1. Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant juvenile A.M., born June 16, 2006, with two counts of attempted second-degree murder and two counts of second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon. According to the juvenile-delinquency petition, on August 27, 2022, two adult males, Male A and Male B, confronted 16-year-old A.M. and 14-year-old A.R. after the juveniles "started messing" with Male A's vehicle. The confrontation occurred near Male A's driveway. Male A indicated that he recognized the juveniles because he had previously smoked marijuana with them. Male A asked the juveniles what they were doing. A verbal altercation ensued, and A.M. pulled out a handgun and pointed it at the ground. Male A said something to the effect of, "If you're going to pull that out, then shoot me." A.M. replied that he was going to wait for a nearby vehicle to pass, and after the vehicle passed, A.M. counted down from five. When he reached one, he pointed the gun at the males. About five seconds later, he opened fire and repeatedly shot at both males while they were standing approximately 50 to 70 feet away. The males ducked and ran away. Eight shell casings were located at the scene. Fortunately, no one was injured.

2. The state moved to certify A.M. for adult prosecution, and the district court ordered a certification study. See Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 18.04, subd. 1 (stating that the district court "may order social, psychiatric, or psychological studies concerning the child who is the subject of the certification proceeding"). Because of A.M.'s age and the seriousness of the alleged offenses, certification was presumed, and A.M. had the burden of overcoming that presumption by "clear and convincing evidence." See Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 3 (2022) (stating that certification is presumed if the child was 16 or 17 at the time of the offense, the offense was a felony involving a firearm or would result in imprisonment "under the Sentencing Guidelines and applicable statutes," and probable cause supports the charges); Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 18.06, subd. 1 (same). A.M. opposed the certification motion, arguing, in part, that the certification statute, Minn. Stat. § 260B.125 (2022), is unconstitutional.

3. The district court held a certification hearing at which the court heard testimony from a psychologist, Dr. Sara Vaccarella, and a probation officer, April Jones, and received into evidence a psychological report from Dr. Vaccarella and a certification study from Jones. Jones recommended certification. Dr. Vaccarella concluded that there were factors for and against certification, but she did not offer a recommendation on the ultimate issue of certification.

4. The district court granted the state's request to certify A.M. for adult prosecution, reasoning that five of the six relevant public-safety factors supported certification. See id., subd. 4 (setting forth public-safety factors). The district court rejected A.M.'s constitutional challenge. A.M. moved to stay the criminal proceedings pending appeal of the certification order. The district court granted the motion and stayed the proceedings. This appeal followed.

5. "When a child is alleged to have committed, after becoming 14 years of age, an offense that would be a felony if committed by an adult, the [district] court may enter an order certifying the proceeding for action under the laws and court procedures controlling adult criminal violations." Id., subd. 1. A presumption in favor of certification exists if the child was at least 16 years of age at the time of the alleged offense, the offense is one that would result in a presumptive commitment to prison or was a felony involving the use of a firearm, and probable cause exists to support the charge. Id., subd. 3. The child bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by "clear and convincing evidence that retaining the proceeding in the juvenile court serves public safety." Id.

6. To determine whether certifying a child for adult prosecution serves public safety, the district court must consider six factors:

(1) the seriousness of the alleged offense in terms of community protection, including the existence of any aggravating factors recognized by the Sentencing Guidelines, the use of a firearm, and the impact on any victim;

(2) the culpability of the child in committing the alleged offense, including the level of the child's participation in planning and carrying out the offense and the existence of any mitigating factors recognized by the Sentencing Guidelines;

(3) the child's prior record of delinquency;

(4) the child's programming history, including the child's past willingness to participate meaningfully in available programming;

(5) the adequacy of the punishment or programming available in the juvenile justice system; and

(6) the dispositional options available for the child.

Id., subd. 4; Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 18.06, subd. 3.

