Opinion
H14CP16011604A
05-09-2016
In re Addison L. [1]
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO INTERVENE
STEPHEN F. FRAZZINI JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
The present decision considers a motion to intervene in a child protection proceeding involving the above-named child, for whom the Commissioner of Children and Families (Commissioner) is the statutory parent. Katherine L. has filed such a motion in which she asserts that she was, when the motion was filed, the child's foster mother. Her motion further asserts that employees of the Department of Children and Families (DCF, or department) informed her, prior to any court hearings involving the child, that she was going to be allowed to adopt the child and later told her, after the TPR judgment, that the department was going to remove the child from her home and place her instead for adoption with a family that had already adopted her biological sister. (As noted in the margin, the child is no longer living with Ms. L.)
An amended motion to intervene was filed on May 2, 2016.
The child is a so-called " Safe Haven" baby, who was brought shortly after birth to a local hospital by someone identifying herself as a neighbor of the parents. The child was soon thereafter placed in the custody of the department, which then obtained an order of temporary custody and filed coterminous petitions alleging neglect and seeking termination of parental rights (TPR), both on the grounds of abandonment by the natural parents. Notice by publication was ordered for the unknown and unidentified parents, neither of whom ever appeared or participated in court proceedings concerning the child. On February 17, 2016, the date for the initial hearing on the coterminous petitions, the court confirmed publication, defaulted the parents, and conducted default neglect and TPR trials. The child was found to have been neglected, the parental rights of the natural parents were terminated on the grounds of abandonment, and the Commissioner was appointed the child's statutory parent.
At the hearing on the coterminous petitions, both the assistant attorney general representing the Commissioner and the child's attorney referred to the movant foster mother, who was present, as she had been allowed to attend and observe the proceeding, as a " pre-adoptive" parent, and the court that day, upon request of the assistant attorney general, changed the child's last name to that of the movant. See Hearing on Coterminous Petitions Transcript, 5, February 17, 2016.
Removal of the child from Ms. L.'s home did not occur immediately because the child's attorney requested an administrative treatment plan hearing at DOF pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-15. Section 17a-15(a) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: " The commissioner shall prepare and maintain a written plan for care, treatment and permanent placement of every child under the commissioner's supervision, which shall include, but not be limited to, . . . the proposed plan of treatment services and temporary placement and a goal for permanent placement of the child . . ." Further, § 17a-15(c) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: " Any child . . . aggrieved by any provision of a plan prepared under subsection (a) of this section . . . shall be provided a hearing within thirty days following a written request for the same directed to the commissioner." The court has been informed that under DCF policy, such a request halted any removal until decision on that request. See DCF Policy Manual § 22-6-4, available at http://www.ct.gov/dcf/cwp/view.asp?a=2639& Q=393264& PM=1 (last visited May 4, 2016) (copy contained in the file of this case in the Superior Court clerk's office). (" If a treatment plan hearing is requested by the child's attorney or the child's guardian ad litem within ten (10) days of receiving the written notice of the removal, the child shall remain with the out of home care provider pending the outcome of the treatment plan hearing, unless there has been a determination that an emergency situation exists or is suspected, which requires immediate removal of the child.")
The motion to intervene originally sought an ex parte order restraining DCF from removing the child or proceeding with an adoption by the other family " and other relief . . . deemed to be in the child's best interest." The court denied ex parte relief, but scheduled an immediate hearing. Both DCF and the child's attorney have filed objections to the motion, and the department has also moved to dismiss the motion to intervene on the grounds that the movant lacks standing, which raises the question of subject matter jurisdiction. Hearing on the motions took place over three days, ending on April 11 of this year. At that hearing, the court raised sua sponte the issue of whether it had subject matter jurisdiction to allow intervention by anyone for the purpose of affecting placement of the child. The movant has also supplemented her initial request for " other relief . . . deemed to be in the child's best interest" by seeking " in the alternative, for the court to grant her limited intervention for the purpose . . . of filing a motion to open . . ." Movant's Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Intervene, 9. For the reasons stated below, the motion to intervene is denied.
See, e.g., Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 282 Conn. 791, 802, 925 A.2d 292 (2007) (" If a party is found to lack standing, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause." [Internal quotation marks omitted]); In re Christina M., 280 Conn. 474, 480, 908 A.2d 1073 (2006) (same); Missionary Society of Connecticut v. Board of Pardons & Paroles, 278 Conn. 197, 201, 896 A.2d 809 (2006) (same); D'Eramo v. Smith, 273 Conn. 610, 615 n.6, 872 A.2d 408 (2005) (" The proper procedural vehicle for disputing a party's standing is a motion to dismiss." [Internal quotation marks omitted]); St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 544, 825 A.2d 90 (2003) (" The issue of standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss."), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Flanagan v. Blumenthal, 100 Conn.App. 255, 260, 917 A.2d 1047 (2007).
As required by law, the court must first address the jurisdictional issues. In seeking judicial relief, Ms. L. " bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n.12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003). " The burden rests with the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in [her] favor. clearly to allege facts demonstrating that [she] is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Goodyear v. Discala, 269 Conn. 507, 511, 849 A.2d 791 (2004). The general rule in civil matters is that " [w]hen a . . . court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light . . . In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cogswell v. American Transit Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 505, 516, 923 A.2d 638 (2007); see also Cox v. Aiken, 278 Conn. 204, 211, 897 A.2d 71 (2006) (same); Filippi v. Sullivan, 273 Conn. 1, 8, 866 A.2d 599 (2005) (same). The same is true in considering a motion to intervene: " For purposes of judging the satisfaction of [the] conditions [for intervention] we look to the pleadings, that is, to the motion for leave to intervene and to the proposed complaint or defense in intervention, and . . . we accept the allegations in those pleadings as true." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 279 Conn. 447, 457, 904 A.2d 137 (2006). Hence, in the present case, the amended motion to intervene and various other pleadings filed by Ms. L. allege certain facts that, for purposes of the motions to intervene and to dismiss, will be considered in a manner most favorable to her.
" [The question of subject matter jurisdiction] . . . once raised, either by a party or by the court itself . . . must be answered before the court may decide the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Batte-Holmgren v. Commissioner of Public Health, 281 Conn. 277 283, 914 A.2d 996 (2007). " Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it . . . [A] courts lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ferguson Mech. Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Works, 282 Conn. 764, 771, 924 A.2d 846 (2007). " Once the question of subject matter jurisdiction has been raised, cognizance of it must be taken and the matter passed upon before [the court] can move one further step in the cause, as any movement is necessarily the exercise of jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Harrison, 264 Conn. 829, 839 n.6, 826 A.2d 1102 (2003).
