Opinion
J-A20041-19 No. 415 MDA 2019 No. 417 MDA 2019 No. 434 MDA 2019 No. 436 MDA 2019
09-25-2019
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: G.W.-S., A MINOR APPEAL OF: E.M.W., MOTHER IN RE: ADOPTION OF: A.M.W.-S., A MINOR APPEAL OF: E.M.W., MOTHER IN THE INTEREST OF: G. W.-S., A MINOR APPEAL OF: E.M.W., MOTHER IN THE INTEREST OF: A.M.W.-S., A MINOR APPEAL OF: E.M.W., MOTHER
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Decree Entered February 11, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2018-0088a, 2018-0089a, CP-67-DP-0000306-2017, CP-67-DP-0000307-2017 Appeal from the Decree Entered February 11, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2018-0088a Appeal from the Order Entered February 11, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-67-DP-0000306-2017 Appeal from the Order Entered February 11, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-67-DP-0000307-2017 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.E.:
Appellant, E.M.W. ("Mother"), appeals from the decrees entered in the York County Court of Common Pleas, which granted the petitions for involuntary termination of her parental rights to G.W.-S. (born in March 2016) and A.M.W.-S. (born in June 2017) ("Children") and the concurrent orders which changed the goals to adoption. We affirm.
The court was not required to appoint separate legal-interests counsel for Children due to their young ages. See In re T.S., ___ Pa. ___, 192 A.3d 1080 (2018), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S.Ct. 1187, 203 L.Ed.2d 220 (2019) (establishing presumption that child three years of age or younger cannot form subjective, articulable preference that would necessitate appointment of separate legal counsel to advocate during termination proceeding).
The termination decrees and goal change orders are dated February 7, 2019, time stamped February 8, 2019, and entered on the docket on February 11, 2019. Mother properly filed four separate notices of appeal, one for each child regarding the goal change and one for each child regarding the termination of parental rights. See Commonwealth v. Walker , ___ Pa. ___, 185 A.3d 969 (2018) (requiring as of June 1, 2018, separate notices of appeal from single orders which resolve issues arising on separate trial court docket numbers). This Court subsequently consolidated the appeals.
The trial court opinions accurately set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this case. Thus, we have no reason to restate them.
Mother raises three issues for our review:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CHANGING THE GOAL OF THIS CASE FROM REUNIFICATION WITH A PARENT TO PLACEMENT FOR ADOPTION?
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INVOLUNTARILY TERMINATING THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF THE NATURAL MOTHER PURSUANT TO SECTION 2511(A)(1), 2511(A)(2), AND 2511(A)(5) OF THE ADOPTION ACT?(Mother's Brief at 5).
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT AN INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS OF THE NATURAL MOTHER WOULD BEST SERVE THE NEEDS AND WELFARE OF THE CHILDREN PURSUANT TO SECTION 2511(B) OF THE ADOPTION ACT?
The standard and scope of review applicable in goal change and termination of parental rights cases are as follows:
On appeal, goal change decisions are subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review. In re N.C., 909 A.2d 818, 822 (Pa.Super. 2006).
In order to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, we must determine that the court's judgment was "manifestly unreasonable," that the court did not apply the law, or that the court's action was "a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will," as shown by the record. We are bound by the trial court's findings of fact that have support in the record. The trial court, not the appellate court, is charged with the responsibilities of evaluating credibility of the witness[es] and resolving any conflicts in the testimony. In carrying out these responsibilities, the trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. When the trial court's findings are supported by competent evidence of record, we will affirm, "even if the record could also support an opposite result."
In re R.M.G., 997 A.2d 339, 345 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 608 Pa. 648, 12 A.3d 372 (2010). Additionally:
Id. at 822-23 (internal citations omitted).
When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the decision of the trial court is supported by competent evidence. Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court's decision, the decree must stand. Where a trial court has granted a petition to involuntarily terminate parental rights, this Court must accord the hearing judge's decision the same deference that it would give to a jury verdict. We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record in order to determine whether the trial court's decision is supported by competent evidence.In re Adoption of K.J., 936 A.2d 1128, 1131-32 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 597 Pa. 718, 951 A.2d 1165 (2008) (internal citations omitted).
