Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. JD227854
SCOTLAND, P. J.
R.B. (appellant) challenges the juvenile court’s orders adjudicating his daughter, A.B., a dependent child and removing her from the family home. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b); further section references are to the Welfare and Institution Code unless otherwise specified.) For reasons that follow, we reject his claims of error and shall affirm the juvenile court’s orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The evidence in this case was conflicting and presented different versions of the events that led to juvenile court jurisdiction. We summarize the facts in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s findings and orders. (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 924.)
At 2:30 a.m., police officers found 16-year-old A.B. “wandering the streets with a 19[-]year[-]old male.” They took her to the house where she lived with her father, appellant. However, she did not have a key to the house, and no one came to the door when the officers knocked. Thus, A.B. was taken to the Children’s Receiving Home of Sacramento (Receiving Home) for her protection.
A.B. told a social worker that she was “nervous and scared about what her father would do to her.” She explained that appellant was “very mean to her and yells at her, pushes her, grabs her, and threatens to kill her.” She did not “feel safe with her father” and was “very depressed” and alone living with him. A.B. said that, the week before, appellant grabbed her and pushed her down, leaving bruises on her arms. She did not report the incident because she was afraid of him; however, she believed that his live-in girlfriend witnessed the abuse.
Described by the social worker as “visibly upset,” A.B. explained that appellant gets angry because he is worried about money, and that he has threatened to “get even” with her if she tells anyone about his behavior. Because of the threats, A.B. twice told the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) that appellant did not abuse her. She did not want to go home to, speak with, or even see appellant.
A.B. admitted that she “snuck out” of the house that night around 11:00 p.m. because she was upset with appellant and she wanted to talk to her boyfriend. She went home later but could not get inside the house; so she and her boyfriend went to the park where they were later found by the police. The boyfriend confirmed A.B.’s version of events that night. He also expressed concern for A.B., saying appellant is “just not a nice guy at all.”
DHHS’s efforts to contact appellant that day were unsuccessful. The following day, DHHS filed a dependency petition alleging that A.B. had suffered, or was at substantial risk of suffering, serious physical harm or illness if she was returned to appellant’s custody. The petition was based on (1) appellant’s alleged history of abusing A.B., in particular the abuse described by A.B. as having occurred on July 8, 2008; (2) the fact that A.B. was found in a park with an adult male at 2:30 a.m.; and (3) A.B.’s desire not to return home.
A.B. was not at the detention hearing. Her attorney told the juvenile court that A.B. was too afraid of appellant to attend. Counsel asked the court to consider A.B.’s maternal grandmother, adult brother, and deceased mother’s fiancé for placement; and also asked the court not to order any visitation with appellant.
Appellant objected to the detention, asked for visitation with A.B., and requested a no-contact order between A.B. and her boyfriend. Appellant objected to A.B.’s placement with any of the individuals identified by her attorney.
The juvenile court ordered that A.B. be detained, that reunification services be provided to appellant, that there be “Level A visitation,” and that A.B. not have contact with her boyfriend. A jurisdictional hearing was scheduled, and the court directed DHHS to contact the mentioned relatives to see if they were interested in being evaluated for placement.
The jurisdictional/dispositional report submitted to the court by DHHS stated that appellant denied the allegations of abuse and neglect, claiming he was unaware that A.B. had left the house until 11:00 a.m. the next morning, and that he had “spanked” A.B. only two or three times, each time in front of his live-in girlfriend. He added, “‘[t]his is a hardship case. I want her to go to Juvenile Hall for lying.’”
The report noted that, during an interview with the social worker, appellant “incessantly talk[ed] about random subjects” and had to be redirected in order to obtain relevant information. At some point during the interview, appellant said, “‘[A.B.]’s pretty, but she doesn’t have big boobs.’” Asked to explain the remark, he indicated the maternal grandmother made “disparaging remarks” about A.B.’s appearance, which made A.B. cry.
