Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County No. DP013066, Gary Bischoff, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Diana W. Prince, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Benjamin P. de Mayo, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Aurelio Torre, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
ARONSON, J.
Trisha B. (mother) appeals from an order of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights to Adam B., now age two. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26; all further undesignated section references are to this code.) Mother contends the juvenile court erred in finding Adam adoptable at the permanent plan selection and implementation hearing (.26 hearing). Mother argues the medical and developmental challenges Adam faced, some of which resulted from her alcohol consumption during pregnancy, made it “unlikely” anyone would adopt him. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1) [juvenile court must determine child is likely to be adopted before court may terminate parental rights].) The juvenile court, however, could reasonably reject mother’s conclusion, since a prospective adoptive couple stepped forward requesting Adam specifically, trained for months to welcome him into their home and, in the five months preceding the .26 hearing, made him an integral member of their family. We therefore affirm the juvenile court’s adoptability finding and the order terminating parental rights.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In February 2006, a San Bernardino County social worker detained two-month-old Adam for caretaker incapacity after mother, vomiting repeatedly, passed out due to alcohol intoxication, failed to feed her child, and awoke only to stumble away — still intoxicated — from the maternal grandmother’s home with Adam in her arms. Mother had struggled unsuccessfully with alcoholism for at least seven years. In 2001, she lost custody of a daughter when the juvenile court placed the girl with her father, who later proved to be Adam’s father as well. After mother entered a no-contest plea to the dependency petition concerning Adam, the juvenile court sustained jurisdiction for failure to protect or provide support. (§ 300, subds. (b) & (g).) The court then transferred the matter to Orange County based on mother’s Garden Grove residence.
Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) placed Adam in a foster care home for medically fragile infants. Doctors had diagnosed Adam at birth with porencephaly, reflux, and thrush. Porencephaly is a rare central nervous system disorder in which a cyst filled with cerebrospinal fluid develops in the brain. The prognosis ranges from minor neurological problems, with normal intelligence, to severe mental retardation. Only time would reveal Adam’s prospects. SSA learned mother drank alcohol throughout her pregnancy with Adam, and used methamphetamine during the first trimester.
The Children’s Hospital of Orange County admitted Adam in late February 2006 for failure to thrive and a low blood platelet count. He returned to the hospital twice in April 2006 but thereafter showed improvement. His medical problems remained daunting, however, including an underactive pituitary gland, a separate hormone condition marked by excessive thirst and production of diluted urine, “possible” fetal alcohol syndrome, and his history of failure to thrive, reflux, and porencephaly. At age six months, a battery of necessarily imprecise diagnostic tests yielded conflicting results, with one methodology suggesting, for instance, that Adam suffered no cognitive delays, while another put his cognitive age at 2 months. Adam’s assessment ranges proved similarly varied for gross motor skills, receptive and expressive communication, social and emotional development, and adaptivity and self-help.
Adam’s foster care mother noted progress in other areas: he began to sleep through the night, picked up objects and placed them in his mouth, held his own bottle, and started to pull himself up into a semi-standing position. The foster mother described Adam as a happy baby. Although he could become frustrated when learning new developmental tasks, he maintained a pleasant personality and was easy to comfort. In an interim review at age nine months, however, SSA concluded Adam’s medical condition and developmental delays rendered him “unadoptable” at that time.
But the agency did not give up. After the juvenile court terminated reunification services in October 2006, SSA recommended Adam for the Heart Gallery, a nationwide exhibit of professional photographs of children with unique needs who are waiting to be adopted. The juvenile court approved Adam for the project and, whether it was through the Heart Gallery or by some other means, a prospective adoptive couple soon stepped forward expressing interest in Adam.
The couple visited Adam between four and six times per week for months, and completed medical training specific to caring for his needs. The prospective adoptive mother drew on her ongoing, parttime employment as an instructional assistant for special education children. The couple recognized Adam’s challenges were significant, including blindness or near blindness resulting from underdevelopment of cortical nerves. The ophthalmologist explained the condition can be permanent or may improve and, in Adam’s case, noted promise in his ability to fixate his gaze and follow movement, holding out hope of some visual acuity.
Adam received in-home infant stimulation therapy to address both his visual impairment and developmental delays, which the agency estimated at more than 30 percent. He demonstrated progress in the therapy, working on tactile and visual tasks, such as taking objects out of a container, removing rings from a stacking toy, clapping his hands following cues, and vocalizing consonant-vowel combinations.
SSA placed Adam in the prospective adoptive couple’s home in March 2007. In multiple evaluations over the next five months before the .26 hearing, the social worker observed “[t]his placement remains appropriate and the caretakers have demonstrated an ability to meet the child’s needs.” The worker also noted, “The caretakers have committed to become the child’s adoptive family should parental rights be terminated . . . .” Concluding at the .26 hearing in August 2007 that Adam was likely to be adopted, the juvenile court terminated mother’s parental rights and she now appeals.
