Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Solano County Super. Ct. No. J36301
STEIN, J.
Defendant, a minor, appeals from an order committing him to home supervision for a maximum term of one year six months. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On February 17, 2006, the Solano County District Attorney filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 600 petition, charging defendant with one count of attempted second degree burglary of a vehicle (Pen. Code, §§ 664/459) and one count of vandalism (Pen. Code, § 59, subd. (a)). The petition later was amended add a count of misdemeanor petty theft. (Pen. Code, § 484, subd. (a).)
At the jurisdictional hearing, as to the first two counts, a witness testified that on February 16, 2006, she was looking out of the window of her apartment, and saw a young man or boy standing at the door of a camper/motor home. She knew the owner of the motor home and she knew that the boy did not own it. She saw the boy grab the door of the home and yank it open, after which he hopped into the motor home. At that point, the witness saw another boy, whom she identified as defendant, come around from the other side of the motor home and reach out for the door. Two other boys were standing nearby. The witness then yelled out her window, telling the boys to leave; it wasn’t their motor home. She called the police, but continued to watch the boys. They ran off together, jumping over a fence.
The witness contacted the person who owned the motor home. The owner went out, and saw that the driver’s side door, which had been locked, was open. The inside lock had been broken out of the door and the door was tweaked off its hinges so that it would not close properly. Nothing seemed to have been taken, but some things had been knocked over. The owner called the police. She noticed two boys—who turned out to be defendant and the boy who had yanked the door open—standing a little distance away. When defendant’s companion started to speak to the owner, defendant told him to shut up. They ran off when the victim said she had the police on the telephone. The victim ran after the two boys, who ran around the block, where they joined the other two boys. The four boys got on their scooters and went into an apartment complex across the street, where the police took over the pursuit.
A short time later, the police took the first witness to another location, where they brought out two boys. She identified one of them as the boy who had entered the motor home and one as one of the other boys, noticing that they had changed clothes.
The defense was that the son of the owner had given the boys permission to enter the motor home. Defendant’s attorney also elicited testimony from an investigating officer that the witness who saw the break-in may have confused defendant with one of the other boys, suggesting that defendant was one of the two who stood by while the others entered or began to enter the motor home. The confusion stemmed from the witness’s description of the clothing worn by the different boys. However, the witness’s identification of defendant at trial was unequivocal, and was supported by her detailed recall of the events and the actors.
The court found there had been an attempt to burglarize the motor home. It found the act of yanking the door open had been done unlawfully and maliciously. It also found there was no evidence of the cost of the damage, and therefore granted a defense motion that the crimes be adjudicated misdemeanors.
The third count was supported by the testimony of a detective with the Dixon Police Department. The witness testified that on the afternoon of August 28, 2005, while off duty, he was shopping at a supermarket in Vacaville. He came around a corner and startled a person, whom he later identified as defendant. The person was standing with his pants open, apparently getting ready to stuff a package down his pants. The witness started to walk away, but realizing what was going on, turned back. Defendant had finished shoving the package down his pants. The witness showed defendant his badge and took defendant to the store manager. The package contained chicken. Defendant stated he had taken it because he was hungry and did not have any money. The court found defendant had committed misdemeanor petty theft.
On these findings, the court sustained the petition’s allegations. It adjudicated defendant a ward of the juvenile court, and at the dispositional hearing, ordered defendant placed in the custody of his parents under the supervision of his probation officer, with a maximum period of confinement of one year six months.