Others who were interviewed, including appellant’s live-in girlfriend and A.B.’s maternal grandmother, adult brother, and maternal aunt, did not recall ever seeing appellant be physically abusive to A.B. However, family members said that he was verbally abusive to A.B. Her brother recalled appellant telling A.B. that she was a “slut,” a “cunt,” a “whore,” and a “bitch.” Appellant’s girlfriend acknowledged that appellant had spanked A.B. with an open hand. She described A.B. as “spoiled,” and believed that she was now acting out because appellant would not allow her to see her boyfriend.
DHHS recommended that A.B. be placed in the care of her maternal aunt and that appellant receive services, including counseling and anger management classes. The goal, as recommended by DHHS, was to have A.B. return home.
A contested jurisdictional hearing was scheduled for August 8, 2008, but did not begin until September 16, 2008, and ended on September 22, 2008. The juvenile court took the matter under submission and ruled on October 6, 2008. Finding that A.B. had suffered, or was at substantial risk of suffering, serious physical harm as a result of appellant’s failure or inability to supervisor her adequately (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b)), the court adjudicated her a dependent child, removed her from appellant’s custody, placed her with her maternal aunt, and ordered appellant be provided reunification services, including visitation with A.B.
DISCUSSION
I
Appellant first contends that DHHS prosecuted a “false cause of action” in initially accusing him of grabbing A.B.’s arms and bruising her on July 8, 2008.
This allegation in the dependency petition was based on A.B.’s statement to the social worker at the Receiving Home on July 15, 2008, when A.B. said appellant beat and bruised her the week before, i.e., July 8, 2008. At the jurisdictional hearing in September 2008, A.B. testified the abuse actually occurred in May 2008, not July 2008. Although A.B.’s recollection of the date changed, she continued to accuse appellant of abusing her. Her credibility in this respect was for the juvenile court to determine (In re Rubisela E. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 177, 194), and the court found A.B. to be credible. Thus, regardless of when the abuse occurred, it was a sufficient basis for filing a section 300 petition. (In re Alysha S. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 393, 399-400 [petition sufficient if it pleads essential facts establishing at least one ground of juvenile court jurisdiction].)
At oral argument in this court on August 18, 2009, appellant disputed that A.B. testified he physically abused her. In his words, “[n]othing in the [record] showed that [he] had ever hit or hurt [A.B.], so it’s just something that [A.B.] made up, which is all in the report.” When asked whether the record in fact showed that A.B. testified he hurt her, appellant again insisted “[t]here is nothing in this transcript at all that ever can justify or say that I’ve ever raised a hand to any of my children or hurt any of my children whatsoever.” Indeed, he claimed A.B. testified that “there was no incident. She made up a story.”
However, the transcript of the jurisdictional hearing reveals A.B. testified that her report to the social worker that appellant “hit [her] excessively” “around May 2008” was an “accurate statement.” Specifically, A.B. testified that when she came home about 11:30 p.m. from “skating,” appellant was upset because he had tried to call her but her “phone was dying so [she] couldn’t... answer it”; “[a]nd I went in [my] room, and he came in there behind me, and he started yelling at me. He’s like, where the F were you at and stuff like that. And then he grabbed my hair, threw me on the ground and punched me in my arm. His girlfriend was standing there the whole time watching. She didn’t say anything.” A.B. also testified there had been other such incidents, including one in which appellant “slapped me in my face, and he pushed me, and I fell off the bed. And then I got back up, and he just like kept yelling at me.” On another occasion, she said, appellant “pushed me when I was in the car. It was just very violent.”
It is true that there was testimony by other witnesses stating A.B. made up the allegations of abuse. For example, D.G. testified that A.B. never said appellant abused her; indeed, according to D.G., A.B. admitted she had lied about the physical abuse. However, as we noted above, it was the juvenile court’s responsibility to assess the credibility of the witnesses; and the court’s findings reflect that it believed A.B.’s testimony that appellant hit and bruised her arm in May 2008 after he became angry with her. We are bound by this credibility determination, and the testimony of A.B. constitutes substantial evidence supporting the jurisdictional finding.