A motion to dismiss may raise additional facts to challenge jurisdiction; see Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 647 n.7, 974 A.2d 669 (2009); and the department's motion to dismiss refers to certain facts, all of which were also asserted by the movant in her pleadings. Thus, at least for purposes of the motion to dismiss, no material facts appear to be in dispute.
The department and child's attorney both argue that " [a]nalysis of an outside person's request for intervention must depend on the proffered purpose for the intervention." Department of Children and Families' Brief Regarding Statutory Authority to Permit Intervention, 1; see also The Minor Child's Brief Regarding Permissi[ve] Intervention, 2. (" It is essential for the Court to consider why a party is seeking to intervene.") The movant here seeks to intervene for several purposes: to resume placement of the child in her household, to prevent adoption of the child by another family, and to seek to open the TPR judgment so that she can request intervention under Practice Book § 35a-4(c) in the dispositional phase of the neglect and/or TPR proceedings to seek guardianship of the child. Accepting the suggestion of the department and child, the court will consider subject matter jurisdiction separately with regard to each proposed purpose of intervention.
See footnote 16 on page 10 .
I
INTERVENTION TO SEEK PLACEMENT AND PREVENT ADOPTION OF A CHILD FOR WHOM THE COMMISSIONER OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IS STATUTORY PARENT
A
DOES THE SUPERIOR COURT HAVE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO PERMIT THE INTERVENTION SOUGHT HERE?
State law gives a child's relatives the legal right to intervene in child protection proceedings in the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters under certain circumstances, and the court discretion to allow those relatives and others to intervene under other circumstances, but all those instances pertain to child protection proceedings prior to termination of parental rights and appointment of a statutory parent. No statute or practice book rule expressly gives a foster or preadoptive parent the right to intervene in order to seek orders concerning a child (or its placement) after appointment of a statutory parent, and Ms. L. does not so assert. Instead, she has repeatedly asserted that her claim is for " permissive intervention, " which has long been taken to mean in our practice that " although the person may not have the legal right to intervene, the court may, in its discretion, permit him or her to intervene, depending on the circumstances." BNY Western Trust v. Roman, 295 Conn. 194, 204 n.8, 990 A.2d 853 (2010). She argues that the Superior Court has inherent authority to allow permissive intervention " even though there is not a statutory grant of authority . . ." Movant's Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Intervene, 2.
General Statutes § 46b-129(d)(1) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: " (A) If not later than thirty days after the preliminary hearing, or within a reasonable time when a relative resides out of state, the Commissioner of Children and Families determines that there is not a suitable person related to the child or youth by blood or marriage who can be licensed as a foster parent or serve as a temporary custodian, and the court has not granted temporary custody to a person related to the child or youth by blood or marriage, any person related to the child or youth by blood or marriage may file, not later than ninety days after the date of the preliminary hearing, a motion to intervene for the limited purpose of moving for temporary custody of such child or youth. If a motion to intervene is timely filed, the court shall grant such motion except for good cause shown . (B) Any person related to a child or youth may file a motion to intervene for purposes of seeking temporary custody of a child or youth more than ninety days after the date of the preliminary hearing. The granting of such motion shall be solely in the court's discretion, except that such motion shall be granted absent good cause shown whenever the child's or youth's most recent placement has been disrupted or is about to be disrupted . . ." (Emphasis added to show when such intervention is of right.)
General Statutes § 46b-129(d) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: " (1) . . . (B) Any person related to a child or youth may file a motion to intervene for purposes of seeking temporary custody of a child or youth more than ninety days after the date of the preliminary hearing. The granting of such motion shall be solely in the court's discretion, except that such motion shall be granted absent good cause shown whenever the child's or youth's most recent placement has been disrupted or is about to be disrupted . . . (4) Any person related to a child or youth may file a motion to intervene for purposes of seeking guardianship of a child or youth more than ninety days after the date of the preliminary hearing. The granting of such motion to intervene shall be solely in the court's discretion, except that such motion shall be granted absent good cause shown whenever the child's or youth's most recent placement has been disrupted or is about to be disrupted. The court may, in the court's discretion, order the Commissioner of Children and Families to conduct an assessment of such relative granted intervenor status pursuant to this subdivision." (Emphasis added to show when such intervention is discretionary.)
See Practice Book § 35a-4(c), in footnote 16 on page 10 .
In 1992, our Supreme Court stated in a child protection proceeding that " questions of permissive intervention are committed to the sound discretion of the trial court . . ." In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 277, 618 A.2d 1 (1992). That statement was, of course, true at that time, based on the then long-existing rules of court regarding juvenile matters. The juvenile rules of practice once conferred broad authority on the court to grant intervention, in the interests of justice, to an " [e]quitable party at interest, " a term later modified to an " [i]ntervening party"; both terms, however, were similarly defined as " [ a ] ny person whose interest in the matter before the court is not of such a nature and kind as to entitle him to legal service as a prerequisite to the court's jurisdiction over the proceeding but whose participation therein, at the discretion of the court, may promote the interests of justice ." (Emphasis added.) Practice Book (Cum. Supp. 1974) § 1100(l ) (now § 26-1(j)); see also Practice Book (1993) § 1023.1(k) (now § 26-1(j)) (" [ a ] ny person whose interest in the matter before the court is not of such a nature and kind as to entitle legal service as a prerequisite to the court's authority to adjudicate the matter pending before it but whose participation therein, at the discretion of the court, may promote the interests of justice." [Emphasis added.])
Practice Book (Cum.Sup. 1974) § 1100 (now § 26-1), captioned " Definitions, and contained in the then " Rules for the Juvenile Court, " stated, in pertinent part, as follows: " ( l ) " 'Parties' includes: . . . (2) 'Equitable party at interest': Any person whose interest in the matter before the court is not of such a nature and kind as to entitle him to legal service as a prerequisite to the court's jurisdiction over the proceeding but whose participation therein, at the discretion of the court, may promote the interests of justice. This definition may include but is not limited to any father or mother, natural, adoptive or putative, or any parental surrogate, whose legal status denies him the parental rights which are equated with guardianship of the child's person, and he may in any proceeding before the court be given notice thereof in any manner reasonably appropriate to that end, but no such 'equitable party at interest' shall be entitled, as a matter of right, to provision of counsel by the court . . ."