This appeal followed.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Defendant contends the evidence does not support the court’s finding he aided and abetted his codefendant in the commission of the attempted burglary and vandalism. Whether a person has aided and abetted in the commission of a crime ordinarily is a question of fact. (In re Juan G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1, 5 (Juan G.); In re Lynette G. (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1094 (Lynette G).) It follows that on appeal, all conflicts in the evidence and attendant reasonable inferences are resolved in favor of the judgment or order. (Juan G., supra,at p. 5.) An aider and abettor is one who acts with knowledge of the criminal purpose of the perpetrator and with the intent or purpose either of committing, or of encouraging or facilitating commission of, the offense. (People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560 (Beeman); In re Jose T. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1455, 1460 (Jose T.) “Among the factors which may be considered in determining aiding and abetting are: presence at the crime scene, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense.” (Juan G., supra,at p. 5 & fn. 6.) “Neither mere presence at the scene of a crime, nor the failure to take steps to prevent a crime, is alone sufficient to establish that a person is an aider and abettor. Such evidence may, however, be considered together with other evidence in determining that a person is an aider and abettor. [Citation.]” (Jose T., supra, at p. 1460.)
In Lynette G., the principal actor, a teenage girl, was in the company of three other teenage girls when she struck the victim and took her purse. When the victim called out for help, the four girls ran off. A short time later, police stopped four girls, one of whom was the defendant. The girls generally matched the description of the principal actor and the three girls who had been present when the principal actor committed the crime. The clothing worn by three of the girls matched the descriptions of the clothing worn by three of the four girls who had run away. A person who had witnessed the crime identified all four girls as those who had been seen running away, and other people at the scene also identified the girls. (Lynette G., supra,54 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1090-1092.) The appellate court found the evidence sufficient to convict the defendant of robbery on a theory of aiding and abetting. (Id. at p. 1095.) In Juan G., the defendant stood by when his companion drew a knife, pointed it at the victim and demanded money. The victim felt threatened by the defendant, who was standing close enough to touch him. He gave money to the companion, and defendant and the companion fled. The police found them walking together through an empty lot and then attempting to climb a perimeter wall. (Juan G., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at pp. 3-4.) The appellate court found substantial evidence supported the finding the defendant had aided and abetted the robbery. (Id. at p. 6.)
Here, defendant was with three other boys, including the principal actor, at the motor home. Defendant’s companion entered the motor home by kicking the door open with enough force to break the lock and damage the hinges. There is evidence defendant then came around the motor home and acted as if he, too, intended to enter. When the boys were confronted by the witness, they ran off together, jumping over a fence. The actions of defendant and his companions were inconsistent with any belief they had permission to enter the motor home. Defendant did not disassociate himself with the boy who had broken in. To the contrary, he not only stayed with that boy, but directed him not to speak to the woman who owned the motor home. The court in Lynette G. pointed out, in similar circumstances, “Although flight, in and of itself, may be explained by a desire merely to disassociate oneself from an unexpected criminal activity, the trial court was not required to adopt that view; it could, reasonably, have concluded that had [defendant’s] flight been from fear of an unjustified charge of involvement, she also would have immediately disassociated herself from the other three girls.” (Lynette G., supra, 54 Cal.App.3d at p. 1095.) The same reasoning applies here.
On this evidence, the juvenile court was entitled to find defendant did not just fail to take steps to prevent a crime, but, perfectly aware of his companion’s unlawful intent, acted with the intent to encourage and facilitate it. Defendant’s liability extends to the natural and reasonable consequences of the acts he knowingly and intentionally aided and encouraged. (Beeman, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 560.) The evidence therefore also supports the juvenile court’s finding that defendant was guilty of vandalism.
That defendant’s actions might be interpreted as innocent makes no difference. The issue is whether the juvenile court’s finding was supported by substantial evidence. We also see no reason to distinguish Lynette G., supra, 54 Cal.App.3d 1087and Juan G., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th 1 by the closeness of the defendant to the principal actor at the time the principal actor committed the criminal act. In those cases, the closeness of the aider and abettor added to the threat to the victim, providing additional evidence of the defendants’ intentions. Here, where the crime was a burglary, whether defendant stood near or far from the principal actor is of little relevance, particularly when there was evidence defendant himself was about to enter the motor home after the principal actor forced open the door.
CONCLUSION
The order is affirmed.
We concur:
MARCHIANO, P. J.,MARGULIES, J.