II
Next, appellant contends the juvenile court erred in failing to complete the dispositional hearing within 60 days after the petition being filed.
Appellant did not raise this objection in the juvenile court; in fact, he appeared in court on August 8, 2008, and agreed to a continuance of the hearing to allow the parties to review the social worker’s report. Then, on September 18, 2008, the third day of the hearing, he agreed that it could be continued until September 22, 2008. When, on September 22, the court asked the parties if there was any objection to allowing the court time to review the reporter’s transcript before ruling, appellant raised none. Appellant’s failure to object to the orders continuing the jurisdictional hearing beyond the 60-day limit “shall be deemed a consent to the continuance.” (§ 352, subd. (c).) Having failed to raise the objection in the juvenile court, he is precluded from raising it on appeal. (In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 501-502.)
Appellant asserts that he “had no choice but to follow what the [juvenile] court wanted [as] far as days for the trial”; that the decision to continue the matter from September 18 to September 22, 2008, was “made by the court without [appellant] knowing”; and that he was “in a catch[-]22, he [could] object to the time the [court] need[ed] (which would make opposition mad that they didn’t get a ‘fair’ hearing, or irritate the [court] and make [it] even more bias[ed] against [appellant]) or [he] could allow the [court] time to make a ruling then have it used against him for not objecting to the time the [court] needed.”
The record does not support his claim. Throughout the proceeding in the juvenile court, appellant was represented by counsel who, on appellant’s behalf, agreed to the continuances. Nothing shows that appellant was forced into agreeing to the continuances, and there is no showing that the court was biased against him. (Andrews v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 781, 795-796 [bias is not shown by the court’s believing evidence offered against appellant and disbelieving the evidence produced by appellant, or by ruling against appellant on other issues].)
Our independent review of the record reveals no “evidence of ‘an animus inconsistent with judicial objectivity.’” (People v. Superior Court (Dorsey) (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1230.)
III
Appellant claims DHHS did not make reasonable efforts to prevent A.B.’s removal from appellant’s home. (§ 319, subd. (d)(1) [the court shall determine “whether reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his or her home... and whether there are available services that would prevent the need for further detention”].) The juvenile court found otherwise, and substantial evidence supports that determination.
On the night police officers found A.B. in the park with her boyfriend, the officers initially took her home. When they knocked on the front door, no one answered, and A.B. did not have a key. Thus, they took her to the Receiving Home for her safety. There, she unambiguously stated she did not want to go home and was afraid for her safety. The following day, DHHS unsuccessfully attempted to reach appellant. When DHHS was able to contact him and offered him services, he refused them. This evidence supports a conclusion that there was nothing more DHHS could have done to prevent A.B.’s removal from appellant’s home. Appellant’s refusal to participate in the services meant there were no “available services that would prevent the need for further detention.” (§ 319, subd. (d)(1).)
IV
Appellant contends that, despite “continuing objections from [his] counsel,” the juvenile court allowed itself to be “distracted” by “hearsay” testimony of the maternal grandmother and aunt.
In his opening brief, appellant does not identify the specific evidence he claims was improper. “‘It is the duty of a party to support the arguments in its briefs by appropriate reference to the record, which includes providing exact page citations.’ (Bernard v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1203, 1205; accord, Cal. Rules of Court, rule [8.204(a)(1)(C)].) If a party fails to support an argument with the necessary citations to the record,... the argument [may be] deemed to be [forfeited].” (Duarte v. Chino Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856; In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, fn. 2; Nelson v. Gaunt (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 623, 638-639 [that appellant is representing himself on appeal does not entitle him to a relaxation of the rules governing appellate review].)