Similarly, the General Statutes once provided standing to foster parents " in matters concerning the placement or revocation of commitment of a foster child living with such parent." Such statutory standing might arguably have also conferred on the Superior Court the authority to entertain Ms. L.'s request; but the statutes were modified more than fifteen years ago to provide that foster parents now have merely " the right to be heard" in such matters and do not appear to create any additional authority on the court itself.
Public Acts 1977, No. 77-273 added subsection (h) to General Statues § 17-62, the predecessor to § 46b-129, and provided as follows: " A foster parent shall have standing for the purposes of section 17-62 of the general statutes in juvenile court in matters concerning the placement of a foster child living with such parent." This provision became § 46b-129(i) with the addition of a new subsection (e) by No. 79-579 of the 1979 Public Acts, and read, " [a] foster parent shall have standing for the purposes of this section in superior court in matters concerning the placement or revocation of commitment of a foster child living with such parent. A foster parent shall receive notice of any application to revoke commitment or any hearing on such application." (Emphasis omitted.)
Public Acts 2001, No. 01-142, § 8, modified this provision, by then § 46b-129(o), to read as follows: " A foster parent shall have the right to be heard for the purposes of this section in Superior Court in matters concerning the placement or revocation of commitment of a foster child living with such parent. A foster parent shall receive notice of any motion to revoke commitment or any hearing on such motion. A foster parent who has cared for a child or youth for not less than six months shall have the right to be heard and comment on the best interests of such child or youth in any matter under this section which is brought not more than one year after the last day the foster parent provided such care."
Since then, the statutes and rules concerning intervention child protection proceedings have been revised extensively and are no longer so expansive. The General Statutes now contain no provisions that authorize intervention of nonrelatives, and the Practice Book expressly limits intervention of a nonrelative, even when found to be in the interests of justice or the best interest of the child, to the dispositional phase of a case. See Practice Book § § 26-1 and 35a-4.
Practice Book § 26-1, captioned " Definitions Applicable to Proceedings on Juvenile Matters, " now defines " Parties" as follows: " (j) 'Parties' includes: (1) The child or youth who is the subject of a proceeding and those additional persons as defined herein; (2) 'Legal party': Any person, including a parent, whose legal relationship to the matter pending before the judicial authority is of such a nature and kind as to mandate the receipt of proper legal notice as a condition precedent to the establishment of the judicial authority's jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter pending before it, and (3) 'Intervening party': Any person who is permitted to intervene in accordance with Section 35a-4."
The movant also argues that General Statutes § § 52-102, 52-107 and 52-108, which correlate to Practice Book § § 9-6, 9-18 and 9-19, give the court authority to allow permissive intervention here. Those statutes, however, pertain to " civil actions, " and those Practice Book sections are, under the terms of the Practice Book, not applicable in juvenile proceedings. The movant correctly points out, however, that the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that juvenile proceedings are " not civil actions within the compass of General Statutes § 52-212a, " which sets forth the standard for the opening of civil judgments. See In re Baby Girl B., supra, 224 Conn. 281. In doing so, however, the court engaged in a functional analysis of the scope and purpose of § 52-212a as relating to juvenile proceedings; noted the inherent authority of a court to open judgments; and found the assumption elsewhere in the General Statutes that judgments in juvenile matters may be subject to motions to open. Id., 281-87. After that decision, the legislature enacted General Statutes § 45a-719, which effectively codified the court's holding in In re Baby Girl B. by expressly providing that § 52-212a applies to the opening of TPR judgments while also applying two limitations on the court's authority to open such a judgment: the child may not yet have been adopted, and opening the TPR judgment must be found to be in the child's best interest.
General Statutes § 52-102, captioned " Joinder of persons with interest adverse to plaintiff and of necessary persons, " provides as follows: " Upon motion made by any party or nonparty to a civil action, the person named in the party's motion or the nonparty so moving, as the case may be, (1) may be made a party by the court if that person has or claims an interest in the controversy, or any part thereof, adverse to the plaintiff, or (2) shall be made a party by the court if that person is necessary for a complete determination or settlement of any question involved therein; provided no person who is immune from liability shall be made a defendant in the controversy."
Practice Book § 9-6, captioned " Interested Persons as Defendants, " provides as follows: " Any person may be made a defendant who has or claims an interest in the controversy, or any part thereof, adverse to the plaintiff, or whom it is necessary, for a complete determination or settlement of any question involved therein, to make a party."
Practice Book § 34a-1, which lists the Practice Book sections outside the juvenile rules that apply in juvenile proceedings, does not include Practice Book § § 9-6, 9-18 or 9-19, all of which are in the portion of the Practice Book pertaining to procedure in civil matters. More specifically, Practice Book § 34a-1, provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
General Statutes § 52-212a, captioned " Civil judgment or decree opened or set aside within four months only, " provides as follows: " Unless otherwise provided by law and except in such cases in which the court has continuing jurisdiction, a civil judgment or decree rendered in the Superior Court may not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside is filed within four months following the date on which it was rendered or passed. The continuing jurisdiction conferred on the court in preadoptive proceedings pursuant to subsection (o) of section 17a-112 does not confer continuing jurisdiction on the court for purposes of reopening a judgment terminating parental rights. The parties may waive the provisions of this section or otherwise submit to the jurisdiction of the court, provided the filing of an amended petition for termination of parental rights does not constitute a waiver of the provisions of this section or a submission to the jurisdiction of the court to reopen a judgment terminating parental rights . . ."
General Statutes § 45a-719, enacted by Public Acts 1993, No. 93-170, § 1 and captioned " Reopening judgment terminating parental rights. Best interest of child. Final decree of adoption, " provides, in pertinent part, as follows: " The court may grant a motion to open or set aside a judgment terminating parental rights pursuant to section 52-212 or 52-212a or pursuant to common law or may grant a petition for a new trial on the issue of the termination of parental rights, provided the court shall consider the best interest of the child, except that no such motion or petition may be granted if a final decree of adoption has been issued prior to the filing of any such motion or petition."
The same sort of analysis employed in In re Baby Girl B. suggests that § § 52-102, 52-107 and 52-108 are not applicable in juvenile matters. Finding such authority there, moreover, would vitiate the intent and effect of the juvenile statutes and rules to limit intervention of nonrelatives to the dispositional phase of a case. The language of § 52-108 that parties may be added " at any stage of the action, as the court deems the interests of justice require" is contrary to the holding of various cases that intervention in the adjudicatory phase of a TPR decision is wholly improper. Although some earlier juvenile cases did refer to those statutes and rules when discussing intervention, they did so before the juvenile rules were amended in 2002 to clarify which Practice Book provisions outside of the chapters pertaining exclusively to juvenile matters would apply in juvenile proceedings.
