Opinion
E044503
9-5-2008
In re ABNER A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ABNER A., Defendant and Appellant.
Gregory L. Cannon, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, David Delgado-Rucci and Raymond M. DiGuiseppe, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Not to be Published
Abner A., the minor, appeals from a judgment declaring him to be a ward (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) and placing him on probation. He contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in failing to establish a factual basis for the plea, despite the parties stipulation that a factual basis existed.
BACKGROUND
On December 15, 2006, the minor and another juvenile confronted the victim, grabbing the victim by the shoulders and throwing him to the ground. While the minors companion sat on the victim, the minor took a video game from the victims pocket. The minor did not cooperate with an information program of supervision (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 654), so a delinquency petition was filed, alleging the minor committed an act which would be robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) if committed by an adult.
On October 16, 2007, pursuant to an agreement, the prosecution added a second count to the petition, alleging an act which would constitute grand theft person (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (c)) if committed by an adult. A contested disposition hearing was held because the prosecutor disagreed with the probation officers recommendation that the minor be placed on summary probation. After taking testimony, the juvenile court declared the minor to be a ward of the court and placed him on formal or "ward" probation. He appeals.
DISCUSSION
The minor contends the juvenile courts true finding must be reversed because the court abused its discretion by accepting the minors admission without establishing an adequate factual basis. The minors assertion rests on the premise that the court is required to establish an adequate factual basis by Welfare and Institutions Code section 702, and rule 5.778 of the California Rules of Court. We find no error.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 702 requires the juvenile court to make a finding, noted in the minutes of the court, whether or not the minor is a person described by section Welfare and Institutions Code sections 300, 601, or 602, and to declare whether the offense is a misdemeanor or felony. The statute does not require the juvenile court to "establish an adequate factual basis" for an admission. Rule 5.778 of the California Rules of Court requires the juvenile court to read and explain the petition, advise the minor of his rights, inquire whether the minor intends to admit or deny the petition, and list the findings the court must make upon an admission or a plea of no contest.
Of these findings, California Rules of Court, rule 5.778(f)(6) requires the juvenile court to find that there is a factual basis for the admission prior to finding the child to be a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code sections 601 or 602. The rule sets forth a detailed procedure by which an admission is to be obtained, requiring the court to advise the minor and satisfy itself that the minor understands each of the enumerated trial rights, the nature of the conduct alleged and the possible consequences of an admission, and to make specific findings on each point. (In re Regina N. (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 577, 584.)
The minor relies on cases interpreting Penal Code section 1192.5, applicable to adult offenders, in arguing that the juvenile court must garner information regarding the factual basis either from the defendant or defense counsel. (See People v. Holmes (2004) 32 Cal.4th 432, 443.) But the language of California Rules of Court, rule 5.778(f)(6) is different from that of Penal Code section 1192.5. California Rules of Court, rule 5.778(f)(6) requires only that the juvenile court make a finding that a factual basis exists; it does not require an inquiry as to a factual basis, nor does it require a juvenile court to garner information regarding a factual basis from either the minor or his counsel, as discussed in People v. Holmes, supra.
Penal Code section 1192.5 expressly requires the court to "cause an inquiry to be made of the defendant to satisfy itself that the plea is freely and voluntarily made, and that there is a factual basis for the plea." For an adult offender, this means that a bare stipulation by counsel, without reference to any document in the record, is insufficient. (People v. Willard (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1334, 1335.) Such an inquiry protects against the entry of a guilty plea by an innocent defendant, and makes a record in the event of appellate or collateral attacks on that plea. (People v. Marlin (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 559, 571.) Even in adult cases, the trial courts finding that there is a factual basis is reviewed for an abuse of discretion and any error will be deemed harmless if the record supports a finding of a factual basis for the conditional plea. (People v. Willard, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 1333.)
Penal Code section 1192.5 does not apply to juvenile cases, although in certain circumstances, such as when the minor tenders an admission coupled with a protestation of innocence, a conflict arises, supporting the need for a factual basis. (In re Byron B. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 330, 338.) The only other case found in our research applying the provisions of Penal Code section 1192.5 to a juvenile involved a minor who had been prosecuted as an adult. (See In re Jermaine B. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 634, 637.)
Even if California Rules of Court, rule 5.778 could be read as requiring an inquiry as to the factual basis for an admission, it is not a constitutional requirement, so the minor must establish prejudice. (In re Regina N., supra, 117 Cal.App.3d at p. 586.) Moreover, a court need not obtain an element-by-element factual basis but need only obtain a prima facie factual basis for the plea. (People v. Marlin, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 572.) The court possesses wide discretion in determining whether a sufficient factual basis exists for a guilty plea. (Ibid.)
In adult cases, when trial counsel stipulates to a factual basis for a plea but appellate counsel claims the plea lacks an adequate factual basis, an appellate court may review the record to determine if it meets the factual basis requirement, to determine prejudice. (People v. Mickens (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1557, 1564.) In such cases, the court may rely on facts disclosed in a probation officers report, including a defendants uncontradicted admission of facts. (People v. Trujillo (2006) 40 Cal.4th 165, 185.) It follows that a juvenile court, lacking the express requirement of inquiry as to the existence of an adequate factual basis for a plea, should be allowed to do the same in a delinquency matter. The record in the present case includes a probation report which sets out the details of the offense as well as the minors admission he stole from the victim. The record contains sufficient information to support a finding that a factual basis for the minors admission exists.
Further, there is no prejudice. The minor does not assert that the admission was made unknowingly or involuntarily, or that it is constitutionally invalid. The minor did not make a motion to withdraw his plea. The minors true motivation for filing the notice of appeal following a contested disposition hearing, appears related to the fact he was placed on "ward probation", as the prosecutor had requested, rather than on summary probation, as the probation officer had initially recommended.
The juvenile court was not obligated, either by statute or rule of court, to determine by an independent inquiry whether there exists a factual basis for the admission; it was only required to make a finding that there is a factual basis. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.778(f)(6).) The court did not abuse its discretion in finding that a factual basis existed.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur:
Ramirez, P. J.
Hollenhorst, J.