7. In considering these factors, a district court must "give greater weight to the seriousness of the alleged offense and the child's prior record of delinquency." Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 4; Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 18.06, subd. 3. The district court must take the factual allegations contained in the juvenile-delinquency petition as true. In re Welfare of J.H., 844 N.W.2d 28, 38 (Minn. 2014). However, "evidence of the alleged offense alone is insufficient to justify certification." In re Welfare of L.M., 719 N.W.2d 708, 712 (Minn.App. 2006); see In re Welfare of J.L.B., 435 N.W.2d 595, 599 (Minn.App. 1989) (stating that in addition to any inference that may be drawn from the commission of the offense itself, the record must contain evidence of non-offense-related factors bearing on public safety), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 17, 1989).

8. A district court has "considerable latitude" in deciding whether to certify a juvenile for adult prosecution. In re Welfare of P.C.T., 823 N.W.2d 676, 681 (Minn.App. 2012) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 2013). Thus, we review a district court's certification decision for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of H.B., 986 N.W.2d 158, 166 (Minn. 2022); P.C.T., 823 N.W.2d at 681. An abuse of discretion occurs when a district court's decision is based on an incorrect view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record. State v. Vangrevenhof, 941 N.W.2d 730, 736 (Minn. 2020). "[W]e will not disturb the district court's findings of fact regarding public safety unless they are clearly erroneous." H.B., 986 N.W.2d at 166. In applying the clear-error standard, we do not reweigh evidence or engage in fact-finding, and we view the record in a light most favorable to the district court's findings. In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221-22 (Minn. 2021); J.H., 844 N.W.2d at 35. A finding is not clearly erroneous if there is reasonable evidence in the record to support it. Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co., 832 N.W.2d 790, 797 (Minn. 2013). To conclude that factual findings are clearly erroneous, we must be "left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Id. (quotations omitted).

9. A.M. challenges the district court's analysis of the public-safety factors. The district court determined that the first public-safety factor, the seriousness of the alleged offense, favored certification, finding that the alleged offenses were "extremely serious" and that the facts established "a grave public safety concern." The record supports those findings.

10. A.M. argues that the district court failed to consider the impact on the victims and that the victims were the aggressors. The record refutes that argument. The district court considered the impact on the victims, noting, based on the testimony of Dr. Vaccarella, that it was likely that they feared for their lives. The district court also found, based on the certification study, that one of the victims wanted A.M. to be certified as an adult. The district court rejected A.M.'s assertion that the victims were the aggressors, specifically finding that the record did not support that assertion. Indeed, as set forth in the delinquency petition, A.M. fired multiple rounds at unarmed individuals as they ran from the gunfire. The district court did not err in its analysis of the first public-safety factor.

11. As to the second public-safety factor, the juvenile's culpability, the district court found that A.M. was "fully culpable," that he was not "forced or pressured to commit the offense," that there were no mitigating circumstances, and that the culpability factor "strongly favor[ed] certification." The record supports those findings. A.M. argues that he played a minor role in the offense and was under duress because Male A made a "veiled threat" in urging A.M. to shoot. We are not persuaded by that argument.

12. A.M. also argues that the district court failed to consider mitigating factors. He claims that he lacked the "capacity for judgement at the time [of] the offense" because of his age and maturity. Once again, we are not persuaded. Dr. Vaccarella testified that "[t]eenagers are notoriously impulsive and prone to poor judgment." She further testified that there existed an "impulsiveness" in the alleged crime "that would be characteristic of-of juvenile poor executive functioning." However, Dr. Vaccarella also testified that A.M.'s actions showed aspects "of planning and deliberation." And the district court relied on Dr. Vaccarella's report, which stated that A.M. appeared competent and aware of his actions and that A.M.'s decision to fire was planned.

13. As to the third public-safety factor, the child's prior record of delinquency, the district court found that although A.M. "has had no previous delinquency adjudications," he has had "extensive past involvement with the Juvenile system beginning at age 12" and was on probation when the charged offenses occurred. The district court reasoned that although A.M.'s history of truancy, successfully completed stays of adjudication, and petty offenses was concerning, there was no evidence of "any prior assaultive behavior, or prior behavior that implicates serious threats to public safety." The district court properly determined that this factor does not support certification.

