SeeSantosky , 455 U.S. at 769-70, 102 S.Ct. 1388 ; In re J.F.C. , 96 S.W.3d 256, 264-65 (Tex. 2002) ; In re C.H. , 89 S.W.3d 17, 25-26 (Tex. 2002). 559 S.W.3d 176, 178–79, 2017 WL 1684649, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 2, 2017). 538 S.W.3d 107, 111 (Tex. 2017) (holding that, under a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard, a statutorily compliant affidavit relinquishing parental rights "can be ample evidence to support a best-interest determination").

In making that credibility determination, the trial court was aided by the testimony of other witnesses describing the efforts undertaken to help Mother go back on her medicine even without insurance and by Mother's admission that she had in the past stopped taking it because she did not see the point. See In re A.C., 559 S.W.3d 176, 180 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2017) (noting that appellate courts must defer to factfinder's credibility determination in factual-sufficiency review), aff'd, 560 S.W.3d 624 (Tex. 2018).

Our standards of review reflect the elevated burden of proof at trial. In re A.C., 559 S.W.3d 176, 180 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2017), aff'd, 560 S.W.3d 624 (Tex.

As fact finder in the bench trial, the court was entitled to credit testimony and evidence supporting its findings related to the grounds for termination. See In re A.C., 559 S.W.3d 176, 180 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2017) (court of appeals "defer[s] to the factfinder's credibility determinations"), aff'd, 560 S.W.3d 624 (Tex. 2018). Applying the governing standards of review, we conclude that the evidence detailed above was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's findings that, by clear and convincing evidence, grounds for termination existed under sections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). Fam. §§ 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E); see In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266

As fact finder in the bench trial, the court was entitled to credit testimony and evidence supporting its findings related to the grounds for termination. See In re A.C., 559 S.W.3d 176, 180 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2017) (court of appeals "defer[s] to the factfinder's credibility determinations"), aff'd, 560 S.W.3d 624 (Tex. 2018). Applying the governing standards of review, we conclude that the evidence detailed above was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's findings that, by clear and convincing evidence, grounds for termination existed under sections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). FAM. §§ 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E); see In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.

The jury was entitled to credit the witness testimony supporting these facts. See In re A.C., 559 S.W.3d 176, 180 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2017) (court of appeals "defer[s] to the factfinder's credibility determinations"), aff'd, 560 S.W.3d 624 (Tex. 2018). Applying the proper standards of review, see id., we conclude that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the jury's finding that Mother's conduct endangered G.G.-H.'s physical or emotional well-being.

See Mitschke v. Borromeo, 645 S.W.3d 251, 256 n.8 (Tex. 2022) (noting single panel of a multi-member court lacks power to overrule a precedent); Dyer v. Medoc Health Servs., LLC, 573 S.W.3d 418, 427 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2019, pet. denied); In re A.C., 559 S.W.3d 176, 182 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2017), aff'd, 560 S.W.3d 624 (Tex. 2018); MobileVision Imaging Servs., L.L.C. v. LifeCare Hosp. of N. Texas, L.P., 260 S.W.3d 561, 566 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.).

But, absent an intervening change in law, we follow our own precedent. In re A.C. , 559 S.W.3d 176, 182 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017), aff'd , 560 S.W.3d 624 (Tex. 2018). Further, in those opinions, our sister courts did not address whether the right of association under the TCPA requires public participation or whether any public participation was present in those cases.

See, e.g., In re A.C., No. 05-16-01531-CV, 2017 WL 1684649, *4-5, (Tex. App.—Dallas May 2, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (enforcing MSA terminating mother's parental rights when not objected to prior to judgment); In re J.R.W., No. 05-15-00493-CV, 2015 WL 5050169, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 27, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (same). /s/ Sue Walker

Because a majority of the court holds otherwise, I respectfully dissent.See, e.g. , In re A.C. , No. 05–16–01531–CV, 2017 WL 1684649, *4–5, (Tex. App.–Dallas May 2, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (enforcing MSA terminating mother's parental rights when not objected to prior to judgment); In re J.R.W. , No. 05–15–00493–CV, 2015 WL 5050169, at *3 (Tex. App.–Dallas Aug. 27, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (same). APPENDIX