The movant also asserts that the authority to allow permissive intervention adheres in the court's inherent authority to order its proceedings. It has long been held that " courts have an inherent power, independent of statutory authorization, to prescribe rules to regulate their proceedings and facilitate the administration of justice as they deem necessary." State v. Clemente, 166 Conn. 501, 514, 353 A.2d 723 (1974). There is thus no doubt that courts do have certain authority, but not to exceed the bounds that the court itself, through its rule-making function, has imposed. Moreover, the Connecticut Superior Court, as a creation of the state constitution, also has inherent constitutional authority to govern its proceedings, although the judges have generally eschewed conflict with the legislature except upon " clear invasion of judicial power by the legislature." Id., 515. There is no such conflict between statute and rule pertaining to intervention, however.
A party whose legal rights would be impaired by operation of a juvenile judgment probably has a due process right to participate in that proceeding. Thus, this court has allowed the department itself to intervene in an uncared for proceeding brought by a guardian ad litem and seeking commitment of a child because such a judgment would affect the department's rights and obligations. See In re Luis V.-S., Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. H14-CPC13-010912-A (December 8, 2014, Frazzini, J.). In addition, the legislature has authorized certain foster and preadoptive parents to bring writs of habeas corpus regarding custody of a child, and the court takes judicial notice that Ms. L. filed such a writ on the date of hearing on these motions and withdrew it the next day. Otherwise, however, this court has searched for such authority and found none that would allow intervention after appointment of a statutory parent for the purpose of seeking orders regarding the child's placement. The court thus concludes that, absent statutory or Practice Book authority, it has no authority or subject matter jurisdiction to grant the relief sought here.
General Statutes § 52-466 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: " (f) A foster parent or an approved adoptive parent shall have standing to make application for writ of habeas corpus regarding the custody of a child currently or recently in [her] care for a continuous period of not less than ninety days in the case of a child under three years of age at the time of such application and not less than one hundred eighty days in the case of any other child."
B
DOES THE MOVANT HAVE STANDING TO INTERVENE IN ORDER TO SEEK POST-TERMINATION CUSTODY AND PREVENT ADOPTION BY OTHERS?
The law on " standing and its aggrievement component"; Andross v. West Hartford, 285 Conn. 309, 321, 939 A.2d 1146 (2008); has been stated many times:
Standing is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented . . . These two objectives are ordinarily held to have been met when a complainant makes a colorable claim of direct injury he has suffered or is likely to suffer, in an individual or representative capacity. Such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy . . . provides the requisite assurance of concrete adverseness and diligent advocacy . . . The requirement of directness between the injuries claimed by the plaintiff and the conduct of the defendant also is expressed, in our standing jurisprudence, by the focus on whether the plaintiff is the proper party to assert the claim at issue . . .
Two broad yet distinct categories of aggrievement exist, classical and statutory . . . Classical aggrievement requires a two part showing. First, a party must demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the [controversy], as opposed to a general interest that all members of the community share . . . Second, the party must also show that the [alleged conduct] has specially and injuriously affected that specific personal or legal interest . . .
Statutory aggrievement exists by legislative fiat, not by judicial analysis of the particular facts of the case. In other words, in cases of statutory aggrievement, particular legislation grants standing to those who claim injury to an interest protected by that legislation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Windels v. Envtl. Prot. Comm'n, 284 Conn. 268, 288, 933 A.2d 256 (2007). " Aggrievement does not demand certainty, only the possibility of an adverse effect on a legally protected interest." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burton v. Comm'r of Envtl. Prot., 291 Conn. 789, 803, 970 A.2d 640 (2009). " The determination of aggrievement presents a question of fact for the trial court and a plaintiff has the burden of proving that fact." Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, 175 Conn. 483, 493, 400 A.2d 726 (1978). " [A]s to the quality and quantum of evidence required to establish aggrievement, an appellant need not establish his or her interest and harm with certainty, but rather, may satisfy the requirement of aggrievement by credible proof that the subject activity has resulted in the possibility of harm to his or her specific personal and legal interest . . . Although one may establish aggrievement by establishing the possibility of harm, mere speculation that harm may ensue is not an adequate basis for finding aggrievement.(Citations omitted.) Goldfisher v. Connecticut Siting Council, 95 Conn.App. 193, 197-98, 895 A.2d 286 (2006).
In the present case, the movant does not claim statutory aggrievement. At oral argument, her attorney expressly relinquished any claim that Ms. L. was asserting deprivation of any constitutionally protected right. Nor is the court aware of any legislation that would confer standing on her, other than insofar as she might fall within the ambit of General Statutes § 52-466(f), which must be tested within a habeas corpus proceeding rather than here. Any claim of standing must thus rest on a claim of classical aggrievement, and that determination depends on whether Ms. L. has asserted the possibility of harm to a specific personal and legal interest, or, in the words of many cases, invasion of " legally protected interest." O'Leary v. McGuinness, 140 Conn. 80, 83, 98 A.2d 660 (1953) (determination of aggrievement involves question of whether " there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest . . . has been adversely affected").
While many cases refer to the phrases " specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision" and " legally protected interest, " a review of the case law reveals no explicit definitions of these terms. Dictionary definitions provide little additional clarity. Connecticut courts have instead traditionally assessed such interests on a fact-specific basis. There are, however, several categories of these interests that emerge from the case law, including property interests, contract interests, and other protected interests.
" Legally protected interest" has been defined by Black's Law Dictionary as " [a] property interest that the law will protect against impairment or destruction, whether in law or in equity." Black's Law Dictionary (10th Ed. 2014). Further, a " legal interest" has been defined as " [a]n interest that has its origins in the principles, standards, and rules developed by courts of law as opposed to courts of chancery . . . [a]n interest recognized by law, such as legal title" Black's Law Dictionary, supra .
See, e.g., Erisoty's Appeal from Probate, 216 Conn. 514, 521-22, 582 A.2d 760 (1990) (holding that person ordered to provide blood samples for paternity procedures was aggrieved by such order); Connecticut State Medical Society v. Connecticut Board of Examiners in Podiatry, 203 Conn. 295, 300-01, 524 A.2d 636 (1987) (holding that physician had " a specific personal and legal interest" in his license to practice medicine); Huck v Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Agency, 203 Conn. 525, 530, 525 A.2d 940 (1987) (" plaintiff's status as owner of the property establishes that she has a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision." [Internal quotation marks omitted.]); Cach, LLC v. Sninsky, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. CV-11-6007758-S, (March 8, 2013, Iannotti, J.) (holding that assignee of contract had standing to pursue rights under contract). As noted by the court in Maloney v. Taplin, 154 Conn 247, 250, 224 A.2d 731 (1966), overruled on other grounds by In re Baskin's Appeal from Probate, 194 Conn. 635, 484 A.2d 934 (1984), " [t]he qualifying interest may be a direct pecuniary one, or it may consist of an injurious effect upon some legally protected right or status of the appellant, such as the effect which a decree of adoption has on the natural parent of the adopted child."
