Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Timothy A. Kams, Judge, No. 08CEJ600769-1
James M. Kehoe, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Julie A. Hokans, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Levy, J.
INTRODUCTION
A juvenile criminal wardship petition was filed alleging that appellant A.B. resisted an executive officer with force or violence (count 1), committed a battery on a peace officer (count 2) and resisted an officer (count 3). (Pen. Code, §§ 69, 243, subd. (b), 148, subd. (a)(1).)
Appellant accepted a negotiated plea agreement. In exchange for dismissal of counts 1 and 2, he admitted count 3 as a misdemeanor.
Appellant was judged to be a ward and placed on probation for one year.
Pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 827, subdivision (b)(2), the court ordered the superintendent of the relevant school district to be notified that appellant violated Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a). The person who prepared the notification form put an “X” in the box indicating that appellant committed a misdemeanor offense involving assault or battery and then wrote “PC 148(a)(1) -- resisting an officer.” In response to two letters written by appellant’s counsel, the juvenile court ordered the clerk to destroy this notification and to prepare an amended notification because the original notification “reflected the correct Penal Code violation (148(a)) but incorrectly listed this as assault and battery.”
Unless otherwise specified all statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Appellant argues the notifications were sent in error because he did not admit committing an offense that was specifically listed in section 827, subdivision (b)(2). We are not persuaded.
Because appellant accepted a negotiated plea bargain, the summary of facts necessarily is derived from the probation report which, in turn, relied on the police report.
During the evening in May 2008, two police officers were sitting in a marked patrol vehicle. They observed four juvenile males, one of whom was appellant, walking past the patrol vehicle. Two of the males were wearing attire consistent with clothing worn by Bulldog gang members. As they walked past the patrol vehicle, appellant looked into the vehicle and said, “Fuck the police.” One of the officers asked appellant to repeat himself. Appellant replied, “Fuck you. Don’t worry about it homeboy.” The four males continued walking. The officers exited their vehicle. One of them asked appellant if he could pat him down. Appellant agreed. He turned around and placed his hands toward the top of his head. The officer grabbed appellant’s wrist and started to pat him down. Appellant pulled his hands away from the officer and said, “No, fuck you. You’re not touching me.” The officer attempted to grab appellant, but appellant pulled away. The officer successfully gripped appellant’s arm and pulled him to the curb. The officer continued to pat search appellant, who pulled his hands away again and said, “Don’t touch me, you fucking pig.” Appellant was handcuffed and placed in the back of the patrol vehicle.
The other three males were questioned and released. The officers returned to their patrol vehicle. Appellant had spat on the dashboard, keyboard and radio. Appellant told the officers that he spat on the computer, “Because I wanted to spit on your punk ass, but you weren’t in the car.” Appellant also said, “I didn’t want to spit in the backseat where I’m sitting, so I spit where you guys were sitting.” After appellant was Mirandized, he said that he spat because the officer was, “a bitch ass cop.”
On the drive to the “Juvenile Justice Campus,” appellant insulted and threatened the officers. He also spat on the officer who was sitting in the front passenger seat. This officer turned toward appellant “and advised him that he would be facing another charge of battery on a police officer.” Appellant replied, “Fuck you. You’re all some dirty cops. Just because I spit on you, you can’t charge me with that.”
DISCUSSION
In pertinent part, section 827, subdivision (b)(2) provides:
“[¶] … Notwithstanding subdivision (a), written notice that a minor enrolled in a public school, kindergarten to grade 12, inclusive, has been found by a court of competent jurisdiction to have committed any felony or any misdemeanor involving curfew, gambling, alcohol, drugs, tobacco products, carrying of weapons, a sex offense listed in Section 290 of the Penal Code, assault or battery, larceny, vandalism, or graffiti shall be provided by the court, within seven days, to the superintendent of the school district of attendance. Written notice shall include only the offense found to have been committed by the minor and the disposition of the minor’s case.…” (§ 827, subd. (b)(2), emphasis added.)
Appellant argues that notification is to be sent only in cases where the minor was found to have committed an offense specifically listed in section 827, subdivision (b)(2). Since Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a) is not a specifically listed offense and the battery allegation was dismissed, notification should not have been sent. Respondent argues that section 827, subdivision (b)(2) plainly provides that notification is to be sent when the minor is found to have committed any felony or misdemeanor involving an enumerated offense and the offense appellant admitted committing involved an assault or battery. Therefore, notification was properly sent. We agree with respondent.
The issue before us turns on a question of statutory construction. The canons of statutory construction are well-established:
“[¶] … ‘We begin with the fundamental rule that our primary task is to determine the lawmakers’ intent. [Citation.] … To determine intent, “‘The court turns first to the words themselves for the answer.’” [Citations.] “If the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature (in the case of a statute).…”’ [Citation.] We give the language of the statute its ‘usual, ordinary import and accord significance, if possible, to every word, phrase and sentence in pursuance of the legislative purpose. A construction making some words surplusage is to be avoided. The words of the statute must be construed in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose.… Both the legislative history of the statute and the wider historical circumstances of its enactment may be considered in ascertaining the legislative intent.’ [Citation.]” (Kane v. Hurley (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 859, 862.)
“The court looks first to the language of the statute; if clear and unambiguous, the court will give effect to its plain meaning.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 209, 223.) Such is the case here. In our view, the language of section 827, subdivision (b)(2) is clear and unambiguous. This section provides that notification is to be sent when the minor is found to have committed “any felony or any misdemeanor involving” certain specified offenses. The Legislature’s choice to use the phrase “any felony or any misdemeanor involving” clearly expresses its intent to expand the reach of the notification requirement beyond the specifically listed offenses to any criminal conduct that is related to a listed offense. The word “involving” has been found by other courts construing different statutes to have expansive connotations. (See, e.g., People v. Rodola (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1505, 1508; United States v. Alexander (D.C. Cir. 2003) 331 F.3d 116, 131; United States v. King (2d Cir. 2003) 325 F.3d 110, 113; United States v. Brandon (4th Cir. 2001) 247 F.3d 186, 190.) An interpretation rendering the phrase “any felony or any misdemeanor involving” into mere surplusage should be avoided; whenever possible, “every word and phrase of a statute should be given significance in order to effect the legislative intent.” (People v. Rodola, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 1508.) If the Legislature intended to limit notification only to those situations where the minor was found by the juvenile court to have committed a specifically listed offense, it could easily have done so by simply listing the offenses. It chose not to do so.
Interpreting section 827, subdivision (b)(2) in this manner is not inconsistent with the goals of the juvenile justice system. Ensuring public safety is one of the system’s preeminent goals. (In re James R. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 413, 434.) After notification, the fact of a minor’s criminal offense is disseminated as necessary so that counselors, teachers and administrators can “work with the [minor] in an appropriate fashion, to avoid being needlessly vulnerable or to protect other persons from needless vulnerability.” (§ 827, subd. (b)(2).) Providing notification in situations where the minor is found to have committed a crime involving a listed offense is consistent with the public safety purpose of this subdivision because it ensures that individuals who work with the minor are not needlessly left vulnerable solely because of the terms of a plea bargain.
Accordingly, appellant’s challenge to the notification fails.
Appellant did not contend that under the factual circumstances of this matter, the Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a) allegation that he admitted did not involve an assault or battery. Had he raised such a contention, it would have been meritless.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Vartabedian, Acting P.J., Hill, J.