Opinion
D042129.
10-8-2003
In re AARON L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JEFFREY L., Defendant and Appellant.
Presumed father Jeffrey L. (Father) appeals the judgment terminating his parental rights over Aaron L. He contends the court erred by failing to find Aaron would benefit from a continued relationship with him (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)). We affirm.
Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
BACKGROUND
In April 2001, when Aaron was two years old, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) filed a dependency petition because he was exposed to Fathers violence against Aarons mother (Mother); Mother used methamphetamine and amphetamine; Father failed to drug test as required by his voluntary plan; and both parents were bi-polar. Aaron was detained in foster care.
At the July 18, 2001 jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, the court ordered Aaron placed in foster care and gave the social worker discretion to place him with a relative. Aaron then lived with his paternal grandfather and stepgrandmother for an undisclosed period. Sometime in 2001, he was moved to a concurrent planning foster home where he remained until August 2, 2002, when he was moved to the home of his preschool teacher. The reason for the move was that a social worker had told the concurrent planning foster family that they would not be able to adopt Aaron, as Father was reunifying with him. Upon being told this, the family moved out of state, as they had been planning to do after adopting Aaron. After their move, they telephoned Aaron multiple times every week and communicated with the Agency frequently about his well being. The family remained committed to Aaron and their desire to adopt him continued.
It is unclear when Aaron began living in the concurrent planning foster home. The record variously gives the date as "March 2001," and March 28, July 25, and August 12, 2001. It also says that he lived with this family for 17 months; since he was moved from the home on August 2, 2002, this would mean he was moved to the home on March 2, 2001. Since he was not detained until March 28 or 29, 2001, a few days before the dependency petition was filed; lived in another foster home before moving to the concurrent planning home; and sometime after July 18 lived with his paternal grandfather and stepgrandmother, it appears that he was probably moved to the concurrent planning home in late July or in August 2001.
The section 366.26 hearing took place on April 30, 2003.
BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP
Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) allows termination of parental rights upon clear and convincing evidence of adoptability. An exception exists if "[t]he parents . . . have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).) A beneficial relationship is one that "promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents." (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.) The existence of this relationship is determined by "[t]he age of the child, the portion of the childs life spent in the parents custody, the `positive or `negative effect of interaction between parent and child, and the childs particular needs." (Id. at p. 576.)
Examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, we conclude that while Father maintained regular visitation and contact, substantial evidence supports the determination he failed to meet his burden of showing a beneficial relationship. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at pp. 576-577; In re Cristella C. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1373.) At the time of the section 366.26 hearing, Aaron was nearly four and one-half years old and had been out of Fathers care for more than two years. Father had not graduated beyond weekly two-hour supervised visits.
A psychologist who conducted a bonding study concluded that while Aaron shared a loving bond with Father, it was a secondary bond, not a primary one; Aaron "[did] not have a psychological notion that Father [was] the person he [went] to for emotional nurturing and otherwise for support, which the literature says is the basis of a primary bond;" and it would not be detrimental to terminate parental rights, although it would be detrimental to Aaron to sever his bond with his prospective adoptive parents.
The social worker concurred. He noted that while living with the prospective adoptive parents, Aaron had "developed a strong parent/child relationship" with them; even though they had moved out of state, he still saw them as his parents and called them "daddy and mommy;" he saw their three children as his siblings; he talked about Father only for a short time after visits; he had fun during visits and had cried when one visit ended; after another visit, Father complained that he had had to assist Aaron in using the restroom; Father spent little time during visits trying to bond with Aaron, but instead bought him sweets and allowed unrestricted play; Father had an extensive substance abuse history, a criminal record, a history of mental illness, and an unstable life style; in the month before the section 366.26 hearing, he showed signs of paranoia; and Aaron needed a nurturing, protective, structured, and stable home, which Father could not consistently provide.
The juvenile court did not err by declining to apply section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A). Substantial evidence supports the termination of parental rights.
DISPOSITION
Judgment affirmed.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J. and HALLER, J., we concur.