Courts of appeals generally do not have jurisdiction to review contempt orders through direct appeal. See Norman v. Norman, 692 S.W.2d 655, 655 (Tex. 1985); In the Interest of A.C.J., 146 S.W.3d 323, 326 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2004, no pet.). The only available means of review from a contempt order is via a petition for writ of habeas corpus or a petition for writ of mandamus.

According to Mother, the trial court did not have the discretion to complete the enforcement hearing after Mother had orally requested that the case be transferred, and Mother contends that Father's false allegation that B.L.W. resided in Montgomery County excuses her failure to file a timely written motion to transfer. Generally, courts of appeals do not possess jurisdiction to review a trial court's contempt order through a direct appeal. See Norman v. Norman, 692 S.W.2d 655, 655 (Tex. 1985); In re A.C.J., 146 S.W.3d 323, 326 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, no pet.). Because an order finding a party in contempt does not dispose of all claims before the court, it is not considered to be a final, appealable judgment.

To the extent Ms. Kennedy challenges the judgment of contempt for failing to obey the court's orders, we must dismiss this issue, as courts of appeal generally do not have jurisdiction to review contempt orders by way of direct appeal. See, e.g., Wagner v. Warnasch, 295 S.W.2d 890, 893 (Tex. 1956); In re A.C.J., 146 S.W.3d 323, 326 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2004, no pet.); In re T.L.K., 90 S.W.3d 833, 841 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.).

Tex. Animal Health Comm'n v. Nunley, 647 S.W.2d 951, 952 (Tex. 1983); In re B.C.C., 187 S.W.3d 721, 723 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2006, no pet.); In re A.C.J., 146 S.W.3d 323, 326 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, no pet.); In re T.L.K., 90 S.W.3d 833, 841 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.); Cadle Co. v. Lobingier, 50 S.W.3d 662, 672 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied) (en banc). Rather, a contempt order must be challenged through an original proceeding.

Tex. Animal Health Comm'n v. Nunley, 647 S.W.2d 951, 952 (Tex. 1983); In re B.C.C., 187 S.W.3d 721, 723 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2006, no pet.); In re A.C.J., 146 S.W.3d 323, 326 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, no pet.); In re T.L.K., 90 S.W.3d 833, 841 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.); Cadle Co. v. Lobingier, 50 S.W.3d 662, 672 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied) (en banc). Rather, a contempt order must be challenged through an original proceeding.

("A trial court's order pertaining to health insurance for the children will not be reversed on appeal unless the complaining party can show a clear abuse of discretion."); In the Int. of A.C.J., 146 S.W.3d 323,327 (Tex. App.- Beaumont 2004, no pet.) ("We will not reverse a trial court's judgment on attorney's fees in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion.");

We will not reverse a trial court's judgment on attorney's fees in a SAPCR absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. In re A.C.J., 146 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, no pet.). "Texas has long followed the 'American Rule' prohibiting fee awards unless specifically provided by contract or statute."

We will not reverse a trial court's judgment on attorney's fees in a SAPCR absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. In re A.C.J., 146 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2004, no pet.); see also Casteel-Diebolt, 912 S.W.2d at 305 (under former version of the family code). There is no abuse of discretion where an award of attorney's fees is supported by the evidence.

Because both parents are responsible for providing for the child's needs, attorney's fees rendered in the prosecution or defense of a suit affecting the parent-child relationship may appropriately be imposed on either parent. In re A.C.J., 146 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2004, no pet.); 40A TEX. JUR. 3D Family Law § 2056. Just as failing to condition the award of fees in an ordinary case may chill the ability of the non-prevailing party to exercise its right to appeal, conditioning the award of fees in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship may defeat the ability of the parent who prevails in the trial court to defend the order being appealed as one that is in the best interest of the child.

; In re B.B.R., 188 S.W.3d 341, 344 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.); Tull v. Tull, 159 S.W.3d 758, 760 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.); In re A.C.J., 146 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. App.—Beaumont, 2004, no pet.); see also Parr v. Parr, No. 01-07-00750-CV, 2009 WL 1424729, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 21, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.). At the hearing, Tammy's attorney, Ronald Ferris, sought an award of attorney's fees in the amount of $11,160.00 for his representation of Tammy through trial.