14. As to the fourth public-safety factor, which concerns "programming history" and "willingness to participate" in programming, the district court found that A.M. had "a lengthy programming history with varied levels of success" and found that A.M. had "displayed a pattern of unwillingness to participate with recommended mental health therapy," had failed to appear for court hearings, had failed to cooperate with probation, and had a lengthy history of truancy and behavioral issues at school. The district court also found that A.M. "is not currently demonstrating consistent or meaningful participation in enrolled programming at Prairie Lakes Youth Program [PLYP] pending this matter." The district court therefore determined that the fourth public-safety factor favored certification.

15. A.M. argues that his lack of participation and cooperation was due to his sole custodial parent's substance abuse, and the record supports that assertion. But the district court acknowledged the role that inadequate parenting played in A.M.'s behavior, and we therefore discern no error here.

16. A.M. also argues that the district court should not have considered his truancy history and behavioral issues at school. The district court's findings indicate that A.M. disrupted class, accepted stolen items from a peer, did not listen to staff, wore clothing with a photo of a pistol, refused work, and skipped classes. "[A] child's programming history . . . is not limited to formal programming history in the juvenile justice system; instead, it broadly refers to programming history consisting of a specialized system of services, opportunities, or projects designed to meet a relevant behavioral or social need of the child." J.H., 844 N.W.2d at 39. Generally, "a school does not fall within the broad definition of programming . . . because its purpose is to provide children with basic education, not to address specific behavioral or social issues of a child relevant to juvenile delinquency." Id. Yet, the district court reasoned that A.M.'s "ongoing truancy and school behavior records also demonstrate lack of consistent behavior change despite numerous interventions." The district court should not have considered A.M.'s behavioral incidents in an informal school setting when assessing the fourth public-safety factor.

17. In addition to that legal error, we note the record does not support the district court's finding that A.M. had demonstrated "a pattern of unwillingness to participate with recommended mental health therapy." Dr. Vaccarella reported that A.M. completed a substance-use evaluation in April 2022 and that he subsequently completed CD treatment recommendations and saw a counselor. He reportedly was engaged with his counselor throughout their sessions. He told Dr. Vaccarella that his counselor "grew on [him]" and that he "liked talking to her," so he continued that therapeutic relationship.

18. Probation Officer Jones explained that because A.M. was opposed to a recommendation for individual therapy, arrangements were made to offer individual services with an alcohol-and-drug counselor. Jones noted that A.M. "remains in the program currently by [Z]oom sessions at PLYP." Jones explained that the treatment plan for A.M. to have weekly individual sessions with the alcohol-and-drug counselor allowed for a more "therapeutic setting" and "support[ed]" the recommendation for individual therapy. In other words, A.M.'s weekly sessions with his counselor-with which he fully cooperated, even while detained at PLYP-were intended to serve as his individual therapy. The district court acknowledged those circumstances, finding that A.M. "refused to attend mental health therapy while on probation requiring his recommendations to be changed to regularly meeting with a chemical dependency counselor." The district court further found that A.M. "was successful at completing this revised recommendation." The court cited that single example as support for its finding that A.M. had demonstrated a "pattern" of refusing to cooperate with mental-health services. On this record, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. See Rasmussen, 832 N.W.2d at 797.

19. Moreover, the record provides only minimal support for the district court's finding that A.M. "is not currently demonstrating consistent or meaningful participation in enrolled programming" at PLYP "pending this matter." Dr. Vaccarella reported that "PLYP records indicate [that A.M.] has been compliant and participating in programming adequately" and that he has been "polite and respectful toward staff and peers." Dr. Vaccarella also reported that A.M. "has received ongoing CD counseling despite no longer being required to, as he believes he benefits from the added support" and opined that A.M.'s programming history does not support certification. Dr. Vaccarella further reported A.M. "is also showing amenability to intervention while institutionalized and has not engaged in any antisocial behaviors," referring to A.M.'s detention at PLYP.

20. Probation Officer Jones similarly reported that "PLYP records indicate no significant behavior issues with [A.M.] and that "[o]verall, he is respectful to staff and teachers and meets his program obligations." Jones also reported that "[A.M.] is attending school at PLYP," that "[r]ecords from PLYP indicate no behavior issues with peers or staff at his current school," and that "[h]e was passing all classes except art."