II
DISCUSSION
Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Adoptability Finding
Mother contends the juvenile court erred by finding Adam adoptable, a prerequisite to termination of parental rights. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) We review the juvenile court’s adoptability determination for substantial evidence. (In re Y.R. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 99, 112. (Y.R.).) In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must “presume in favor of the order, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) The juvenile court must find the child adoptable by clear and convincing evidence (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)), but no heightened standard of proof entitles us to second-guess the trial court’s determination. “‘“If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment. [Citation.]”’” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053-1054.) In short, if any credible evidence supports the juvenile court’s adoptability conclusion, we must uphold the finding. (In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 424-425.) Our review of the record confirms substantial evidence supporting Adam’s adoptability.
The juvenile court’s inquiry at the .26 hearing focuses on whether the child’s age, physical condition, or emotional state make it unlikely anyone will adopt the child within a reasonable time. (In re Carl R. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1061.) “[T]he fact that a prospective adoptive parent has expressed interest in adopting the minor is evidence that the minor’s age, physical condition, mental state, and other matters relating to the child are not likely to dissuade individuals from adopting the minor. In other words, a prospective adoptive parent’s willingness to adopt generally indicates the minor is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time either by the prospective adoptive parent or by some other family.” (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649-1650, original italics.)
Mother relies on our statement in In re Helen W. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 71, 80 (Helen W.), that, “[w]hen a child is deemed adoptable only because a particular care taker is willing to adopt, the analysis shifts from evaluating the characteristics of the child to whether there is any legal impediment to the prospective adoptive parent’s adoption and whether the he or she is able to meet the needs of the child.”
Mother points to the prospective adoptive father’s criminal conviction as an obstacle to adoption. The record does not reveal the nature of the conviction, but the standard of review requires us to presume it was minor, since SSA granted the father an exemption in February 2007, long before the .26 hearing. Mother correctly points out the juvenile court, not SSA, ultimately bears responsibility for determining what constitutes a disqualifying impediment, but we conclude her complaint is forfeited here. A party may not “sit back and acquiesce in the procedure used, await a . . . verdict,” and then assert error for the first time on appeal. (People v. Rhoades (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1126.) Mother knew of SSA’s exemption but failed to pursue the matter with the juvenile court for a contrary ruling; her claim therefore fails. (Ibid.)
Mother also relies on the fact that SSA’s home study evaluating the couple’s new, out-of-county residence was still in progress at the time of the .26 hearing. The social worker acknowledged in her report that “the criminal record clearance specific to the adoptive home study has not yet been completed.” The standard of review, however, is again dispositive. The juvenile court could reasonably conclude the criminal record clearance SSA already performed was sufficient, since it was unlikely a disqualifying conviction would only show up under the couple’s new address and not elsewhere in their record.
Here, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude the prospective adoptive parents, like the parent in Helen W., were capable of meeting the child’s needs. There, we noted the prospective parent “was financially secure[,] emotionally mature, and fully understood the responsibilities of adoption.” (Helen W., supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 80.) Here, because SSA explained the responsibilities of adoption to the couple and they not only trained for months to receive Adam into their home but actually cared for him for several months thereafter, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude they understood the challenges they faced in caring for Adam. Their decision to move to a large home with “plenty of space for [Adam] to grow and develop” demonstrated emotional maturity in thinking ahead to provide for his needs, plus the financial wherewithal to do so. The prospective father’s ability to maintain a positive, communicative relationship with his ex-wife to raise their seven-year-old son also demonstrated valuable parenting experience, emotional maturity, and the promise of a sibling relationship for Adam. The prospective adoptive mother’s experience working in special education also contributed to Adam’s financial security, in addition to showing attributes of compassion, patience, maturity, and professional training benefiting Adam.
Mother attacks the juvenile court’s conclusion on grounds the couple had only been married a year. Mother also notes Adam faces an uncertain future based on his medical and developmental challenges. As the social worker observed, however, the couple had dated for years before they married and had demonstrated the requisite enthusiasm and energy for raising a special-needs child. They also enjoyed multigenerational support, having “extended family and friends . . . supportive of this adoption and . . . available for help if needed.” As to the always uncertain future, as in Y.R., the couple’s reaffirmed adoption commitment “constitutes substantial evidence they would likely adopt [Adam]” and “demonstrated any challenges [he] presented were not likely to dissuade others from adopting [him].” (Y.R., supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 113.) In sum, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s adoptability conclusion.
III
DISPOSITION
The order finding Adam adoptable and terminating mother’s parental rights is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J. O’LEARY, J.