Furthermore, we note that the trial court, as the finder of fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility of witnesses and all conflicts in testimony are to be resolved by the finder of fact. The burden of proof is on the party seeking termination to establish by clear and convincing evidence the existence of grounds for doing so.
The standard of clear and convincing evidence means testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. We may uphold a termination decision if any proper basis exists for the result reached. If the trial court's findings are supported by competent evidence, we must affirm the court's decision, even though the record could support an opposite result.
Before filing a petition for the termination of a parent's rights, the Commonwealth is required to make reasonable efforts to promote reunification between a child and [his] parents. The Commonwealth's obligation in this regard is not indefinite, however, because in addition to the parents' interests the Commonwealth must also respect the child's right to a stable, safe, and healthy environment. When reasonable efforts at reunification have failed, then the child welfare agency must work towards terminating parental rights and placing the child with adoptive parents. As we
have repeatedly acknowledged, [a] child's life simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 9-12 (Pa.Super. 2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
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Under section 2511, the trial court must engage in a bifurcated process. The initial focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies at least one of the...statutory grounds delineated in section 2511(a). If the trial court determines that the parent's conduct warrants termination under section 2511(a), then it must engage in an analysis of the best interests of the child...under section 2511(b), taking into primary consideration the developmental, physical, and emotional needs of the child.
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[A] best interest of the child analysis under [section] 2511(b) requires consideration of intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability. To this end, this Court has indicated that the trial court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, paying close attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing the bond. Moreover, in performing a "best interests" analysis[, t]he court should also consider the importance of continuity of relationships to the child, because severing close parental ties is usually extremely painful. The court must consider whether a natural parental bond exists between child and parent, and whether termination would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial relationship. Most importantly, adequate consideration must be given to the needs and welfare of the child.
Section 2511 outlines certain irreducible minimum requirements of care that parents must provide for their children, and a parent who cannot or will not meet the requirements may properly be considered unfit and have her parental rights terminated. In re B.L.L., 787 A.2d 1007 (Pa.Super. 2001).
There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely passive interest in the development of the child. Thus, this [C]ourt has held that the parental obligation is a positive duty which requires affirmative performance.
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In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 582 Pa. 718, 872 A.2d 1200 (2005) (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, "a parent's basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of...her child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill...her parental duties, to the child's right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of his...potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment." Id. at 856. "Above all else[,] adequate consideration must be given to the needs and welfare of the child. A parent's own feelings of love and affection for a child, alone, do not prevent termination of parental rights." In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010) (internal citations omitted).
Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of ...her ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship.
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinions of the Honorable Todd Russell Platts, we conclude Mother's issues merit no relief. The trial court opinions comprehensively discuss and properly dispose of the questions presented. ( See Rule 1925(a) Opinion, filed April 5, 2019, at 1-2; Adjudication Decision, filed February 11, 2019, at 8-22) (examining all aspects of case in light of relevant statutes and concluding Agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother's parental rights, and goal changes from reunification to adoption, are in Children's best interests). Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court opinions.
Throughout her brief, Mother complains the court failed to consider and essentially sanctioned the Agency's decision not to increase Mother's visitation with Children after the Agency had filed its petitions for goal change and termination. Mother did not specify this complaint in her Rule 1925(a)(2)(i) statements, so it is waived. See Lineberger v. Wyeth , 894 A.2d 141 (Pa.Super. 2006) (providing issues not raised in Rule 1925 concise statement will be deemed waived); In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505 (Pa.Super. 2007) (applying Rule 1925 waiver standards in family law context). Moreover, at the conclusion of the November 16, 2018 goal change/termination hearing, the court expressly stated it disagreed with the Agency's decision to deny increased visitation solely because the Agency had filed its petitions. The court made clear the Agency should move forward consistent with reunification until the court changes the goal to adoption. Thus, the record belies Mother's claim.
Decrees and orders affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 09/25/2019
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