The court begins its analysis in the present case with the proposition that a foster parent (using that term in contrast to a " preadoptive parent" who has been told a child will be placed permanently with her or him) does not have a legally protected interest, under either the United States constitution or state law, to continued placement of a foster child residing with that person. See Nye v. Marcus, 198 Conn. 138, 142-46, 502 A.2d 869 (1985), superseded by statute as stated in Terese B. v. Commissioner of Children & Families, 68 Conn.App. 223, 230 n.10, 789 A.2d 1114 (2002); see also Terese B. v. Commissioner of Children & Families, supra, 68 Conn.App. 230-31. In Nye, foster parents were found not to have classical standing to bring a habeas corpus action to maintain custody of a child for whom the Commissioner has been appointed statutory parent. Nye v. Marcus, supra, 198 Conn. 139-40, 142-46. In Terese B., foster parents were found not to have standing to appeal an administrative decision to remove a child, for whom the Commissioner was statutory parent, from their home. Terese B. v. Commissioner of Children & Families, supra, 224, 229-31. The logic of both those decisions is that " the expectations and entitlements of foster families can be limited by the state"; Nye v. Marcus, supra, 143; and that foster parents are entrusted with foster children on a temporary basis only and do not enjoy a liberty interest in the " integrity of their family unit." Id., 144.
As has been noted elsewhere, § 52-466(f) was enacted in response to the decision in Nye, and now confers statutory standing on certain foster and preadoptive parents. See Terese B. v. Commissioner of Children & Families, supra, 230 n.10.
In In re Baby Girl B., the Supreme Court did acknowledge that a " preadoptive parent, " as the movant claims to be (or have been), may " occupy a different legal status than foster parents . . . At best, such differentiated status may be significant with regard to issues relating to the future disposition of the child, such as custody and removal of the child from the prospective adoptive home." In re Baby Girl B., supra, 224 Conn. 276. Hence, our courts have recognized that foster and preadoptive parents may have a proper role in the dispositional phase of a child protection case, and In re Baby Girl B. has been cited by the Appellate Court as one basis for allowing such intervention in the dispositional phase. See In re Vincent D., 65 Conn.App. 658, 665-66, 783 A.2d 534 (2001). As the court in In re Vincent D. noted, " [i]t would serve no purpose to preclude persons with significant knowledge of and experience with the child from assisting the court's determination of the placement that best protects the best interest of the child." Id., 666.
No court has found, however, that such a " differentiated status" gives a preadoptive parent standing to seek judicial relief after termination of parental rights or creates a " legally protected interest" so as to meet the first requirement for classical aggrievement. Since the movant does not claim any statutory right has been invaded by the department's actions, the only other source for a " legally protected interest" would appear to be the Connecticut or United States constitutions, and some courts have, under certain circumstances recognized that preadoptive parents have a limited liberty interest in maintaining placement. See, e.g., Thelen v. Catholic Social Services, 691 F.Supp. 1179, 1185 (E.D.Wis. 1988) (" [I]n the context of Wisconsin law, the prospective adoptive couple has a limited, but not wholly insignificant, constitutionally protected liberty interest in their family unit during the initial six-month period that a child is placed in their home") (cited by In re Baby Girl B., supra, 224 Conn. 276). As the movant here has specifically disclaimed any protected liberty interest under Connecticut law, however, the court can find no " legally protected interest" that would afford her classical aggrievement. The court thus concludes that she does not have standing to intervene in this proceeding--following termination of parental rights and appointment of a statutory parent--in order to seek custody or guardianship or to prevent removal or adoption of the child. Such lack of standing on her part deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction to consider her motion.
II
STANDING TO OPEN THE JUDGMENT AND SEEK ORDERS IN THE DISPOSITIONAL PHASE
The movant's other claim for intervention is rather interesting. Her motion and memoranda assert that, before the February 17, 2016, hearing on the coterminous petitions, DCF representatives told her the following:
That " the manner by which this baby [Addison] was brought to the hospital . . . was very similar to a 'safe haven' baby in December 2014 who . . . had also been dropped off" at the same hospital as Addison;
That before the baby was placed in her home, the department had discussed the idea of doing genetic testing of the two babies " and that DCF did not think it was a good idea";
That after the baby was placed with the movant, a DCF social worker told her that a DNA test would be conducted on the two children;
That when asked the purpose of the DNA testing, the DCF social worker told her that " it was important for the child to know if they had a sibling for medical reasons (e.g.[, ] bone marrow transplant)"; and
When the movant asked " if she was going to lose the baby, " she " was told that she would not lose the baby.
Movant's Amended Motion to Intervene, paragraphs 6, 9-14.
She further asserts that, at the hearing on the coterminous petitions, DCF asked for the baby's name to be changed to her last name and that, when this judge asked what would happen if DNA testing confirmed a genetic relationship between the two safe haven babies, DCF informed the court " that it would be the Department's intent to advocate for sibling visits." Movant's Amended Motion to Intervene, supra, paragraph 19.
The court further takes judicial notice of the following events at that hearing. Before the presentation of any evidence at that hearing, counsel for the department asked the court, in front of the movant (who was present at the court hearing), to change the child's last name to that of the movant's " in order to expedite any subsequent adoptions." Hearing on Coterminous Petitions Transcript, 5 (February 17, 2016). As further explanation for the request, counsel for the department stated, " we just ask that that name change occur so there's less barriers to overcome in order to process the adoption as quickly as possible." Hearing on Coterminous Petitions Transcript, supra, 5. Further, counsel for the department said to the court that " [t]he child is in a pre-adoptive home, " while the child's attorney told the court that she had visited " the child twice in the pre-adoptive home." Hearing on Coterminous Petitions Transcript, supra, 6.
In the amended motion to intervene and during oral argument on the motions, the movant's attorney asserted that Ms. L. " relied on these replies" and had been induced, or misled, by the various representations made to her or in front of her by DCF to believe that the placement of Addison with her would not be jeopardized by the DNA results, even if the other safe haven baby was determined to be her biological sister. The amended motion and her attorney have further asserted that, had she not been so misled, she would have sought to intervene in the dispositional phase of the neglect proceeding to seek guardianship of the minor child.
