Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. J04401
SCOTLAND, P. J.
Martha L. (appellant), mother of A.B. (the minor), appeals from juvenile court orders denying a relative placement assessment and terminating parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 361.3, 366.26, 395; further section references are to this code.) She argues the San Joaquin County Human Services Agency (HSA) failed to consider the maternal grandmother for relative placement, and the court thus erred in finding the current foster parents had preference for adoptive placement.
We conclude appellant lacks standing to raise the challenge. Thus, we shall dismiss the appeal.
FACTS
The newborn minor was detained in October 2006 because both appellant and the minor tested positive for cocaine at the minor’s birth. The jurisdictional/dispositional report stated the social worker did paperwork to assess both the maternal aunt and the maternal grandmother for placement of the minor. The maternal aunt declined assessment, and the maternal grandmother was scheduled for a home evaluation. Subsequent reports do not address the results of the evaluation.
The minor remained in his initial placement until May 2007, when he was moved to a “concurrent planning home.” Appellant had been out of contact for several months and last visited the minor in February 2007. The social worker recommended terminating services and setting a section 366.26 hearing to select a permanent plan.
Appellant was not present at the review hearing in June 2007. Adopting the social worker’s recommendation, the juvenile court terminated services and scheduled the section 366.26 hearing.
The assessment for the section 366.26 hearing stated appellant called the social worker about visitation in July 2007, but did not follow up to schedule it. In August 2007, appellant and the maternal grandmother came to the social worker’s office seeking visitation. The maternal grandmother called back with a telephone number so a visit could be arranged, but appellant’s whereabouts were again unknown. In October 2007, the maternal grandmother informed the social worker that appellant was in custody. The maternal grandmother also requested placement of the minor and was referred for an assessment. By December 2007, visitation had not yet been initiated for the maternal grandmother.
Testimony at the section 366.26 hearing established that the maternal grandmother declined placement of the minor in late 2006. Thereafter, the minor was placed in a concurrent placement in accordance with the department policy. In August 2007, when the maternal grandmother again expressed an interest in placement, the social worker noted there was documentation that the maternal grandmother previously declined assessment for placement. A Spanish-speaking social worker then explained that there would be no reassessment unless the minor was to be moved. When asked why she declined the assessment in 2006, the maternal grandmother told the social workers she wanted to teach her daughter a lesson and hoped the result would be that her daughter would participate in services. The social worker’s supervisor later directed that the maternal grandmother be assessed, and the social worker made a referral to the concurrent planning unit.
Due to difficulty contacting the maternal grandmother, a second referral was made in January 2008. The maternal grandmother’s home was inspected in April 2008 but was being remodeled and was not suitable for placement; therefore, further assessments had to wait until construction was complete.
The court terminated parental rights and found the caregiver preference in section 366.26, subdivision (k) applied.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends that HSA failed to consider the maternal grandmother when the minor was moved to a concurrent placement and that it delayed in assessing the maternal grandmother when she later came forward seeking placement after services were terminated.
Citing Cesar V. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1023 (hereafter Cesar V.), respondent argues appellant lacks standing to raise the relative placement issue. In her reply brief, appellant asserts she has standing but cites no authority to support her claim and does not attempt to distinguish the authority cited by respondent.
“An appellant cannot urge errors which affect only another party who does not appeal.” (In re Vanessa Z. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 258, 261.)
In Cesar V., a child’s father and grandmother sought review of orders denying placement of the child with the grandmother. Reunification efforts had ceased, and the juvenile court had set a hearing to determine a permanent plan. Because a change of placement was necessary, the social worker began an evaluation of the grandmother but dropped the effort in favor of another adoptive placement. (Cesar V., supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1026-1029, 1033.) The juvenile court found no abuse of discretion in denying relative placement, and the father filed a petition for modification alleging new evidence in support of grandmother’s placement request. (Id. at p. 1030.) The reviewing court concluded the father lacked standing to raise the relative placement issue because (1) denial of placement could not affect his interest in reunification since services had been terminated, and (2) a nonrelative placement did not preclude him from establishing an exception to termination of his parental rights. (Id. at p. 1035.)
Here, the maternal grandmother declined placement early in the reunification phase. She did not request an assessment for placement until after services were terminated. When she made the request, no change of placement was contemplated and, unlike the reunification phase, no evaluation was required at that time. (In re Joseph T. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 787, 794-795.) In any event, an evaluation did occur and the maternal grandmother asked for placement preference at the section 366.26 hearing. However, unlike in Cesar V., she has not appealed the order denying her request.
Appellant’s only interest at the section 366.26 hearing was in avoiding termination of parental rights. Placement of the minor did not affect that interest, and appellant is attempting to raise an issue that affects only a nonappealing party. (Cesar V., supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1035.) She has no standing to do so. (Ibid.; In re Vanessa Z., supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 261.)
Even if appellant had standing in the juvenile court to argue that HSA failed to recontact and assess the maternal grandmother for placement when the minor was moved to a concurrent placement during the reunification phase, she did not raise the issue at the review hearing or challenge the orders entered at that time continuing the minor in foster care. Thus, appellant forfeited the issue. (In re Daniel K. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 661, 667; John F. v. Superior Court (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 400, 404-405; In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, fn. 2.)
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed for lack of standing.
We concur: HULL, J. BUTZ, J.