Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County., No. CK82315, Donna Levin, Juvenile Court Referee.
Lori A. Fields, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, O. Raquel Ramirez, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ARMSTRONG, J.
David H. appeals from the jurisdictional orders and dispositional orders in the dependency proceedings concerning his son Aaron and his daughter Maya. We affirm, as we explain:
This family came to the attention of DCFS and the courts on May 13, 2010, after 7-year-old Maya reported to her mother, then to police, that Father had sexually abused her. The Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition was filed on May 20, 2010, and was sustained on September 23, 2010, under section 300, subdivisions (b), (d), and (j), after a contested hearing. The sustained allegations were that Father had sexually abused Maya, thus endangering both Maya and her 8-year-old brother, Aaron.
All further statutory references are to that code.
The children were placed with their mother throughout the dependency.
On appeal, Father does not challenge the substantial evidence for the juvenile court's finding that he sexually abused Maya, and there clearly was such evidence. Instead, he argues that there is no substantial evidence that his son Aaron was a child described by section (b), (d), or (j). Essentially, Father argues that the evidence showing that he abused a girl, Maya, is not sufficient to show that a boy, Aaron, was at risk for sexual abuse. As both parties acknowledge, the issue of whether a parent's abuse of a female child can support a finding that the abused girl's male sibling is at substantial risk of sexual abuse has been addressed in several cases, which reach differing conclusions. (In re Maria R. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 48; In re Rubisela E. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 177; In re Andy G. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1405, In re Karen R. (2001) 95 Cal.App.4th 84; In re P.A. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1339.)
In this case, we find that there was sufficient evidence for each of the findings. Section 300, subdivision (d) provides that a child may be made a dependent child of the court if "The child has been sexually abused, or there is a substantial risk that the child will be sexually abused, as defined in Section 11165.1 of the Penal Code, by his or her parent or guardian or a member of his or her household...."
The evidence was that on many occasions Father, wearing only a shirt, went into Maya's room at night after she was asleep, took her out of bed, pulled down her pajama pants so that she was naked from the waist down, put her legs behind his back, held her down, pushed his groin into hers, and simulated intercourse by rubbing her body against his until he ejaculated.
We find that this evidence is substantial evidence to support a reasonable inference that father's behavior was "so sexually aberrant" that Aaron, a boy close in age to Maya, was at substantial risk of sexual abuse. (In re Karen R., supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at pp. 90-91; In re Andy G., supra, 183 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1415.)
Further, as DCFS argues, Father's explanation for Maya's disclosure suggests that Aaron was at risk. That explanation was that he routinely woke Maya up in the middle of the night and carried her to the bathroom so that she would not wet the bed. On occasion he might not have been wearing pants, so that his penis might have come into contact with Maya, although he had not intended that. (Father said that he had at one point taken Aaron into the bathroom at night too.) In other words, Father sought to deny the conduct, and to excuse it as well.
It is true that, as Father argues, the evidence was that he had not abused Aaron, or Maya and Aaron's half-sibling Marcel, who was 8 years old when Father married the children's mother. We do not see, however, that the evidence mandates a different result. That evidence was something for the juvenile court to weigh.
We note, too, that "This conclusion is consistent with section 355.1, subdivision (d), which provides in pertinent part that: '(d) Where the court finds that either a parent, a guardian, or any other person who resides with... a minor who is currently the subject of the petition filed under Section 300... (3) has been found in a prior dependency hearing... to have committed an act of sexual abuse, ... that finding shall be prima facie evidence in any proceeding that the subject minor is a person described by subdivision (a), (b), (c), or (d) of Section 300 and is at substantial risk of abuse or neglect. The prima facie evidence constitutes a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence.' [¶] Although section 355.1, subdivision (d), was not triggered here because there was no prior dependency proceeding at the time of the jurisdictional hearing, it nonetheless evinces a legislative determination that siblings of sexually abused children are at substantial risk of harm and are entitled to protection by the juvenile courts." (In re P.A., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1347.)
Our analysis of the finding under section 300, subdivision (j) is similar. That subdivision provides that a child may be made a dependent child of the court if "The child's sibling has been abused or neglected, as defined in subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i), and there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected, as defined in those subdivisions."
"The broad language of subdivision (j) clearly indicates that the trial court is to consider the totality of the circumstances of the child and his or her sibling in determining whether the child is at substantial risk of harm, within the meaning of any of the subdivisions enumerated in subdivision (j). The provision thus accords the trial court greater latitude to exercise jurisdiction as to a child whose sibling has been found to have been abused...." (In re Maria R., supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 64.) The evidence concerning Maya's abuse, and Father's explanations for that abuse, constitutes substantial evidence for the juvenile court's finding under this subdivision, as does the evidence that Maya and Aaron are close in age.
Section 300, subdivision (b) provides that a child may be made a dependent child of the court if "[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child...."
Here, the evidence was that Father acted in complete disregard for Maya's well being, and that of the rest of his family. He molested his daughter and deceived his wife. The home environment was thus "extremely dysfunctional, and pos[ed] a threat to the[] well-being" of both children. (In re Maria R., supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 69.) That is substantial evidence for the sustained finding under subdivision (b).
Finally, Father argues that the juvenile court erred when it found that Maya was a child described in subdivision (j), given that that subdivision refers to abuse of a sibling. Father has not identified any detriment to him from this finding, in terms of his reunification orders or in any other way. Maya is a dependent child of the court on other grounds, so that we need not consider this contention. (In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.)
As to the dispositional order, Father argues only that if the jurisdictional order is reversed, the dispositional order must be reversed as well. We affirm both orders.
Disposition
The jurisdictional and dispositional orders are affirmed.
We concur: TURNER, P. J., MOSK, J.