As noted above, Practice Book § 35a-4(c) does permit nonrelatives, such as the movant here, to seek to intervene in the dispositional phase of a child protection case. The movant asserts that she was induced to forego that opportunity by the representations made by DCF before the dispositional phase of this proceeding. The question this case raises is whether a nonrelative has standing, at this stage in the matter, to intervene to open the TPR judgment in order to seek to intervene in the dispositional phase of the proceeding to seek such orders.
The movant's standing to seek to open a judgment to which she was not a party, however, is problematic. The general rule is that someone not party to a judgment does not have standing to move to open that judgment. See M.U.N. Capital, LLC v. National Hall Properties, LLC, 163 Conn.App. 372, 376 (2016). In M.U.N. Capital, LLC, the Appellate Court dismissed an appeal by a nonparty to a judgment because the appellant was not aggrieved by that judgment. Id. Our courts have recognized, however, that a non party aggrieved by a judgment may have standing to appeal that judgment. See In re Miriam A., Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. D03-CP11-002826-A (September 2, 2011, Sommer, J.) . In In re Miriam A., the state was found to have standing to appeal a TPR judgment to which it had not been a party regarding a child who had been the beneficiary of public assistance payments because of the possible impact of a TPR judgment on the state purse:
Subject matter jurisdiction to open the judgment, however, is not an issue. The court has statutory jurisdiction to open TPR judgments pursuant to § 45a-719 and § 52-212a. The former provides, in pertinent part, as follows: " The court may grant a motion to open or set aside a judgment terminating parental rights pursuant to section 52-212 or 52-212a or pursuant to common law or may grant a petition for a new trial on the issue of the termination of parental rights, provided the court shall consider the best interest of the child . . ." The latter provides, in pertinent part, as follows: " Unless otherwise provided by law and except in such cases in which the court has continuing jurisdiction, a civil judgment or decree rendered in the Superior Court may not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside is filed within four months following the date on which it was rendered or passed." In addition, § 45a-719 expressly allows the physical custodian of a child to " provide evidence to the court concerning the best interest of the child at any hearing held on the motion to reopen or set aside a judgment terminating parental rights."
General Statutes § 45-288 provides that any person aggrieved by any order or decree of a probate court may appeal therefrom to the Superior Court . . . In determining whether a party is aggrieved, the test is whether there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest that he has in the estate has been adversely affected . . . The qualifying interest may be a direct pecuniary one, or it may consist of an injurious effect upon some legally protected right or status of the appellant . . . The interest of the state extends beyond any right to reimbursement of court ordered child support. The state has a fundamental responsibility to assure that children receive the benefits to which they are entitled from their parents.(Citations omitted.) Id.
The same logic would seem to apply to here. In determining whether the movant has standing to intervene in order to move to open the TPR judgment, the question is whether she was aggrieved by that judgment. The answer to that question lies in whether she had a legally protected interest adversely affected by that judgment. " Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest . . . has been adversely affected." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United Cable TV Servs. Corp. v. Department of Pub. Util. Control, 235 Conn. 334, 343, 663 A.2d 1011 (1995). Although the Practice Book may permit nonrelatives to request permissive intervention in the dispositional phase of a child protection case is such an interest, the subject matter of the case involving this child was, as has been held in numerous cases considering intervention in TPR proceedings, whether to terminate the parental rights of the child's natural parents, not who should have custody or guardianship the child. Thus, for example, in In re Ryan V., 46 Conn.App. 69, 76, 698 A.2d 371 (1997), the Appellate Court held that a grandmother who wanted to adopt a child lacked standing to intervene in a TPR proceeding because she had " no legal interest in the action to terminate parental rights . . . [and] no real interest in the action in which she attempted to intervene . . ." Similarly, in In re Denzel A., 53 Conn.App. 827, 835, 733 A.2d 298 (1999), the court held that " [t]he purpose of the intervention of a grandparent in a [TPR] case does not include the right to effect an adoption or to obtain custody for the grandparent but is solely for the purpose of affecting the termination itself." The court thus concludes that Ms. L. has no " legally protected interest" in the subject matter of the TPR proceeding that she seeks to open and, therefore, no standing based on the doctrine of classical aggrievement to seek to intervene for the purposes of moving to open that judgment.
III
PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION
Even if the court did have subject matter jurisdiction to consider Ms. L.'s motion to intervene; see In re Ryan V., supra, 46 Conn.App. 75-76; intervention would not be warranted here, based on an examination of the factors set forth in Horton v. Meskill, 187 Conn. 187, 197, 445 A.2d 579 (1982), and encoded in our law, in determining whether to grant the permissive intervention. The factors set forth in Horton are " the proposed intervenor's interests in the controversy, the adequacy of representation of such interests by existing parties, the delay in the proceedings or other prejudice to the existing parties the intervention may cause, and the necessity for or value of the intervention in terms of resolving the controversy before the court." Horton v. Meskill, supra, 197. These factors are closely tracked by the factors set forth in Practice Book § 35a-4(d) for considering a motion for permissive intervention, as noted in the margin below.
In In re Ryan V., the court found that the grandmother lacked standing to intervene, but then also considered the substantive merits of intervention. Id., 75-76. In a child protection case seeking to provide a child with permanency, it seems prudent to consider both jurisdictional and substantive issues together to avoid further delay in permanency.
See Practice Book § 35a-4(d), which provides as follows: " In making a determination upon a motion to intervene, the judicial authority may consider: the timeliness of the motion as judged by the circumstances of the case; whether the movant has a direct and immediate interest in the case; whether the movant's interest is not adequately represented by existing parties; whether the intervention may cause delay in the proceedings or other prejudice to the existing parties; the necessity for or value of the intervention in terms of resolving the controversy before the judicial authority; and the best interests of the child."
In the present case, the movant did not have a direct interest in the adjudicatory decisions of whether the child had been neglected or whether a statutory basis existed for terminating parental rights. Further, although § 46b-129(p) may have afforded her a right to be heard and comment on the best interests of the child, she had no legally protected interest in the decision to terminate parental rights. Thus, she had no legal right or legally protected interest that was adversely affected by the neglect adjudication or the TPR judgment. In that respect, the case of In re Joshua S., 127 Conn.App. 723, 725-26, 14 A.3d 1076 (2011), is instructive: foster parents there sought to intervene to prevent a transfer of guardianship to the child's maternal relatives. In holding that they did not have a sufficient interest in the proceeding, the court stated that:
Our Supreme Court has stated that a person or entity does not have a sufficient interest to qualify for the right to intervene merely because an impending judgment will have some effect on him, her, or it. The judgment to be rendered must affect the proposed intervenor's direct or personal rights, not those of another . . . Here, the purpose of the proceedings into which the foster parents sought to intervene was to determine the guardianship of Joshua S. after a finding of neglect. Thus, the judgment affected the rights of Joshua S., and perhaps his parents, not the rights of the foster parents. Although the court's determination regarding the guardianship of Joshua S. likely affected the foster parents emotionally, it did not affect any direct or personal rights held by them as a matter of law. It is well established that [f]oster families do not have the same rights as biological families or adoptive families.(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 729. Although the dispositive issue in that case was whether the foster parents had a colorable claim to intervention as a matter of right; id., 728; the court's remarks are telling on the strength of Ms. L.'s interest in the judgment here.
Further, in In re Ryan V., where the court rejected the claim of a grandmother that she had improperly been denied intervention in a TPR proceeding, the court noted that the grandmother " did not seek intervention to argue whether the mother's parental rights should have been terminated. Rather, she sought to argue that she should be awarded custody or be allowed to adopt." In re Ryan V., supra, 46 Conn.App. 73. Similarly, in In re Denzel A., court found that the grandparents had properly been denied intervention status:
After the statutory grounds for termination are proved by clear and convincing evidence in an adjudicatory phase, the question then to be decided in a dispositional phase is whether it is in the best interests of the child to sever the parent-child relationship. That is different from the question of who should have custody of the child if termination of parental rights is determined to be in the best interests of the child.
The only reason in this case not to sever the parent-child relationship would be if the severance would ensure that Denzel could reside with his grandmother. Where he should reside and with whom, however, are not questions that relate to whether it is in his best interests to terminate his relationship with his parents. It bears emphasis that a judicial termination of parental rights may not be premised on a determination that it would be in the child's best interests to terminate the parent's rights in order to substitute another, more suitable set of adoptive parents. The purpose of the intervention of a grandparent in a termination of parental rights case does not include the right to effect an adoption or to obtain custody for the grandparent but is solely for the purpose of affecting the termination itself.(Citations omitted; emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal quotations omitted.) In re Denzel A., supra, 53 Conn.App. 834-35. Based on the movant's argument here that she would have sought to intervene to seek guardianship during the dispositional phase, it is clear that the real purpose of any intervention here would not have been to oppose termination of the parental rights of the unknown parents who had abandoned the child, but rather to seek custody of the child once placed by DCF in her household.
The next factor concerns whether Ms. L.'s interests were adequately represented by other parties to the proceeding; and her claim is stronger with regard to this factor. The child may have had mixed interests, both in maintaining any bond of affection and attachment she has developed with Ms. L. in the only home she had known since leaving the hospital shortly after birth, but also in permanency. The movant's counsel has stated that she would have sought intervention in the dispositional phase of the neglect proceeding to seek guardianship of the child, but guardianship is an inherently impermanent disposition since it may be modified at any time. In fact, that was the only relief Ms. L. could have sought in the dispositional phase, since, as numerous cases have held, an intervenor in the dispositional phase cannot in that proceeding seek adoption or post-TPR placement. The child's interest in permanency, however, could only be achieved by a TPR judgment, which would free her for the permanency afforded by adoption. Hence, the movant's interests were not adequately represented by others to the proceeding.
The next Horton factor is delay in the proceedings or prejudice to other parties, and it weighs heavily against allowing intervention either to delay the permanency plans of the department for adoption by the child in another family or to open the TPR judgment for the purposes of allowing Ms. L. to seek guardianship of the child. The child is now eligible for permanency by adoption, but allowing intervention by Ms. L. would necessarily delay any such adoption, as well as defeat the child's interest in permanency if guardianship were to be granted.
The final Horton factor is the necessity for or value of the intervention in terms of resolving the controversy before the court, and this too weighs heavily against allowing intervention. As has been noted many times, one of the primary goals of our child protection system is to provide a child with permanency, in the home of the child's parents if they can assume a responsible position in the child's life in a reasonable time, in the home of relatives if they can be located and assume such a position in a reasonable time, or in an adoptive home if neither parent nor kin can meet the child's need for permanency in a reasonable time. Practice Book § 35a-4(d) thus includes " the best interests of the child" among the factors that a court should consider in deciding whether to grant intervention in the dispositional phase of a child protection case. Intervention would do nothing to resolve the controversy before the court, which was whether Addison had been neglected and whether the parental rights of her natural parents should be terminated.
See, e.g., In re Juvenile Appeal, 187 Conn. 431, 439-40, 446 A.2d 808 (1982): " The government's function in seeking to terminate parental rights and place a child in an adoptive home is an aspect of its role as parens patriae It is important to note in this relation that the ultimate standard underlying the whole statutory scheme regulating child welfare is the 'best interest of the child. The public policy of this state as enunciated in General Statutes § 17-38a(a) is to protect children whose health and welfare may be adversely affected through injury and neglect to provide a temporary or permanent nurturing and safe environment for children when necessary. Time is of the essence in child custody cases. This furthers the express public policy of this state to provide all of its children a safe, stable nurturing environment. When the child whose interest is to be protected is very young, delay in adjudication imposes a particularly serious cost on governmental functioning." (Citations omitted, quotation marks omitted; internal alterations omitted.); see also In re Andrew C., Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, Judicial District of Hartford, docket no H12CP11013647A (April 19, 2011, Keller, J.): The" paramount purpose of our termination of parental rights and adoption laws is the compelling interest in locating a stable and permanent home for a child in a timely fashion . . . At the point that a judgment terminating parental rights is determined to be in the best interest of a child, achieving permanency, preferably adoption for that child whenever possible, is the paramount goal of the department in its role as statutory parent."
In balancing these factors, the court concludes, in the exercise of its discretion, not to permit intervention here. Although the movant may have foregone an opportunity to seek intervention in the dispositional phase of the coterminous neglect and TPR proceeding, any such intervention could only have sought relief that would have been contrary to the child's interest in permanency. Returning the child, preventing an adoption, allowing further proceedings here, or opening the judgment would all cause significant delay in obtaining permanency. It is, moreover, for that reason, virtually certain that an award of guardianship to Ms. L. would never have been granted, as it would have run contrary to the stated goals of child protection system of providing a child with permanency, either back in the parental home, with relatives, or by adoption out of the family.
