on the merits).
Under the Adoption Act, an indigent parent is entitled to court-appointed counsel for proceedings pursuant to a petition for termination of parental rights. 705 ILCS 405/1-5 (West 2002); In re Adoption of Sotelo, 130 Ill.App.3d 398, 400, 85 Ill.Dec. 685, 474 N.E.2d 413 (1985). However, the Supreme Court has held that an indigent parent does not necessarily have a due process right to court-appointed counsel in a termination proceeding brought by the State. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, [343 Ill.App.3d 851] 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981).
Several jurisdictions have recognized the importance of appointed counsel under the Due Process Clause of U.S. Const. Amend. XIV when an indigent's parental status is sought to be terminated. See In re Adoption of Sotelo (1985), 130 Ill. App.3d 398, 85 Ill.Dec. 685, 474 N.E.2d 413; State v. Jamison (1968), 251 Or. 114, 444 P.2d 15; Interest of Friesz (1973), 190 Neb. 347, 208 N.W.2d 259; In re Adoption of R.I. (1973), 455 Pa. 29, 312 A.2d 601. In Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Services (1981), 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640, Justice Blackmun wrote: