Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. JJ17281, Donna Quigley Groman, Judge.
Kevin D. Sheehy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Keith H. Borjon, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Joseph P. Lee, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MOSK, J.
INTRODUCTION
The District Attorney of Los Angeles County (District Attorney) filed a petition alleging that appellant A.A. came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 because he was a minor in possession of a firearm, a violation of Penal Code section 12101, subdivision (a)(1). A.A. filed a Pitchess/Brady motion (Pitchess motion) for the discovery of personnel records for two Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department deputies. The juvenile court partially granted the motion, and ordered an in camera review of prior false reports by one of the deputies. At the adjudication hearing, the juvenile court found the allegation against A.A. to be true, sustained the petition, and declared A.A. to be a ward of the juvenile court. The juvenile court ordered A.A. placed on home probation in the home of his guardian.
All statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess); Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady).
On appeal, A.A. contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied a substantial part of his Pitchess motion. A.A. claims that the juvenile court potentially deprived him of evidence to impeach the deputies at the adjudication hearing, and deprived him of his federal constitutional rights to due process, confrontation, compulsory process, a fair trial, and a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense, pursuant to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We conditionally reverse the adjudication and remand the matter to the juvenile court for further proceedings on A.A.’s Pitchess motion.
BACKGROUND
A. Prosecution’s Case
About 11:30 p.m. on July 11, 2009, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Deputies Magos and Burgos were on patrol when Deputy Burgos saw A.A. look in his direction. A.A. then reached into his right front pocket, removed a gun, and tossed it to the sidewalk. A.A. was with two other males, and there were three or four people in the area who appeared to be “hanging out” on the street corner talking to each other. Deputy Burgos recovered the loaded gun seconds later, and his partner detained A.A. Deputy Burgos testified at the adjudication hearing, but Deputy Magos did not.
B. Defense Case
A.A. testified that he was standing next to three or four people whom he did not know, and three or four others were arguing and getting into a car. A.A. was waiting for one of his friends to come back out of his house. One of the deputies pointed to a gun lying about two feet from A.A., but lying close to another person, and asked A.A. if the gun was his. A.A. denied that it was his gun. One of the deputies said, “Well, I saw you throw it, ” and took A.A. to the patrol car. During the ride to the police station, A.A. testified that the deputies “questioned me for more guns, ” and the deputies said they would let him go if he told them “where there were more guns.” A.A. told them “I don’t know where more guns are at.”
C. Pitchess/Brady Motion
A.A. filed a pretrial discovery motion pursuant to Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531, and Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83, seeking the discovery of confidential personnel information for Deputies Burgos and Magos. In support of his motion, A.A.’s counsel declared on information and belief that the deputies prepared a false incident report because A.A. did not possess or discard a firearm. The declaration provided that “[A.A.] was standing on the sidewalk [on] Parmalee [Avenue] with approximately five other people. The deputies’ patrol vehicle turned onto Parmalee and the other people started running. [A.A.] stayed where he was because he did not have any contraband. [A.A.] did not possess a firearm on that night, nor did he discard a firearm on that night.”
The incident report, prepared by Deputy Burgos, provided that Deputies Burgos and Magos saw A.A. standing on the sidewalk on Parmalee Avenue. As the deputies approached A.A., Deputy Burgos saw A.A. look in their direction, and A.A. saw them. The deputies then saw A.A. reach into his pants pocket, remove a handgun, and throw it on the sidewalk.
A.A. contended that the deputies’ alleged wrongful conduct in this case “illustrate[s] that [they] are involved in acts of dishonesty, specifically, the fabrication of police reports” and “evidences that there is likely a pattern and practice of dishonesty on the part of these deputies, which has bearing on their character and credibility.” A.A. contended the requested discovery would be used to locate witnesses to testify that the deputies had “a character trait, habit, and custom of engaging in lying, perjury, writing false police reports, [and] making false arrests.” A.A. stated that “[s]uch information would be used by the defense to effectively cross-examine the officer at trial and for impeachment purposes where appropriate.”
In the motion, A.A. sought “complaints from any and all sources relating to fabrication of charges, fabrication of evidence, fabrication of reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause; illegal search or seizure, false arrest, perjury, dishonesty, writing of false police reports, and any other evidence of misconduct amounting to moral turpitude...” as well as complainant and witness contact information. A.A. also sought, inter alia, records of any discipline imposed upon the deputies as a result of the complaints, exculpatory or impeaching material under Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83, statements of police officers who were complainants or witnesses to the deputies’ alleged wrongful conduct, and contact information and transcripts of all persons who testified at the Civil Service Commission hearings regarding either of the deputies’ alleged wrongful conduct.
The juvenile court partially granted the Pitchess motion, and ordered an in camera review of Deputy Burgos’s personnel documents from the past five years concerning the filing of false reports, but denied the Pitchess motion as to Deputy Magos. After conducting an in camera review of the documents presented by the custodian of records, the juvenile court ordered the production of the contact information regarding one personnel complaint concerning the alleged submission of a false report.
A.A. filed a supplemental Pitchess motion seeking more specific information regarding the personnel complaint because A.A.’s counsel was unable meaningfully to investigate the material provided in the initial disclosure. At the hearing, the juvenile court ordered the disclosure of the verbatim statement made by the complainant, Sergeant Jones.
A.A. does not contend that the trial court erred in ruling on his supplemental Pitchess motion.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review the juvenile court’s ruling on the Pitchess motion for abuse of discretion. (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1286; see also People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 330 [A trial court’s ruling on a motion for access to law enforcement personnel records is subject to review for abuse of discretion].)
B. Pitchess Discovery
1. General Principles
“Evidence Code sections 1043 through 1045 codify Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 [113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305]. ‘The statutory scheme carefully balances two directly conflicting interests: the peace officer’s just claim to confidentiality, and the criminal defendant’s equally compelling interest in all information pertinent to the defense.’ (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 47, 53 [19 Cal.Rptr.2d 73, 850 P.2d 621].) The legislation achieves this balance primarily through a procedure of in camera review, set forth in section 1045, subdivision (b), whereby the trial court can determine whether a police officer’s personnel files contain any material relevant to the defense, with only a minimal breach in the confidentiality of that file.” (People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1220.)
“To initiate discovery, the defendant must file a motion supported by affidavits showing ‘good cause for the discovery, ’ first by demonstrating the materiality of the information to the pending litigation, and second by ‘stating upon reasonable belief’ that the police agency has the records or information at issue. ([Evid. Code, ] § 1043, subd. (b)(3).) This two-part showing of good cause is a ‘relatively low threshold for discovery.’ [Citation.] [¶] If the trial court finds good cause for the discovery, it reviews the pertinent documents in chambers and discloses only that information falling within the statutorily defined standards of relevance. [Citations.]” (Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1019 (Warrick); People v. Gaines (2009) 46 Cal.4th 172, 179 (Gaines) [“A showing of good cause is measured by ‘relatively relaxed standards’ that serve to ‘insure the production’ for trial court review of ‘all potentially relevant documents.’ [Citation.]”].)
“To show good cause as required by section 1043, defense counsel’s declaration in support of a Pitchess motion must propose a defense or defenses to the pending charges.... [¶] Counsel’s affidavit must also describe a factual scenario supporting the claimed officer misconduct. That factual scenario, depending on the circumstances of the case, may consist of a denial of the facts asserted in the police report. [¶]... [¶] [A] plausible scenario of officer misconduct is one that might or could have occurred. Such a scenario is plausible because it presents an assertion of specific police misconduct that is both internally consistent and supports the defense proposed to the charges. A defendant must also show how the information sought could lead to or be evidence potentially admissible at trial. Such a showing ‘put[s] the court on notice’ that the specified officer misconduct ‘will likely be an issue at trial.’ [Citation.] Once that burden is met, the defendant has shown materiality under section 1043.” (Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 1024-1026.)
When a trial court errs in rejecting a showing of good cause for a Pitchess motion and has not reviewed the requested records in camera, the proper remedy is a conditional reversal and remand to permit the trial court to review the requested documents and to issue a discovery order, if warranted. (Gaines, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 180-181.) If, after such a review, the trial court determines that the requested personnel records contain no relevant information, then the trial court is to reinstate the adjudication order. (Id. at p. 181.) If, on the other hand, the trial court determines on remand that relevant information exists and should be disclosed, the trial court shall order disclosure and permit the defendant an opportunity to demonstrate prejudice. (Ibid.) If the defendant is able to show that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different had the information been disclosed, the trial court shall order a new trial. (Ibid.)
2. Ruling on Pitchess Motion
A.A. contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying the Pitchess motion as to Deputy Magos. We disagree.
A.A. did not provide a factual scenario of officer misconduct by Deputy Magos. Counsel’s affidavit in support of the motion alleged that the deputies falsified the police report. Deputy Magos, however, did not prepare the incident report. Deputy Burgos did. Although the incident report is often written in the plural-such as “we saw”-there is nothing in the record to suggest that Deputy Magos contributed to any of the information contained in the report. A.A. failed to provide a factual scenario that Deputy Magos did anything wrong. The request for confidential personnel records as to Deputy Magos therefore was unsupported. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion as to Deputy Magos.
In addition, A.A.’s only specific justification in his Pitchess motion for the requested discovery was for impeachment purposes. Deputy Magos, however, did not testify at the adjudication hearing. Therefore, even had relevant information existed as to him and should have been disclosed pursuant to A.A.’s Pitchess motion, A.A. did not suffer any prejudice. There was not a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different had the information been disclosed. (Gaines, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 180-181.)
As to Deputy Burgos, however, we agree with A.A. that his Pitchess motion demonstrated good cause for discovery-not only of false police reports, if any, as ordered by the juvenile court-but also of personnel records that relate to allegations of his making false arrests, planting evidence, fabricating probable cause, and committing perjury. Deputy Magos testified at the adjudication hearing, so the information sought by A.A. was relevant to impeachment.
The facts here are analogous to Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th 1011. In that case, the police report indicated that the three arresting officers were on patrol in a marked vehicle in an area known for narcotics activities when they observed the defendant looking into a clear plastic baggie in his hand. (Id. at p. 1016.) The baggie contained “off-white solids.” (Ibid.) As the officers exited their vehicle, the defendant fled, discarding numerous off-white “lumps” resembling rock cocaine. (Ibid.) One of the officers recovered 42 lumps from the ground and the other two officers detained the defendant after a short pursuit. (Ibid.) The defendant had an empty baggie in his hand and $2.75 in cash in his pockets. (Ibid.) Defendant was arrested and charged with, inter alia, possession of cocaine base for sale. (Id. at pp. 1016-1017.)
Prior to trial, the defendant filed a Pitchess motion under Evidence Code section 1043 for disclosure of any previous citizen complaints against the three arresting officers. (Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1017.) The defendant supported his motion with a declaration from his counsel setting forth the following facts: “When the three officers got out of the patrol car, defendant, who feared an arrest on an outstanding parole warrant, started to run away, but within moments the officers caught up with him. Meanwhile, there were ‘people pushing and kicking and fighting with each other’ as they collected from the ground objects later determined to be rock cocaine. After two officers retrieved some of the rocks, an officer told defendant, ‘You must have thrown this.’ Defendant denied possessing or discarding any rock cocaine. He said he was in the area to buy cocaine from a seller who was present there. Defense counsel suggested that the officers, not knowing who had discarded the cocaine, falsely claimed to have seen defendant, who was running away, do so.” (Ibid.)
The trial court denied the defendant’s motion, including his request for an in camera review of the requested records, concluding that the defendant had failed to establish good cause. (Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1018.) After the Court of Appeal denied the defendant’s petition for writ of mandate, the Supreme Court granted review. (Ibid.)
In reversing the Court of Appeal’s order denying the defendant’s petition, the Supreme Court concluded, “[the] defendant’s version of events is plausible given the factual scenario described in defense counsel’s declaration. The declaration asserted that the officers mistook defendant for the person who actually discarded the cocaine, and falsely accused him of having done so. The scenario described in defense counsel’s declaration is internally consistent; it conflicts with the police report only in denying that defendant possessed any cocaine and that he was the one who discarded the rocks of cocaine found on the ground. Those denials form the basis of a defense to the charge of possessing cocaine for sale. Thus, defendant has outlined a defense raising the issue of the practice of the arresting officers to make false arrests, plant evidence, commit perjury, and falsify police reports or probable cause.” (Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1027.) Accordingly, the court in Warrick held that the defendant had “established good cause for Pitchess discovery, entitling him to the trial court’s in-chambers review of the arresting officers’ personnel records relating to making false arrests, planting evidence, fabricating police reports or probable cause, and committing perjury.” (Ibid.)
In the instant case, similar to the facts in Warrick, the declaration of A.A.’s counsel essentially asserted that the deputies falsely accused A.A as “the person who actually discarded the” firearm. (Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1027.) The scenario described in the declaration of A.A.’s counsel “conflicts with the police report... in denying that” A.A. possessed the handgun “and that he was the one who discarded” it on the ground. (Ibid.) “Those denials form the basis of a defense to the charge of possessing” the firearm. (Ibid.) Thus, A.A. “has outlined a defense raising the issue of the practice of” Deputy Burgos “to make false arrests, plant evidence, commit perjury, and falsify police reports or probable cause.” (Ibid.) Given that factual scenario, the juvenile court was under an affirmative duty to conduct an in camera inspection for such information beyond just false police reports, and the juvenile court’s failure so do so warrants conditional reversal of the adjudication to allow the juvenile court to conduct the required in-chambers inspection.
A.A. also argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it failed to conduct an in camera review of the personnel file for Brady material (Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83) beyond the five year limitation imposed by Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (b)(1), thereby depriving him of his federal constitutional rights. We disagree.
Prosecutors have a mandate, under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, to disclose to defendants in criminal cases exculpatory material evidence that the prosecutor or his or her team knowingly possesses or has the right to possess. (People v. Jordan (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 349, 358.) “[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” (Brady, supra, 373 U.S. at 87.) When managing its employees, the Sheriff’s Department, however, is not acting as a prosecutor or a member of the prosecution team. (People v. Superior Court (Barrett) (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1314-1320.) In fact, the prosecution generally does not have the right to possess, and does not have access to, a peace officer’s personnel files in the absence of a prosecutor-initiated Pitchess motion. (Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033; People v. Gutierrez (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1475.) Therefore, prosecutors do not have a routine duty to review the personnel files of all significant police officer witnesses. (People v.Gutierrez, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1475-1476.)
In City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 1 (Brandon), the defendant filed a Pitchess motion seeking information in the personnel records of the two arresting officers. The trial court reviewed the materials in chambers and ordered the disclosure of a citizen complaint filed against one of the officers 10 years before the defendant’s arrest. Although Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (b)(1) expressly precludes discovery of citizen complaints “occurring more than five years before” the defendant’s criminal act, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s order as necessary to protect defendant’s federal constitutional right to a fair trial.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment, and directed the Court of Appeal to issue a peremptory writ of mandate that ordered the trial court not to disclose the information. (Id. at p. 16-17.) The court did not disregard the 10-year-old complaint merely because it was outside the five year period proscribed by Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (b)(1). The court, instead, analyzed the requested disclosure under the constitutionally material standards established in Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83, but ultimately determined that it was not subject to disclosure. (Brandon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 16.)
The court in Brandon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at page 15 stated, however, “a trial court that in response to a criminal defendant’s discovery motion undertakes an in-chambers review of confidential documents can, if the documents contain information whose use at trial could be dispositive on either guilt or punishment, order their disclosure.” (Italics added.) The court cautioned, however, that “[w]e do not suggest that trial courts must routinely review information that is contained in peace officer personnel files and is more than five years old to ascertain whether Brady... requires its disclosure.” (Id. at p. 15, fn. 3.)
Here, by contrast, the trial court did not order the disclosure of Brady materials. There “is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one.” (Weatherford v. Bursey (1977) 429 U.S. 545, 559; Gray v. Netherland (1996) 518 U.S. 152, 168; accord, People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1258, superseded by statute on another ground, as stated in In re Steele (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682, 690.) Accordingly, we reject A.A.’s argument that his federal constitutional rights were violated.
A.A. also argues that the juvenile court’s failure to grant his entire Pitchess motion violated his right to confront witnesses. The United States Supreme Court, however, has rejected that argument. The Confrontation Clause protects a defendant's trial, not discovery, rights. (Pennsylvania v. Ritchie (1987) 480 U.S. 39, 53, fn. 9.) Thus, "the ability to question adverse witnesses... does not include the power to require the pretrial disclosure of any and all information that might be useful in contradicting unfavorable testimony." (Id. at p. 53.)
3. In Camera Review
Prior to the adjudication hearing, the juvenile court conducted an in camera hearing to review certain personnel records of Deputy Burgos to determine whether they contained any discoverable information concerning Deputy Burgos filing false reports. Following that in camera review, the juvenile court ordered the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department to provide to A.A. certain information that the court deemed discoverable. Citing People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1226-1229 (Mooc), A.A. requests that we conduct an independent review of the in camera proceedings to determine whether discoverable personnel records were incorrectly withheld. Respondent agrees.