21. The worst that was said about A.M.'s participation in programming at PLYP is that "[h]e has appeared withdrawn at times as though he is deep in thought," "[a]t times, he completes the bare minimum of what is asked of him," and "[h]e is reserved in activities." And Jones reported that "at times he can display more 'behind the scenes' behaviors and does not participate fully in group activities." It is not our role to reweigh the evidence on appeal, and we do not do so here. However, we are concerned that the finding that A.M. "is not currently demonstrating consistent or meaningful participation in enrolled programming at [PLYP]" does not accurately reflect the extent of A.M.'s participation in programming at PLYP.

22. Finally, A.M. argues that the district court erred in its analysis of the fifth and sixth public-safety factors-the adequacy of punishment or programming in the juvenile system and the available dispositions-because the difference between the length of the presumptive adult sentence and the time left for supervision under extended-jurisdiction-juvenile probation would be minimal. See Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 8(b) (stating that if the district court "decides not to order certification in a case in which the presumption . . . applies, the court shall designate the proceeding an extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution"). A.M. further argues that the district court failed "to address how an adult adjudication . . . provides any advantages for better serving public safety."

23. The Minnesota Supreme Court recently addressed the correct application of the fifth public-safety factor in H.B. The supreme court said that the district court had analyzed the fifth factor through the correct "legal lens" because the district court "recognized that the consideration of the adequacy of the punishment or programming available in the juvenile system was to be focused upon how public safety is best served." H.B., 986 N.W.2d at 176. The juvenile in H.B. presented testimony about the type of programming available in a secure juvenile facility; the state "proffered no evidence regarding the programming available to H.B. in the adult prison system." Id. at 177. The district court "inferred that the combination of a secure juvenile facility that provides trauma-informed treatment, transitional programming, and probationary supervision, all with the threat of a stayed adult sentence, would be more likely to protect the public in the long term." Id. The supreme court explained:

The district court took note of expert testimony about H.B.'s need for juvenile-specific programming and the amount of time H.B. would be under the juvenile court's jurisdiction of between 48 to more than 60 months and compared the evidence with the recommendation for adult certification and the presumptive 306-month prison sentence. The district court balanced these competing considerations and ultimately concluded that public safety would be served by an EJJ designation. On this record, the district court's conclusion was not clearly erroneous.

Id.

24. Here, the district court recognized that extended-jurisdiction-juvenile probation and the adult sentence in this case could be of a similar duration, but the court found that this case may take time to resolve and that, therefore, the remaining amount of time designated for extended-jurisdiction-juvenile probation "may be substantially lower" and "could affect the adequacy of punishment or the programming available." The district court found that adult "corrective sanctions and punishment [were] needed" to address public-safety concerns and community danger. The district court also found that psychological testing indicated that there was a "moderate likelihood" that A.M. would engage "in future violent acts." Although that reasoning is sound, for the reasons that follow, the district court's findings regarding the dispositional options available for A.M. are inadequate to enable us to review the district court's ultimate determination that public-safety factors five and six favored certification.

25. As to the dispositional options available for A.M., Probation Officer Jones presented four possible long-term secure programming options if the case were retained in juvenile court under extended-jurisdiction-juvenile status. First, Jones reported that "PLYP can service youth through age 20 if they are designated EJJ" and that "[t]hey offer secure correctional programming" and "non-secure programming along with a group home level of care." Jones noted that A.M. had been held in secure programming at PLYP since the time of the offense and "could remain in secure detention." We understand that to mean that one dispositional option would be to keep A.M. in secure programming at PLYP until the age of 20-where he was cooperating with programming, attending school, and participating in weekly therapy with his CD counselor via Zoom. Although that option was presented to the district court, the court's relevant finding was that PLYP was hesitant to accept A.M. in its non-secure level of programming due to a concern about flight risk.

The district court's findings do not address the possibility of continuing A.M. in the secure PLYP program.

