In re Adoption of L.T.D.

Full title: In Re: Adoption of: L.T.D., a Minor Appeal of: T.D., Mother In Re…

Court: SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Date published: Apr 26, 2016

J-A02018-16 (Pa. Super. Ct. Apr. 26, 2016)

Opinion

J-A02018-16 No. 1552 MDA 2015 No. 1554 MDA 2015

04-26-2016

In Re: Adoption of: L.T.D., a Minor Appeal of: T.D., Mother In Re: Adoption of: J.S.D., a Minor Appeal of: T.D., Mother

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Order entered August 10, 2015 in the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County
Orphans' Court Division, at No(s): 4 of 2015 Appeal from the Order entered August 10, 2015 in the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County
Orphans' Court Division, at No(s): 5 of 2015 BEFORE: PANELLA, J., STABILE, J., and JENKINS, J. MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J

T.D. ("Mother") appeals from the orders entered on August 10, 2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County, which involuntarily terminated her parental rights to her minor son, J.S.D., born in December 2012 and to her minor daughter, L.T.D., born in November 2013 ("Children"). We affirm.

The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history as follows. Prior the initial placement of either child, Mother had an extensive history with Children & Youth Services ("CYS") dating from 2010 and culminating in the involuntary termination of her parental rights of two older children in August 2012.

J.S.D. was initially placed into foster care on December 20, 2012, following a referral from the medical staff on the day he was born and issuance of a verbal order by the court. At the time, the parents' home was deemed inappropriate. J.S.D. was adjudicated dependent on March 18, 2013. A finding of aggravated circumstances was also made with respect to both parents due to the prior involuntary terminations of parental rights. Following reports of initial progress, J.S.D. was returned to the physical custody of his parents on May 8, 2014, with CYS retaining legal custody.

L.T.D. was born in November 2013, and was not placed into foster care, due to the progress on the part of the parents. However, the situation quickly deteriorated and seven weeks after the physical custody of J.S.D. was returned to the parents, foster placement of both Children was necessary.

A CYS caseworker observed bruising on J.S.D.'s body within a week after he was returned to the parents' physical custody. The parents claimed that J.S.D. was pinching himself, but several of the bruises were in locations inconsistent with self-inflicted injury. Shortly thereafter, CYS received a General Protective Services ("GPS") referral. Investigation of the referral revealed that J.S.D. was covered with bruises on both his face and his body.

Based on the parents' inability to assure the safety of the Children in the home, the Children were placed in foster care on July 3, 2014. L.T.D. was adjudicated dependent on September 17, 2014, and an order finding aggravated circumstances as to both parents was entered on September 18, 2014. Both Children have remained in the physical and legal custody of CYS from July 3, 2014 until the present.

On September 17, 2014, the parents were ordered by the court to: obtain and maintain appropriate housing; obtain and maintain financial stability; attend anger management, behavioral health services, resource work, and family center classes (parenting classes); and submit to drug testing. In addition, the parents were given periods of supervised visitation weekly.

CYS filed a petition for involuntary termination of parental rights of Mother for both Children on February 2, 2015. The trial court held hearings on April 29, 2015, May 5, 2015, and August 5, 2015. Following the hearings, on August 10, 2015, the trial court entered orders granting CYS's petition for the involuntary termination of Mother's parental rights.

Mother timely appealed. This Court, sua sponte, consolidated the appeals.

Mother raises the following issue on appeal:

Is the decision of the Orphans' Court to terminate Mother's parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5), and 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) supported by competent credible evidence, in the best interests of the children or justified by necessity?

Mother's Brief at 3.

We review the appeal from the termination of parental rights in accordance with the following standard.

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard when considering a trial court's determination of a petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.

[T]here are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and parents. Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the

record and the court's legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion.

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (internal citations omitted).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are valid. See In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).

Moreover, we have explained that

[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so "clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue."

Id. (citation omitted).

This court may affirm the trial court's decision regarding the termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Here, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights under, among other subsections, section 2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide as follows.

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b).

We have explained this Court's review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the involuntary termination of a parent's rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(1) as follows.

To satisfy the requirements of section 2511(a)(1), the moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence of conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform parental duties.


* * *

Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent's explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect of termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).

In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations omitted).

[T]o be legally significant, the [post-abandonment] contact must be steady and consistent over a period of time, contribute to the psychological health of the child, and must demonstrate a serious intent on the part of the parent to recultivate a parent-child relationship and must also demonstrate a willingness and capacity to undertake the parental role. The parent wishing to reestablish his parental responsibilities bears the burden of proof on this question.

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1119 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted). See also In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1006 (Pa. Super 2008) (en banc).

Section 2511 does not require that the parent demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child and refusal or failure to perform parental duties, as the word or joins the two portions of the statute. See In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998).

Further, regarding the definition of "parental duties," this Court has stated as follows.

There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely passive interest in the development of the child. Thus, this court has held that the parental obligation is a positive duty which requires affirmative performance.

This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a genuine effort to maintain communication and association with the child.

Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty requires that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a place of importance in the child's life.

Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his or her ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or convenient time to perform one's parental responsibilities while others provide the child with . . . her physical and emotional needs.

In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).

After a review of the certified record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by involuntarily terminating Mother's parental rights to the Children, and affirm the orders of the trial court based on the concise and well-written opinion by the Honorable Anthony J. Rosini.

Orders affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 4/26/2016

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