One of the factors established by Practice Book § 35a-4(d) for deciding permissive intervention in the dispositional phase of a proceeding is " the timeliness of the motion as judged by the circumstances of the case . . ." This factor is probably not fully represented by the Horton factors. Here, Ms. L.'s motion to intervene was untimely, since it was brought after the TPR judgment, but, based on the facts alleged in her motion and other pleadings, that untimeliness is directly the result of DCF's change in position regarding the child's placement in her home. Under the " circumstances of the case, " the court does not find this factor to weigh against the movant's motion to intervene.
IV
CONCLUSION
The movant has sought to intervene in this proceeding for multiple purposes: to keep the minor child in, or return the child to, her home; to effect a stay in adoption proceedings with any other family; and to open the TPR judgment in order to seek guardianship of the child. She has no standing to seek the first or second relief sought, which the Superior Court also has no subject matter jurisdiction to grant. Further, while the court may have subject matter jurisdiction to open a TPR judgment generally, Ms. L. lacks standing to intervene here for the purposes of moving to open that judgment. Finally, even if the court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider Ms. L.'s motion to intervene or she had standing to request intervention, such intervention would not be warranted here, based on the court's analysis of the Horton and Practice Book factors. The motion to intervene is therefore DENIED.
The child's attorney notified the court on April 6, 2016, that in two days she intended to withdraw her request for that hearing, and her notice to the court of that withdrawal further stated that it was the department's intention to remove the child from Ms. L.'s home after the conclusion of court on April 11 (assuming that no court order preventing such a removal entered on that day). On April 11, the court notified the participants in these proceedings that it did not intend to issue an oral decision that day, but would later issue a written decision. The court also denied the oral motion of Ms. L.'s counsel for a temporary order staying any removal of the child until issuance of the court's decision. The amended motion to intervene filed on May 2, 2016, asserts that the child has now been removed from her care. Ms. L. will sometimes be referred to in this decision as " the movant" or " the moving party" in view of the fact that the child no longer resides with her.
The juvenile rules were modified extensively as of October 1, 1993. Newly-adopted Practice Book § 1023.1, however, still authorized broad discretionary intervention to " promote the interests of justice" Practice Book (1993) § 1023.1(k) (now § 26-1(j)). The term " equitable party at interest" in subsection (2) was changed, however, to " legal party, " and a new subsection (3) was added defining an " intervening party." Practice Book (1993) § 1023.1(k) (now § 26-1(j)). The pertinent portions of Practice Book (1993) § 1023.1(k) (now § 26-1(j)) provided as follows: " 'Parties' includes: . . . (2) 'Legal party': Any person, including a parent, whose legal relationship to the matter pending before the court is of such a nature and kind as to mandate the receipt of proper legal notice as a condition precedent to the establishment of the court's authority to adjudicate the matter pending before it; and (3) 'Intervening party': Any person whose interest in the matter before the court is not of such a nature and kind as to entitle legal service as a prerequisite to the court's authority to adjudicate the matter pending before it but whose participation therein, at the discretion of the court, may promote the interests of justice. This definition may include but is not limited to any father or mother, natural, adoptive or putative, or any defacto custodian. An 'intervening party' may in any proceeding before the court be given notice thereof in any manner reasonably appropriate to that end, but no such 'intervening party' shall be entitled, as a matter of right, to provision of counsel by the court."
Public Acts 2007, No. 07-174, § 3 rewrote this section to its present form, now codified at § 46b-129 (p), as follows. " A foster parent, prospective adoptive parent or relative caregiver shall receive notice and have the right to be heard for the purposes of this section in Superior Court in any proceeding concerning a foster child living with such foster parent, prospective adoptive parent or relative caregiver. A foster parent, prospective adoptive parent or relative caregiver who has cared for a child or youth shall have the right to be heard and comment on the best interests of such child or youth in any proceeding under this section which is brought not more than one year after the last day the foster parent, prospective adoptive parent or relative caregiver provided such care."
Practice Book § 35a-4, captioned " Motions to Intervene, " provides, in pertinent part, as follows: " (c) Other persons unrelated to the child or youth by blood or marriage, or persons related to the child or youth by blood or marriage who are not seeking to serve as a placement, temporary custodian or guardian of the child may move to intervene in the dispositional phase of the case, and the judicial authority may grant said motion if it determines that such intervention is in the best interest of the child or youth or in the interests of justice."
General Statutes § 52-107, captioned " Additional parties may be summoned in, " provides as follows: " The court may determine the controversy as between the parties before it, if it can do so without prejudice to the rights of others; but, if a complete determination cannot be had without the presence of other parties, the court may direct that such other parties be brought in. If a person not a party has an interest or title which the judgment will affect, the court, on his application, shall direct him to be made a party." General Statutes § 52-108, captioned " Nonjoinder and misjoinder of parties, " provides as follows: " An action shall not be defeated by the nonjoinder or misjoinder of parties. New parties may be added and summoned in, and parties misjoined may be dropped, by order of the court, at any stage of the action, as the court deems the interests of justice require."
Practice Book § 9-18, captioned " Addition or Substitution of Parties, Additional Parties Summoned in by Court, " provides as follows " The judicial authority may determine the controversy as between the parties before it, if it can do so without prejudice to the rights of others; but, if a complete determination cannot be had without the presence of other parties, the judicial authority may direct that they be brought in. If a person not a party has an interest or title which the judgment will affect, the judicial authority, on its motion, shall direct that person to be made a party." Practice Book § 9-19, captioned " Nonjoinder and Misjoinder of Parties" provides as follows: " Except as provided in Sections 10-44 and 11-3 no action shall be defeated by the nonjoinder or misjoinder of parties. New parties may be added and summoned in, and parties misjoined may be dropped, by order of the judicial authority, at any stage of the cause, as it deems the interests of justice require."
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the sections in chapters 1 through 7 shall apply to juvenile matters in the superior court as defined by General Statutes § 46b-121. (b) The provisions of Sections 8-2, 9-5, 9-22, 10-12(a) and (c), 10-13, 10-14, 10-17, 10-18, 10-29, 10-62, 11-4, 11-5, 11-6, 11-7, 11-8, 11-10, 11-11, 11-12, 11-13, 12-1, 12-2, 12-3, 13-1 through 13-11 inclusive, 13-14, 13-16, 13-21 through 13-32 inclusive, subject to Section 34a-20, 15-3, 15-8, 17-4, and 17-21 of the rules of practice shall apply to juvenile matters in the civil session as defined by General Statutes § 46b-121.