26. The second dispositional option presented to the district court was West Central Regional Juvenile Center (WCRJC). The secure program at that facility can hold an EJJ offender until the age of 21. Jones reported that she left a message with the program. But at the time of Jones's report, she had not made contact with the program. The district court noted that WCRJC was explored as an option, but the district court's findings do not address whether WCRJC would be an appropriate program for A.M. or whether A.M. could be placed in that secure program.

27. The third dispositional option presented to the district court was Northwestern Minnesota Juvenile Center (NMJC), which has secure programming for EJJ offenders until the age of 21. Jones reported, and the district court found, that the secure programming at that facility was currently full and that the facility was "only accepting youth from their own county."

28. The fourth dispositional option presented to the district court was MCF-Red Wing, which provides secure programming for EJJ offenders until the age of 20. That placement occurs through commitment to the commissioner of corrections, and the record does not suggest that the commissioner could refuse to accept A.M. at MCF-Red Wing. Jones reported that MCF-Red Wing "offers a variety of services specific to youth's needs including a reentry phase." The district court acknowledged that Red Wing was put forth as a dispositional option, but the court's findings do not address whether MCF-Red Wing would be appropriate dispositional option for A.M.

29. In sum, the district court's findings explain why non-secure placement at PLYP and secure placement at NMJC were not viable dispositional options for A.M. But the district court's findings do not address why the available, secure programs at PLYP and MCF-Red Wing were not appropriate dispositional options for A.M. Again, the legislature has required consideration of the adequacy of the punishment or programming available in the juvenile justice system and the dispositional options available for the child. Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 4. And the supreme court has recently stated that consideration of the adequacy of the punishment or programming available in the juvenile system must focus on how public safety is best served. H.B., 986 N.W.2d at 176. We note that Dr. Vaccarella opined that given A.M.'s "age, the time remaining under EJJ, the recency of his escalating violence, and his Moderate risk for violent recidivism, there would be sufficient resources available within the juvenile justice system to ensure public safety." Additional findings regarding the fifth and sixth factors are necessary to enable this court to review the district court's exercise of discretion through both sides of the public-safety lens: punishment and programming.

30. This court has reversed and remanded presumptive certification orders for redetermination. See e.g., L.M., 719 N.W.2d at 714 (remanding for further proceedings consistent with this court's opinion because the district court abused its discretion by shifting to the state the burden of rebutting the presumption of certification). We have also reversed and remanded a presumptive certification order for redetermination in a nonprecedential case, In re Welfare of B.A.D., No. A06-1776, 2007 WL 584371, at *5 (Minn.App. Feb. 27, 2007). This court is not bound by its nonprecedential opinions but may consider them as persuasive authority. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c) ("Nonprecedential opinions and order opinions are not binding authority except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel, but nonprecedential opinions may be cited as persuasive authority."). B.A.D. is persuasive authority here.

31. In B.A.D., we reversed and remanded the district court's presumptive certification decision for further findings and redetermination of whether the juvenile had rebutted presumptive certification because the court's determinations supporting certification were based on variances from the applicable law. 2007 WL 584371, at *5. In doing so, we explained:

The programming-adequacy factor inquires into the "adequacy" of the available programming or punishment. Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 4(5). "Adequate" is defined as, "Able to satisfy a requirement." American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 15 (4th ed. 2000). Thus the factor seeks to establish whether the programming or punishment available in the juvenile justice system is able to remediate the juvenile. Both the psychologist and the court-services officer testified to the available programs. . . . The court's findings acknowledge that the "record shows that two programs accept EJJ offenders, Red Wing and Lino Lakes," and that B.A.D. "showed evidence that the facilities could treat persons with [his disorder]." The undisputed testimony demonstrates the adequacy of the available programming. This factor thus weighs against rather than in favor of certification.

B.A.D., 2007 WL 584371, at *5.

