Opinion
J-S07039-17 No. 1475 MDA 2016 No. 1476 MDA 2016 No. 1477 MDA 2016 No. 1478 MDA 2016
03-13-2017
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.C.J.P., a Minor APPEAL OF: Q.P., Mother IN THE INTEREST OF: A.J.P., a Minor APPEAL OF: Q.P., Mother IN THE INTEREST OF: A.M.P., a Minor APPEAL OF: Q.P., Mother IN THE INTEREST OF: A.W.P., a Minor APPEAL OF: Q.P., Mother
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order entered August 16, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, Orphans' Court at No(s): 104 AD 2015/CP-22-DP-314-2008 Appeal from the Order entered August 16, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, Orphans' Court at No(s): 105 AD 2015/CP-22-DP-67-2013 Appeal from the Order entered August 16, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, Orphans' Court at No(s): 106 AD 2015, CP-22-DP-68-2013 Appeal from the Order entered August 16, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, Orphans' Court at No(s): 107 AD 2015/CP-22-DP-90-2015 BEFORE: BOWES, LAZARUS and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:
In these consolidated appeals, Q.P. ("Mother") appeals from the Orders terminating her parental rights to A.C.J.P. (born in 2008), A.J.P. (born in 2010), A.M.P. (born in 2012), and A.W.P. (born in 2014) (collectively "the Children"), pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), and changing their permanency goals to adoption. We affirm.
In separate Decrees entered on August 16, 2016, the trial court also terminated the parental rights of the unknown father of A.C.J.P.; the biological father of A.J.P., N.M.; and the biological father of A.M.P. and A.W.P., M.T. None of these fathers filed an appeal, nor are they parties to the instant appeal.
The three older Children, A.C.J.P., A.J.P., and A.M.P., came into the care of Dauphin County Social Services for Children and Youth ("DCSSCY" or the "Agency") in September 2013. The youngest child, A.W.P., was placed in Agency care and custody in April 2015. On December 21, 2015, DCSSCY filed Petitions (collectively, "the ITPR Petitions") to involuntarily terminate Mother's parental rights to the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). The trial court held an evidentiary hearing (hereinafter "the termination hearing") on the ITPR Petitions on August 16, 2016.
The trial court set forth in its Opinion the relevant evidence adduced at the termination hearing. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/13/16, at 1-5. We adopt the trial court's recitation as though fully set forth herein. See id.
On August 16, 2016, the trial court entered the Orders involuntarily terminating Mother's parental rights to the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). Mother filed separate, timely Notices of Appeal from the Orders, along with Concise Statements of errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). Thereafter, this Court, sua sponte, consolidated the appeals.
On appeal, Mother presents the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it involuntarily terminated Mother's parental rights?Mother's Brief at 15 (capitalization omitted; issues renumbered for ease of disposition).
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it determined to change the [Children's] goal from reunification to adoption?
In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we adhere to the following standard:
appellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard when considering a trial court's determination of a petition for termination of parental rights. ... [O]ur standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., [] 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; [ In re ] R.I.S., 36 A.3d [567, 572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality opinion)]. As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America , Inc., [] 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011); Christianson v. Ely , [] 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012).
As [the Supreme Court] discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment; instead[,] we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record and the court's legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio , [] 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).
The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). "[T]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue." Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
This Court may affirm a trial court's decision regarding the termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 2511(a), along with a consideration of section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). In the instant case, we will focus on section 2511(a)(8) and (b), which provide as follows:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.-- The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
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(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
* * *
(b) Other considerations.-- The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8), (b).
The party seeking termination under section 2511(a)(8) must prove the following by clear and convincing evidence: "(1) the child has been removed from parental care for 12 months or more from the date of removal; (2) the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child." In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1118 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). "Termination under section 2511(a)(8) does not require the court to evaluate a parent's current willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that initially caused placement or the availability or efficacy of Agency services." Id. (citation omitted).