In his reply brief, appellant cites to the testimony of the maternal grandmother, on page 105 of the reporter’s transcript, that A.B.’s mother said appellant physically abused her when she lived with him. Appellant’s counsel called the grandmother as a witness in order to elicit testimony that A.B. had never complained to her that appellant was physically abusive toward A.B. Grandmother had only seen and heard about defendant being “mentally abusive” toward A.B. On cross-examination by A.B.’s attorney regarding the mental abuse, grandmother testified she believed A.B. would not be safe if A.B. had to live with appellant. During further examination by the county counsel, grandmother elaborated that, in her opinion, A.B. would not be safe living with appellant because he had physically abused A.B.’s mother. When appellant’s counsel objected on the grounds of “[r]elevance and speculation,” the juvenile court properly overruled the objection. The evidence was relevant to placement if A.B. was declared a dependent child, and nothing about the testimony was speculative. However, when appellant’s counsel later objected on the ground of hearsay, the court sustained the objection. At this point, the questioning returned to appellant’s mental abuse of A.B. Thus, contrary to appellant’s claim, the court rejected the hearsay evidence and, thus, was not “distracted” by it.
Appellant’s reply brief also points to grandmother’s testimony, on page 110 of the reporter’s transcript, that she “tolerate[s]” appellant. This was not hearsay, and it was elicited by appellant’s counsel in an apparent effort to establish that the witness was not credible because she was biased against appellant.
Lastly, in his reply brief, appellant identifies the maternal aunt’s testimony, on page 153 of the reporter’s transcript, saying that she did not think it was in A.B.’s best interest to live with appellant because the family believed he had not been a good father to her (a fact known to A.B. because, when she was growing up, she asked why the aunt and her family did not like appellant). Appellant cannot complain about this testimony because his counsel did not object to it (In re Dakota S., supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at pp. 501-501) and, in any event, it was relevant to appropriate placement if A.B. was adjudged a dependent child.
We discern no evidentiary error and no bias against appellant.
V
Next, appellant complains that the social workers who prepared the report for the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing were not available for cross-examination during the hearing.
However, if appellant had wanted to examine the social workers, it was his counsel’s burden to request their appearance as witnesses. (§ 355, subd. (b)(2).) His counsel did not do so, thus precluding appellant from complaining on appeal. (Ibid.; see In re Dakota S., supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at pp. 501-502.) In any event, appellant has not explained how the cross-examination of those two social workers could have helped him. The information in the social workers’ report to which he refers was presented through percipient witnesses who were subjected to cross-examination by appellant’s counsel. For this reason, his counsel reasonably could have concluded cross-examination of the social workers was not necessary and conceivably could have harmed appellant.
VI
In appellant’s view, there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s order.
When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding or order is challenged on appeal, the reviewing court must determine if there is any substantial evidence--that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value--to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. (In re Angelia P., supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 924; In re Jason L. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1206, 1214.) In making this determination, we resolve all conflicts in favor of the prevailing party, and issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trier of fact (In re Jason L., supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1214); thus, we may not reweigh the evidence when assessing its sufficiency. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)
In support of his claim, appellant argues (1) he did not allow A.B. to leave the house on July 15, 2008, to see her boyfriend--she “snuck out” to do so; (2) there was no evidence that A.B. was ever “hospitalized or seen with injuries because of [appellant]” or that she “was ever hurt by [him]”; and (3) he “did provide adequate care,” having taken A.B. “to psychiatric care” and done “everything in his power” to keep the boyfriend away from her “after finding out that [the boyfriend] supposedly choked [A.B.]”
However, A.B. testified that appellant abused her physically and emotionally, and the juvenile court found her to be credible. That testimony is sufficient to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order. (In re Rubisela E., supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 195 [the testimony of one witness, if believed by the trial court, is sufficient to uphold a judgment].)
VII
Appellant’s final contention is the juvenile court wrongly denied his motion for rehearing.
He claims that he moved for a rehearing of the court’s order because “Child Protective Services has violated him and obstructed correspondence [citation],” and the motion was denied. However, there is nothing in the record to support this claim of error. Thus, as respondent correctly points out, the contention fails. (Estate of Johnston (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 923, 931 [a reviewing court “cannot consider matters which are not included in the record on appeal”].)
VIII
In sum, evidence believed by the juvenile court supports the judgment, and appellant has not shown any reversible error.
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.
We concur: SIMS , J., BUTZ , J.