Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County No. DL027561, Gregory W. Jones, Judge.
Rex Williams, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Gil Gonzalez and Pamela Ratner Sobeck, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P.J.
Defendant, A.D., appeals from orders adjudging him a continued ward of the court upon findings that he committed misdemeanor battery on a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (b); count 1); misdemeanor assault on a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 241, subd. (c); count 2); and resisting a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1); count 3). Defendant was committed to juvenile hall for 180 days, receiving 59 days’ credit for time previously served. He contends there was insufficient evidence to support the true findings there was reasonable suspicion justifying his detention and the victim was a peace officer. We disagree with these contentions and therefore affirm the judgment.
Defendant also argues, and the Attorney General concurs, that the true findings on count 3 should be stricken as a lesser included offense of count 2. We agree with this contention and order the true findings on count 3 be stricken. Because the court found counts 2 and 3 merged pursuant to Penal Code section 654, this does not affect the sentencing.
FACTS
In response to a radio call, police sergeant Sean Quinn went to an apartment building to look for defendant who could have been under the influence of drugs and fighting with family members. The dispatcher described 16-year-old defendant as a Hispanic male, 5 feet 7 inches tall, dressed in a white T-shirt and gray shorts, and identified as “A.”
Quinn wore a uniform and was driving a marked patrol car. As he approached the apartment complex, he received information that defendant had left but was returning. Quinn stopped in front of the building and saw defendant, who matched the physical description given, along with two other males walking around the side of the building into an alley.
After Quinn pulled his patrol car behind them and shone his spotlight on them, he ordered the group to stop as he stepped out of the car. Defendant’s companions obeyed and explained they were trying to take defendant away from his family. Defendant ignored Quinn’s repeated commands to stop, despite the fact that Quinn identified himself as “police, ” and rapidly walked away. Running, Quinn caught up to him at the front door of defendant’s residence where several people had gathered. When Quinn asked the group if defendant was “A, ” someone confirmed defendant’s identity.
At that point, concerned that if defendant entered the apartment he might get a weapon or hurt someone, Quinn began to pull defendant away. Defendant resisted and swung at Quinn, but missed. At that time, uniformed officer Adling, also responding to the radio call, ran towards the apartment to assist. Defendant hit him in the face. After a struggle, defendant was arrested.
DISCUSSION
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant contends the record contains insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s true findings on all counts. On appeal, defendant bears “a heavy burden in demonstrating that the evidence” is insufficient to sustain the judgment. (In re Ricky T. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1132, 1136.) In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, the court must review the entire record “‘in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence―that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value―such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 701.) If there is sufficient evidence, the judgment must be affirmed. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.)
a. Reasonable Suspicion to Detain Defendant
Defendant argues there is no evidence Quinn had a reasonable suspicion justifying the detention. He claims the detention was based on information from a vague, anonymous, and uncorroborated report that suggested no criminal activity. The record shows otherwise.
A detention is lawful when the detaining officer can articulate specific facts that, “considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity.” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231.) Moreover, a detention is not invalid merely because the offense has already ended. (United States v. Hensley (1985) 469 U.S. 221, 227-229 [105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604].) This standard is “less demanding than probable cause, ” not only because it “‘can be established with information that is different in quantity or content, ’” but also because it ‘“can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.”’ (People v. Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 230-231.)
In the instant case, the evidence shows Quinn was responding to the report of a disturbance where the person involved was possibly under the influence of drugs and fighting. Defendant concedes that being under the influence of illegal drugs is a crime. He nonetheless contends this does not raise a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity because Quinn neither observed him under the influence nor had reason to believe the drugs were prohibited.
But Quinn need not have observed the alleged criminal activity before detaining defendant. (See United States v. Hensley, supra, 469 U.S. at pp. 227-229; see also Brierton v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 499, 509 [reasonable suspicion does not require officer observe all elements of crime].) Moreover, that defendant’s actions may have also had a non-criminal explanation did not preclude investigation. (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 894.) In fact, the main purpose of police investigation is “‘to resolve that very ambiguity and establish whether the activity is in fact legal or illegal.... [Citation.]’” (People v. Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 233.) Because Quinn could have reasonably concluded that a reported person who was fighting with his family and was possibly under the influence of drugs was involved in criminal wrongdoing, his decision to detain defendant for further investigation was justified.