“When a trial court concludes a defendant’s Pitchess motion shows good cause for discovery of relevant evidence contained in a law enforcement officer’s personnel files, the custodian of the records is obligated to bring to the trial court all ‘potentially relevant’ documents to permit the trial court to examine them for itself. ([City of] Santa Cruz [v. Municipal Court (1989)] 49 Cal.3d [74, ] 84.) A law enforcement officer’s personnel record will commonly contain many documents that would, in the normal case, be irrelevant to a Pitchess motion, including those describing marital status and identifying family members, employment applications, letters of recommendation, promotion records, and health records. (See Pen. Code, § 832.8.) Documents clearly irrelevant to a defendant’s Pitchess request need not be presented to the trial court for in camera review. But if the custodian has any doubt whether a particular document is relevant, he or she should present it to the trial court. Such practice is consistent with the premise of Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045 that the locus of decision making is to be the trial court, not the prosecution or the custodian of records. The custodian should be prepared to state in chambers and for the record what other documents (or category of documents) not presented to the court were included in the complete personnel record, and why those were deemed irrelevant or otherwise nonresponsive to the defendant’s Pitchess motion. A court reporter should be present to document the custodian’s statements, as well as any questions the trial court may wish to ask the custodian regarding the completeness of the record. (See People v. Jackson [(1996)] 13 Cal.4th [1164, ] 1221, fn. 10 [explaining that this court ‘reviewed the sealed record of the in camera proceeding’].)” (Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 1228-1229.) The court should exclude from disclosure several enumerated categories of information, including facts that are “so remote as to make disclosure of little or no practical benefit.” (Evid Code, § 1045, subd. (b)(3).)
“The trial court should then make a record of what documents it examined before ruling on the Pitchess motion. Such a record will permit future appellate review. If the documents produced by the custodian are not voluminous, the court can photocopy them and place them in a confidential file. Alternatively, the court can prepare a list of the documents it considered, or simply state for the record what documents it examined. Without some record of the documents examined by the trial court, a party’s ability to obtain appellate review of the trial court’s decision, whether to disclose or not to disclose, would be nonexistent. Of course, to protect the officer’s privacy, the examination of documents and questioning of the custodian should be done in camera in accordance with the requirements of Evidence Code section 915, and the transcript of the in camera hearing and all copies of the documents should be sealed. (Footnote omitted.) (See People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 825 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2] [after ruling on the Pitchess motion, ‘[t]he magistrate ordered that all remaining materials be copied and sealed’].)” (Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 1229-1230.)
In response to A.A.’s Pitchess motion, the juvenile court ordered the Sheriff’s Department to produce personnel records for the preceding five years concerning complaints that Deputy Burgos had submitted false police reports. The custodian of records for the Sheriff’s Department responded and produced records that the juvenile court reviewed in camera. That review was transcribed by the court reporter, and the transcript was sealed. Following its in camera review, the juvenile court ordered the Sheriff’s Department to produce to A.A. information about one complaint against Deputy Burgos. The juvenile court did not review any records concerning Deputy Magos.
Although the sealed court reporter’s transcript of the juvenile court’s in camera review was included in the record on appeal, copies of the documents reviewed by the juvenile court, but not disclosed to A.A., were not included. After reviewing that transcript we requested that the record be augmented to include copies of the materials reviewed by the juvenile court that were not disclosed to A.A. We appointed the juvenile court to act as referee to conduct record correction proceedings.
Pursuant to that appointment, the juvenile court conducted a further in camera proceeding on October 27, 2010, and thereafter filed with this court a report and findings concerning that further proceeding. The sealed reporter’s transcript of that proceeding was also lodged with this court, along with copies of the documents reviewed by the juvenile court at the record correction proceeding.
We have reviewed the report and findings of the juvenile court, the transcript of the record correction proceeding, and all the documents filed under seal with this court that were reviewed by the juvenile court at the record correction proceeding. Based on that review, as well as our prior review of the original in camera proceeding, we conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by withholding any discoverable personnel records that it reviewed.
DISPOSITION
The adjudication order is conditionally reversed and remanded to the juvenile court to obtain and review the personnel records of Deputy Burgos for anything related to allegations of his making false arrests, planting evidence, fabricating probable cause, and committing perjury, within the five year limitation imposed by section 1045, subdivision (b)(1). The juvenile court shall issue a discovery order, if warranted.
With respect to the disclosed documents, if any, the juvenile court shall permit A.A. an opportunity to demonstrate prejudice. If A.A. is able to show that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of his adjudication hearing would have been different had the information been disclosed, the juvenile court shall order a new adjudication hearing. If A.A. is unable to show that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of his adjudication hearing would have been different had the information been disclosed, the juvenile court is to reinstate the adjudication.
We concur: TURNER, P. J., KRIEGLER, J.