Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County No. JW114221-00. Jon E. Stuebbe, Judge.
Stephen M. Hinkle, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Wanda H. Rouzan and Stephen G. Herndon, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before Vartabedian, Acting P.J., Harris, J., and Kane, J.
OPINION
It was alleged in a juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) that appellant Aaron D., a minor, committed a violation of Vehicle Code section 23224, subdivision (a) (possession of alcoholic beverage by an underage driver). Following a contested jurisdiction hearing, the court found the allegation true. At the disposition hearing, the court placed appellant on probation for a period not to exceed six months, but did not declare appellant to be a ward of the court.
On appeal, appellant’s sole contention is that his adjudication of the instant offense was not supported by substantial evidence. We will affirm.
FACTS
Ridgecrest Police Officer Tam Do testified that on March 10, 2007, he effected a stop of a pickup truck after observing the truck fail to stop at a stop sign. There were four persons in the truck, which had an extended cab with a back seat.
Except as otherwise indicated, our factual statement is taken from Officer Do’s testimony.
Appellant was the driver. He rolled down his window, at which point Officer Do detected the faint odor of marijuana. In response to the questioning by the officer, each person denied he possessed or had recently ingested marijuana.
During this portion of his investigation, Officer Do detected the odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle. He “inquire[d] further,” and one of the passengers, Michael Swallow, who “looked very young” and who the officer later determined was 18 years old, “indicate[d] that [he] had been drinking.”
At that point, Officer Do asked all four persons to get out of the vehicle. “[T]hey opened the door,” and when Swallow got out of the truck, the officer saw “[i]n plain view, … three cans of beer underneath the passenger’s seat where Mr. Swallow was sitting,” directly behind the driver’s seat. One of the cans was open and half full.
Officer Do made contact with appellant again and determined that appellant had not been drinking. The officer asked all four persons to whom the beer belonged. All four “denied” [sic].
After all four persons got out of the truck, Officer Do determined no marijuana was present and none of the four was under the influence of marijuana.
Jose A. (Jose) testified that he was with appellant on March 10, “driving around,” when, after he and appellant “got a call,” they “went and picked up” Swallow and Wyatt, another friend, at a party.
The remainder of our factual statement is taken from Jose’s testimony.
Wyatt got in the truck and sat next to Jose in the front seat. Jose was in the middle, between appellant and Wyatt. “[Jose saw] Juan [sic], like, put two beers in his pants and stuff; he had three of them. And, like, we got into the car, and I got in first, since I was in the middle, and then Wyatt got in.” When asked if he knew Wyatt had beer when he got in the car, Jose answered, “Yeah. I seen him and stuff.” Wyatt “was putting them down his pockets and stuff.”
When they were in the truck, Jose “could smell alcohol on Wyatt[.]” Jose did not say anything about Wyatt having beer in his possession. Wyatt did not say to anyone in the truck that he had beer in his possession.
Jose “didn’t see [Swallow] have beer.”
Appellant took Jose home before Officer Do effected the stop of the truck.
DISCUSSION
Vehicle Code section 23224, subdivision (a) provides, subject to exceptions not applicable here, that any person under the age of 21 who “knowingly drive[s] any motor vehicle carrying any alcoholic beverage” is guilty of a misdemeanor. Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish he knew there was beer in the pickup while he was driving, and therefore the instant adjudication cannot stand.
In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support a juvenile court finding that a minor has committed a criminal offense, the reviewing court is bound by the same principles as to sufficiency and the substantiality of the evidence which govern the review of criminal convictions generally. (In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 809.) Those principles include the following:
In addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, the appellate court must determine “ ‘whether from the evidence, including all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, there is any substantial evidence of the existence of each element of the offense charged.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 139, fn. 13.) In making this determination, “[the appellate court] must examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence--evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value--such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.)
“By definition, ‘substantial evidence’ requires evidence and not mere speculation. In any given case, one ‘may speculate about any number of scenarios that may have occurred …. A reasonable inference, however, “may not be based on suspicion alone, or on imagination, speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture, or guess work. [¶] … A finding of fact must be an inference drawn from evidence rather than … a mere speculation as to probabilities without evidence.”’” (People v. Cluff (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 991, 1002, quoting People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 21, disapproved on other points in In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 543-544, fns. 5, 6.) “Evidence which merely raises a strong suspicion of the defendant’s guilt is not sufficient to support a conviction.” (People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755.)
“The appellate court presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1053.) “Although it is the duty of the [trier of fact] to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the [trier of fact], not the appellate court which must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. ‘“If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.”’” (People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 932-933.)
The People point to “[s]everal facts, and reasonable inferences therefrom,” which, they argue, “provide substantial evidence to support the conclusion that appellant knew there was beer in his truck.” First, the People note that Officer Do smelled alcohol from outside the vehicle and that therefore appellant must have been able smell alcohol from inside the vehicle. We accept the truth of this claim, as far as it goes, but given the evidence that both Swallow and Wyatt had been at a party and the lack of direct evidence that anybody was drinking while in the truck, this evidence is of limited value to the prosecution. One or both of appellant’s new passengers may have smelled of alcohol because they had been drinking before getting into the truck.
The People also argue that Swallow’s admission that he had been drinking is significant. This factor, too, is of limited value to the prosecution given that Swallow did not specify when he had been drinking, and the evidence was uncontradicted he had just been at a party. Swallow’s bare admission did not tell the trier of fact that Swallow was drinking in the truck, where it is likely appellant would have noticed, as opposed to at the party, before Swallow ever got into the truck.
Third, the People argue it is reasonably inferable that the three cans of beer found in the back seat were those Wyatt brought into the truck and that at some point, they must have been passed to the back seat, an event that appellant could not have failed to notice. Appellant counters that the evidence was insufficient to support the inference that the cans of beer found in the back seat was the same ones Wyatt brought into the truck. Appellant points out there is no evidence the officer searched Wyatt or even asked him about the beer which, according to Jose, Wyatt brought into the truck, and thus “there is no evidence to indicate that the beer Wyatt was carrying ever left his [pants] pockets.”
However, Jose also testified that he did not see any beer in Swallow’s possession. It is reasonably inferable that three beer cans would be difficult to conceal and that if Swallow brought the beer into the truck, Jose would have noticed. This inference, in turn, supports the further inferences that Swallow did not bring the beer into the truck and that the three cans of beer found in the back seat were the same three cans Jose observed in Wyatt’s possession. And finally, as the People argue and appellant does not dispute, if the beer found in the back seat is the beer Wyatt brought into the truck, it is reasonably inferable that the beer found its way to the back seat by Wyatt passing it back there, and that appellant would have noticed this activity and become aware of the presence of the beer.
Thus, the evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence support the court’s conclusion that appellant was aware of the presence of the beer in his truck.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.