Here, Mother argues that the Agency failed to meet the requirements of subsection 2511(a)(8) by clear and convincing evidence because "[t]he conditions that led to the [C]hildren being [placed] in care ha[ve] been remedied." Mother's Brief at 30. Specifically, Mother contends that
[s]ince November [] 2015, eleven [] months prior to the [termination] hearing ..., Mother was actively pursuing her sobriety through a series of residential drug and alcohol treatment facilities. The Agency never had an issue with Mother's parenting skills. The only issue that existed at the time [that] the [C]hildren were dependent was Mother's sobriety. It is clear from the testimony presented, that Mother had remained clean and sober since she entered into the residential treatment facility in November 2015.Id. at 27 (citations to record omitted). Mother contends that "[t]he termination of [her] parental right[s] would not serve the needs and welfare of the [C]hildren, because Mother was sober and could have cared for [the C]hildren months prior to the [termination] hearing." Id. According to Mother, "the reason why the[] [C]hildren were dependent for thirty-five [] months was because Mother was making significant progress toward her objectives." Id. at 25.
The trial court set forth in its Opinion its reasons for determining that the Agency presented clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother's parental rights was proper under section 2511(a)(8). See Trial Court Opinion, 10/13/16, at 9-10; see also id. at 6 (stating that "the [three] oldest [C]hildren have endured a lack of permanency for nearly three years and [A.W.P.], for most of his life. Continued placement would render the [C]hildren's chance for safety, permanency and well-being secondary to Mother's challenge in remaining drug free."); see also id. at 1-5 (setting forth the evidence adduced at the termination hearing). The record supports the trial court's factual findings, and the court's conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. See In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27. Accordingly, we adopt the trial court's recitation as though fully stated herein. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/13/16, at 6, 9-10.
Next, we must determine whether the termination of Mother's parental rights was in the Children's best interests under section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., supra. We have explained that the focus in terminating parental rights under section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child pursuant to section 2511(b). See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc).
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a court "shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child." 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to include "[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability." In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], th[e] [Pennsylvania Supreme] Court held that the determination of the child's "needs and welfare" requires consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and child. The "utmost attention" should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791.In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).
We have stated that, in conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not required to use expert testimony, but may rely on the testimony of social workers and caseworkers. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121; see also In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762 (Pa. Super. 2008) (stating that although it is often wise to have a bonding evaluation and make it part of the certified record, "[t]here are some instances ... where direct observation of the interaction between the parent and the child is not necessary and may even be detrimental to the child."). There is no bond worth preserving between a child and a natural parent where the child has been in foster care for most of the child's life, and the resulting bond with the natural parent is attenuated. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 764. Finally, it is appropriate to consider a child's bond with his or her foster parent(s). See In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268.
"[A] parent's basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of ... her child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill ... her parental duties, to the child's right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child's] potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment." In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004). "[W]e will not toll the well-being and permanency of [a child] indefinitely." In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1007 (citing In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 732 (Pa. Super. 2008) (noting that a child's life "simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.")).
Here, Mother contends that "[t]he termination of [her] parental right[s] would not best serve the needs and welfare of the [C]hildren, because Mother was sober and could have cared for [the] [C]hildren months prior to the [termination] hearing." Mother's Brief at 27.
Aside from this sole reference to the Children's best interests, and to boilerplate case law concerning section 2511(b), see Mother's Brief at 30-31, Mother does not otherwise develop any argument as to section 2511(b). At the termination hearing, Mother testified that her visits with the Children went well, and that the Children became upset when the visits ended. N.T., 8/16/16, at 76. --------
In its Opinion, the trial court stated its reasons for determining that the Agency presented clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the Children's best interests under section 2511(b). See Trial Court Opinion, 10/13/16, at 11-12. We agree with the trial court's analysis and determination, which is supported by the record, and thus incorporate it as though fully set forth herein. See id.