Contrary to defendant’s claim that no evidence established the source of the report to justify the detention, the record shows that it was his mother who made the report. In addition, defendant’s reliance on In re Eskiel S. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1638 to further contend Quinn did not have a reasonable suspicion for the detention because the report was vague and uncorroborated is misguided. There, the officer’s observations could not have sufficiently corroborated the information because an anonymous caller had described the people allegedly involved in a “‘possible’ criminal activity” only by race and had given only a “general ‘area’... as their location.” (Id. at p. 1644.)
Here, on the other hand, the evidence shows the description contained detailed identifying information, including defendant’s name, ethnicity, height, clothing, and residence. Quinn’s observations corroborated this information within minutes of his arrival at the apartment complex.
In addition, when Quinn asked defendant’s companions if defendant was “A, ” they responded that they were “just trying to take him away from his family.” Their answer thus confirmed the report that he had problems with his family. Moreover, when Quinn caught up with defendant in front of defendant’s apartment, his identity was further validated by a person from the group that had gathered there. This was sufficient to raise a reasonable suspicion to detain. (See People v. Johnson (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1315, 1320 [police officer’s corroborating observations of the defendant’s race, dress, age, and proximity to reported location sufficient to raise reasonable suspicion].)
Defendant’s evasive conduct at the time Quinn attempted to detain him also supports reasonable suspicion. (In re H.M. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 136, 144.) While a person “approached by police for questioning may decline to answer the questions, ... the manner in which the person avoids” the officer is relevant. (People v. Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 234.)
Here, when Quinn pulled his marked patrol car behind defendant and put on the spotlight, defendant continued to walk away even when his companions stopped. Moreover, he quickened his pace and repeatedly ignored Quinn’s instructions to stop, despite the fact that Quinn had identified himself as “police.” This evasive behavior could have reasonably shown “consciousness of guilt” further justifying the detention, because flight at the sight of a uniformed police officer “shows not only unwillingness to [be] question[ed] but also unwillingness to be observed and possibly identified....” (People v. Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 234-235.) Therefore, there is sufficient evidence showing that under the totality of the circumstances Quinn had a reasonable suspicion to detain defendant and the findings must be sustained.
b. Officer Adling
Defendant concedes Adling was known as “Officer Adling” and wore a uniform similar to Quinn’s. Citing sections 830 and 830.1, subdivision (a) of the Penal Code, defendant acknowledges city police officers are peace officers. He nonetheless contends the court’s true findings on count 1, battery on a peace officer, should be reversed because there is no evidence Adling was a peace officer.
Contrary to defendant’s claim, the record shows that Adling was a police officer with the Tustin Police Department. Adling responded to the same radio call to which Quinn responded with respect to defendant and assisted Quinn in arresting defendant. In addition, Adling filed a probable cause declaration with the Orange County Probation Department following defendant’s arrest. It stated Adling, one of the arresting officers, was employed by the Tustin Police Department. Further, defendant’s father, who was present at the scene of arrest, recognized at the time Adling was a “policeman.” In light of the evidence, the court’s true findings on battery on a peace officer must be sustained.
2. Lesser Included Offense
Defendant contends count 3, resisting or obstructing a peace officer, should be stricken because it is a lesser included offense of count 2, assault on a peace officer. Based on the facts of this case, the Attorney General concedes defendant was guilty of but a single course of conduct with respect to counts 2 and 3. We agree and therefore order the true findings on count 3 be stricken. Because the court found counts 2 and 3 merged pursuant to Penal Code section 654, this does not affect the sentencing.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court is directed to strike count 3 and the judgment is otherwise affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BEDSWORTH, J., MOORE, J.