Opinion
No. COA15–844.
01-19-2016
In the Matter of: D.S.S. and J.L.S.
Mercedes O. Chut for petitioner-appellee Guilford County Department of Social Services. Peter Wood for respondent-appellant mother. Cranfill Sumner & Hartzog LLP, by Jaye E. Bingham–Hinch, for guardian ad litem.
Mercedes O. Chut for petitioner-appellee Guilford County Department of Social Services.
Peter Wood for respondent-appellant mother.
Cranfill Sumner & Hartzog LLP, by Jaye E. Bingham–Hinch, for guardian ad litem.
Opinion
Appeal by respondent-mother from order entered 22 April 2015 by Judge Betty J. Brown in Guilford County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 December 2015.
TYSON, Judge.
Respondent-mother appeals from the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to her minor children, D.S.S. and J.L.S. We affirm.
I. Background
On 6 September 2012, the Guilford County Department of Social Services (“Social Services”) obtained non-secure custody of D.S.S. and filed a petition, which alleged she was a neglected and dependent juvenile. After a hearing on 13 December 2012, the trial court entered an order adjudicating D.S.S. as a neglected and dependent juvenile and continuing custody of D.S.S. with Social Services. The court further ordered Respondent to comply with the terms and conditions of her service agreement with Social Services and granted her supervised visitation with D.S.S.
Respondent failed to comply with her court-ordered case plan. By order entered 5 July 2013, the trial court set the permanent plan for D.S.S. as adoption and directed Social Services to file a petition to terminate Respondent's parental rights of D.S.S. Social Services filed a petition to terminate Respondent's parental rights to D.S.S. on 5 August 2013. The petition alleged grounds of neglect, failure to pay a reasonable portion of D.S.S.'s cost of care, and dependency. See N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(1), (3), (6) (2013).
Respondent gave birth to J.L.S. in July 2013. On 19 July 2013, Social Services obtained non-secure custody of J.L.S. and filed a petition alleging J.L.S. was a neglected and dependent juvenile. After a hearing on 26 September 2013, the trial court entered an order adjudicating J.L.S. to be a neglected and dependent juvenile and continued custody of him with Social Services.
The court again ordered Respondent to comply with the terms and conditions of her service agreement with Social Services and granted her supervised visitation with J.L.S. The court initially set the permanent plan for J.L.S. as reunification with Respondent, but on 1 July 2014, the court ordered the permanent plan changed to adoption and directed Social Services to file a petition to terminate Respondent's parental rights of J.L.S.
Social Services filed a petition to terminate Respondent's parental rights to J.L.S. on 22 September 2014. The petition alleged grounds of neglect, failure to correct the conditions that led to J.L.S.'s removal from Respondent's care, failure to pay a reasonable portion of J.L.S.'s cost of care, and dependency. See N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(1)–(3), (6) (2013).
The trial court heard both petitions to terminate Respondent's parental rights on 20 and 23 January 2015. At the start of the hearing, Social Services asserted it had alleged sufficient facts in its petition to also terminate Respondent's parental rights of D.S.S. on the ground of failure to correct the conditions that led to D.S.S.'s removal from Respondent's care, see N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(2), and Social Services orally moved for permission to pursue that ground. Id. The trial court reserved its ruling on Social Services' request until the close of evidence, at which time it allowed the motion.
On 22 April 2015, the trial court terminated Respondent's parental rights to J.L.S. and D.S.S. on multiple grounds of neglect, failure to correct the conditions that led to the children's removal from Respondent's care, failure to pay a reasonable portion of the children's cost of care, and dependency.
Respondent filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court's order.
II. Standard of Review
“On appeal, our standard of review for the termination of parental rights is whether the trial court's findings of fact are based on clear, cogent and convincing evidence and whether the findings support the conclusions of law.” In re Baker, 158 N.C.App. 491, 493, 581 S.E.2d 144, 146 (2003) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
“The trial court's conclusions of law are reviewable de novo on appeal.” In re D.M.M. & K.G.M., 179 N.C.App. 383, 385, 633 S.E.2d 715, 715 (2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
III. Issues
Respondent's appellate counsel filed a “no-merit” brief on Respondent's behalf. Respondent's counsel stated he had conducted a conscientious and thorough review of the record on appeal and concluded this appeal presents no issue of merit on which to base an argument for relief and that this appeal is frivolous. Pursuant to North Carolina Rule of Appellate Procedure 3.1(d), counsel requests this Court to conduct an independent examination of the case.
Also, in accordance with N.C. R.App. P. 3.1(d), counsel wrote Respondent a letter on 3 September 2015, which advised Respondent of her right to file pro se arguments directly with this Court within thirty days of the date of the filing of the “no-merit brief .” Attached to the letter was a copy of the record, the transcript, and the “no-merit” brief filed by counsel.
IV. Analysis
Respondent did not file her own written arguments with this Court. The proscribed time for her to respond has long since expired. N.C. R.App. P. 3.1(d)(2016). After careful review of the transcript and record, we are unable to find prejudicial error to warrant reversal of the trial court's order. The court's order includes sufficient findings of fact, which are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, to support its conclusion that at least one statutory ground for termination of Respondent's parental rights existed. See In re B.S.D.S., 163 N.C.App. 540, 546, 594 S.E.2d 89, 93–94 (2004).
V. Conclusion
The trial court made appropriate findings on each of the relevant dispositional factors to support its conclusions of law. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding it is in D.S.S. and J.L.S.'s best interests to terminate Respondent's parental rights. See N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1110(a) (2013).
The trial court's order terminating Respondent's parental rights to D.S.S. and J.L.S. is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Chief Judge McGEE and Judge STEPHENS, concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).