We additionally note the following. The Children's respective foster parents are adoptive resources. The Agency caseworker, Valerie Broody ("Broody"), testified concerning these placements at the termination hearing as follows:
Starting with [A.C.J.P.], she has done very well with her current foster parent, Miss K[.] [A.C.J.P.] is receiving treatment. [The Agency is] starting to get [A.C.J.P.] more treatment for the issues she's presented. She definitely has a bond with Miss K[.] [A.C.J.P.] is able to talk about her feelings, and she's rather articulate for eight [years-old].N.T., 8/16/16, at 56-57; see also id. at 57 (wherein Broody stated that all of the above-mentioned pre-adoptive foster parents meet the Children's emotional, physical and mental needs).
[A.J.P. and A.M.P.] are with Miss E[.]R[.] They have essentially been with her since September of 2013. They do appear to be bonded [to Miss E.R.] They look to her when they ... need anything. ... I've observed them in [Miss E.R.'s] home. They definitely feel at home with Miss E[.]R[.]
A.W.P. is with Miss H[.]G[.], and she has done wonders with him. He has many medical issues. He's been diagnosed with rickets. He has a feeding tube through his nose. Until recently[,] he had very poor muscle tone, and it's only been with[in] maybe the last three or four months that he's been really sitting up and making efforts to work on his gross motor skills. He's finally started speaking. He was very delayed for a long time.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly determined that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the Children's best interests under section 2511(b). See Trial Court Opinion, 10/13/16, at 11-12; see also In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 763-64 (affirming the involuntary termination of the mother's parental rights, despite the existence of some bond, where placement with the mother would have been contrary to the child's best interests, and any bond with the mother would have been fairly attenuated when the child was separated from her, almost constantly, for four years). As we discern no abuse of the trial court's discretion in terminating Mother's parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8) and (b), her first issue lacks merit.
In her second issue, Mother asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it changed the Children's permanency goal to adoption. See Mother's Brief at 21-26. Mother argues that (1) the Agency did not put in place reasonable measures to reunify her with the Children; (2) Mother was not required to take parenting classes; (3) Mother's visits with the Children "were going extremely well"; and (4) the trial court improperly focused on Mother's prior failures in achieving sobriety, yet did not consider her current sobriety. Id. at 24-25.
When we review a trial court's order to change the placement goal for a dependent child to adoption, our standard is abuse of discretion. In order to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, we must determine that the court's judgment was manifestly unreasonable, that the court did not apply the law, or that the court's action was a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, as shown by the record. We are bound by the trial court's findings of fact that have support in the record. ... When the trial court's findings are supported by
competent evidence of record, we will affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result.In re N.C., 909 A.2d 818, 822-23 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Placement of and custody issues pertaining to dependent children are controlled by the Juvenile Act 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] §§ 6301-65, which was amended in 1998 to conform to the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act []. The policy underlying these statutes is to prevent children from languishing indefinitely in foster care, with its inherent lack of permanency, normalcy, and long-term parental commitment.In re A.B., 19 A.3d 1084, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation and brackets omitted). As to change of goal proceedings, "the best interests of the child and not the interests of the parent must guide the trial court, and the burden is on the child welfare agency involved to prove that a change in goal would be in the child's best interest." In re R.I.S., 36 A.3d at 573 (citations omitted). The safety, permanency, and well-being of the child must take precedence over all other considerations. In the Matter of S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 978 (Pa. Super. 2008).
Upon review of the record and the transcript of the termination hearing, we conclude that there is ample support in the record for the trial court's decision to change the Children's permanency goals to adoption. Having already determined that it is in the Children's best interests to terminate Mother's parental rights, we also agree that it is in the Children's best interests to change their permanency goals to adoption, where the Children are bonded with their pre-adoptive foster parents.
Based upon the foregoing, the trial court did not err in granting the ITPR Petitions and changing Children's permanency goal to adoption.
Orders affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 3/13/2017
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