Opinion
Nos. 2008-08344, 2008-08345, (Docket No. D23279-07).
October 6, 2009.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeals are from (1) a fact-finding order of the Family Court, Queens County (Hunt, J.), dated March 26, 2008, which, after a hearing, found that the appellant had committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of attempted burglary in the first degree as a hate crime, attempted burglary in the second degree as a hate crime, menacing in the second degree as a hate crime, aggravated harassment in the second degree, and criminal trespass in the third degree as a hate crime, and (2) an order of disposition of the same court dated August 13, 2008, as amended October 27, 2008, which, upon the fact-finding order, adjudicated the appellant a juvenile delinquent and placed him in the custody of the New York State Office of Children and Family Services for a period of 18 months.
Rayaaz N. Khan, Jamaica, N.Y., for appellant.
Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Kristin M. Helmers and Janet L. Zaleon of counsel), for respondent.
Before: Skelos, J.P., Covello, Leventhal and Roman, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the appeal from the fact-finding order is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, as that order was superseded by the order of disposition; and it is further,
Ordered that the order of disposition, as amended, is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
Viewing the evidence adduced at the fact-finding hearing in the light most favorable to the presentment agency ( see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of attempted burglary in the first degree as a hate crime, attempted burglary in the second degree as a hate crime, menacing in the second degree as a hate crime, aggravated harassment in the second degree, and criminal trespass in the third degree as a hate crime ( cf. Penal Law § 485.05; People v Marino, 35 AD3d 292, 293). Moreover, upon our independent review of the record, we are satisfied that the findings of fact were not against the weight of the evidence ( see Family Ct Act § 342.2; Matter of Victor I., 57 AD3d 779).