32. Unlike the circumstances in B.A.D., we cannot say that the fifth public-safety factor does not support certification in this case. However, additional findings explaining the district court's rejection of the long-term secure programs at PLYP and MCF-Red Wing-as well as WCRJC if that program is willing to accept A.M.-are necessary to enable meaningful review of the district court's discretionary decision to certify A.M. for prosecution as an adult. The Minnesota Supreme Court has said, in the context of an appeal of a child-custody determination, that findings of fact explaining a district court's exercise of its discretion are necessary to "(1) assure consideration of the statutory factors by the [district] court; (2) facilitate appellate review of the [district] court's custody decision; and (3) satisfy the parties that this important decision was carefully and fairly considered by the [district] court." Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 249 N.W.2d 168, 171 (Minn. 1976). Findings explaining the district court's discretionary decision are just as necessary in the context of a certification determination. Although the district court made lengthy findings in this case, we are left with questions regarding the district court's determination that the fifth and sixth public-safety factors favor certification. Additional findings are necessary to enable appellate review of that determination.

33. Moreover, a remand is appropriate because the district court's determination varied from the applicable law. As noted above, the district court erroneously considered A.M.'s school programing. The district court also erred in concluding that the two most heavily weighted public-safety factors favored certification. Specifically, the district court concluded that "[a]fter considering all public safety factors and placing a greater weight on the seriousness of the offense, and the prior record of the Juvenile, the [c]ourt cannot conclude that [A.M.] has met his burden in overcoming the statutory presumption by clear and convincing evidence." (Emphasis added.) The second public-safety factor that must be given greater weight is not "the prior record of the Juvenile." Instead, it is the juvenile's "prior record of delinquency." Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 4(3) (emphasis added). As to that factor, the court acknowledged that A.M. had no delinquency adjudications and expressly found that the factor did not support certification. Thus, the district court appears to have strayed from the plain language of the statute and to have more generally considered A.M.'s entire record, including juvenile petty offenses, juvenile-traffic offenses, and habitual truancy. Those offenses do not constitute a prior record of "delinquency." See Minn. Stat. § 260B.007, subd. 6 (2022) (defining "delinquent child" as one "who has violated any state or local law," but excluding juvenile traffic offenders and juvenile petty offenders from the definition); Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(14) (2022) (defining a '"[c]hild in need of protection or services'" as one who is in need of protection or services because the child "is a habitual truant"); see also In re Welfare of N.J.S., 753 N.W.2d 704, 709-10 (Minn. 2008) (concluding that "'prior record of delinquency' unambiguously refers to records of petitions to juvenile court and the adjudication of alleged violations of the law by minors" and noting that the statutory definition of "delinquent child" excludes traffic offenses and petty offenses).

34. We now turn to A.M.'s argument that the presumptive-certification statute, section 260B.125, subdivision 3, is unconstitutional because it violates his right to equal protection by shifting the burden of persuasion to him. He further argues that strict scrutiny applies because the statute implicates fundamental rights. In State v. Behl, the supreme court applied rational-basis review and concluded that "the portion of the automatic-certification statute that creates adult-court jurisdiction based upon age and offense criteria is rationally related to the legitimate government interests of serving public safety and determining if the defendant is amenable to juvenile rehabilitation." 564 N.W.2d 560, 568 (Minn. 1997). The supreme court further concluded that facial distinctions based on age and charged offenses do not create suspect classifications. Id. At oral argument to this court, A.M. acknowledged that the only way to grant relief on his constitutional challenge would be for this court to reverse the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Behl, which this court cannot do. State v. M.L.A., 785 N.W.2d 763, 767 (Minn.App. 2010) (stating that this court is bound by supreme court precedent), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 21, 2010).

35. In conclusion, we reject A.M.'s constitutional challenge. And although we recognize that this case clearly involves a very serious offense with significant public-safety implications, it is necessary to reverse and remand for redetermination of the district court's presumptive certification decision based on the following circumstances: (1) improper reliance on A.M.'s behavioral issues in an informal school setting, (2) an unsupported finding regarding A.M.'s pattern of nonparticipation in mental-health therapy, (3) inadequate findings regarding the available dispositional options, and (4) incorrect application of one of the two public-safety factors that must be given the greatest weight. The district court's provision of additional findings that account for those circumstances will ensure proper consideration of the public-safety factors, facilitate appellate review, and satisfy the parties that this important decision was carefully and fully considered by the courts.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. The district court's certification order is reversed and remanded for redetermination consistent with this opinion.

2. The district court has discretion to reopen the record on remand.

3. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.

Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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