Opinion
No. 6-031 / 05-1083
Filed March 1, 2006
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clarke County, Gary G. Kimes, Judge.
A grandfather appeals a district court decision denying his petition to vacate the adoption of his grandchildren. AFFIRMED.
Andrew B. Howie of Hudson, Mallaney Shindler, P.C., West Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, and Elizabeth S. Reynoldson, County Attorney, for appellee State.
Monty Franklin, Humeston, guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Eisenhauer, J., and Brown, S.J.
Senior Judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2005).
I. Background Facts Proceedings
Charles is the maternal grandfather of Hayleigh and Tyler. The children were adjudicated to be children in need of assistance (CINA) in March 2001. The children were placed with the maternal grandmother, Rita, who is Charles's ex-wife. Charles was able to exercise visitation with the children. He did not intervene in the CINA proceedings.
The State filed a petition to terminate the parents' rights in February 2003. Charles's daughter, Jeanine, voluntarily consented to the termination of her parental rights to these two children. The father of Tyler, Larry, also consented to the termination of his parental rights. The parental rights of the father of Hayleigh were terminated after a contested hearing, and the termination was affirmed on appeal. See In re H.N.S., No. 04-0050 (Iowa Ct.App. Mar. 10, 2004).
The children were removed from Rita's care in February 2004 because she was not able to meet their needs. They were placed in foster care. In May 2004, Charles filed a motion to intervene. The Iowa Department of Human Services informed Charles that he was not eligible to adopt the children because he had a past conviction for a forcible felony. See Iowa Code § 600.8(2)(b)(1)(e) (2003) (providing that a prospective adoption petitioner shall not be approved if the petitioner has been convicted of a forcible felony). Charles withdrew his petition to intervene.
In February 2005, Charles attended a foster care review board meeting and stated he wanted the children placed in his care. The notes from the meeting state, "Hayleigh and Tyler both expressed their lack of desire for continued contact with their extended family and specifically do not want contact with the maternal grandfather." On March 11, 2005, the children were adopted by the foster family.
On March 28, 2005, Charles filed a petition to intervene, to vacate the adoption, and to be appointed guardian of the children. Charles testified that he did not approve of his attorney's action of withdrawing his previous motion to intervene. He testified that in 2001, the State agreed that if the children were out of the home for a lengthy period of time they would be placed in his care. He stated that this agreement was made with Elizabeth Reynoldson, the county attorney. Reynoldson pointed out that she was not the county attorney in 2001, and she was not affiliated with the county attorney's office at that time. Rita's sister, Rose, stated that when the children were removed there was an agreement that the children would stay with a member of the family.
Jeanine and Larry testified that they voluntarily agreed to the termination of their parental rights because they were told the children would be placed with a member of the family. The parents signed documents, however, which provide, "That no coercion, threats or promises have been made or used to induce the undersigned parent to enter into this consent, and [name] enters into this consent freely and under his [or her] own will."
The district court denied Charles's petition. The court determined Charles was not entitled to notice of the adoption proceedings because he had not intervened in the previous juvenile court proceedings. The court found there were no irregularities or fraud in the adoption proceedings. It also concluded that it was in the best interests of the children to overrule the petition. Charles appeals.
II. Standard of Review
Our standard of review for rulings on a petition to vacate under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1012 is for the correction of errors at law, even when the judgment sought to be vacated was made in an equity case. See In re Adoption of B.J.H., 564 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Iowa 1997). We will not reverse the district court's decision on a petition to vacate unless there has been an abuse of discretion. Id. If the district court's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, they are binding on appeal. Id.
III. Merits
Charles contends the adoption decree should be vacated because it was entered as a result of extrinsic fraud. Extrinsic fraud may be a ground to vacate a judgment under rule 1.1012, while intrinsic fraud cannot. See Phipps v. Winneshiek County, 593 N.W.2d 143, 146 (Iowa 1999). Extrinsic fraud pertains to the manner in which the judgment was procured. In re Marriage of Kinnard, 512 N.W.2d 821, 823 (Iowa Ct.App. 1993). It involves an act or conduct of the prevailing party which prevented a fair submission of the controversy. Id. It includes lulling a party into a false sense of security or preventing the party from making a defense. Costello v. McFadden, 553 N.W.2d 607, 612 (Iowa 1996).
On appeal, the State claims Charles lacks standing to challenge the adoption decree and his appeal is untimely. These issues were also raised by the State in a motion to dismiss the appeal. The motion was denied by the supreme court. We will consider the merits of the appeal.
Charles points out that he filed a petition to intervene in the termination proceedings. He claims he did not agree with his attorney's action in withdrawing the petition to intervene. He asserts that by filing the petition to intervene, State officials should have known that he was interested in the welfare of the children, and he should have received notice of the adoption proceedings.
The district court specifically found "Charles was not entitled to notice of the children's adoption proceedings." Even assuming his attorney was not authorized to dismiss his intervention request, in civil cases, "[t]he law regards the neglect of an attorney as the client's own neglect, and will give no relief from the consequences thereof." In re Marriage of Johnson, 499 N.W.2d 326, 327 (Iowa Ct.App. 1993). The action of withdrawing the petition to intervene must be considered Charles's own action. Because Charles had not intervened prior to the initiation of the adoption proceedings, there is substantial evidence to support the district court's finding that he was not entitled to notice of those proceedings. See Iowa Code § 600.11(2)(a) (listing those entitled to notice of adoption); In re Adoption of K.T., 497 N.W.2d 163, 165 (Iowa Ct.App. 1992) (finding grandparents who were not guardians or custodians were not entitled to notice of adoption).
The district court also specifically found "there was no agreement regarding the placement or adoption of these children regarding Charles." The court noted that Charles claimed Elizabeth Reynoldson, the county attorney, had been a party to an agreement in 2001 that the children would be placed in his care if they were removed for a substantial period of time. It was clear, however, that Reynoldson was not the county attorney in 2001, and had not even been associated with the county attorney's office at that time.
Furthermore, the parents of the children signed documents stating that their consent to the termination had not been induced by any promises by the State. We find there is substantial evidence in the record to support the district court's finding that there had not been an agreement to place the children with Charles. We conclude Charles has failed to show the adoption decree was the result of extrinsic fraud.
Finally, the district court determined "[i]t is in the best interest of the children that Charles's petition be overruled and the adoption of the children remain as ordered by the court." "Although proof of extrinsic fraud would ordinarily by itself be sufficient under rule [1.1012(2)] to support vacation of a judgment, an additional requirement must be imposed where an adoption decree is the judgment to be vacated." B.J.H., 564 N.W.2d at 392. In seeking to vacate an adoption decree, a petitioner must also show the vacation is in the best interests of the children. Id. We concur in the district court's assessment that it would not be in the children's best interests to vacate the adoption decree.
The children had stated that they were not interested in having contact with Charles. Further, Charles' background supports the court's decision.
We affirm the decision of the district court.