Opinion
No. COA10-778
Filed 7 December 2010 This case not for publication
Appeal by respondent-mother from adjudication and disposition orders entered 24 March 2010 by Judge Edward L. Hedrick, IV in Iredell County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 November 2010.
Lauren Vaughan, for petitioner-appellee Iredell County. Department of Social Services. Robin E. Strickland, for respondent-appellant mother. Pamela Newell, for Guardian ad Litem-appellee.
Iredell County Nos. 02 JT 201, 04 JT 007.
Respondent-mother appeals from orders terminating her parental rights to S.E.P. and L.U.E. We affirm.
On 26 September 2002, the Iredell County Department of Social Services ("DSS") filed a petition alleging that S.E.P. was a neglected and dependent juvenile. See In re S.E.P. L.U.E., 184 N.C. App. 481, 482, 646 S.E.2d 617, 618-19 (2007). On 26 November 2002, S.E.P. was adjudicated dependent. See id. at 482, 646 S.E.2d at 619. On 23 January 2004, DSS filed a petition alleging that L.U.E. was a neglected juvenile. See id. at 484, 646 S.E.2d at 619. On 20 April 2004, the trial court adjudicated L.U.E. neglected. See id. at 484, 646 S.E.2d at 620. On 20 February 2006, DSS petitioned to terminate respondent-mother's parental rights to S.E.P. and L.U.E. See id. at 486, 646 S.E.2d at 621. On 16 October 2006, the trial court terminated respondent-mother's parental rights to both S.E.P. and L.U.E. See id. at 481, 486, 646 S.E.2d at 617-18, 621. Respondent-mother appealed. See id. at 486, 646 S.E.2d at 621. This Court vacated the trial court's orders because the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 488, 646 S.E.2d at 622.
On 17 September 2007, DSS filed new petitions alleging that S.E.P. and L.U.E. were neglected and dependent juveniles. DSS recounted the history of its involvement with respondent-mother, as well as respondent-mother's history of violence and criminal misconduct, which resulted in multiple incarcerations. DSS claimed respondent-mother's violent and criminal behavior was ongoing based on her "accumulat[ion of] several new criminal charges . . . since her release" from prison in February 2007. Thus, DSS alleged that respondent-mother had "continuously failed to maintain a safe home environment" for the juveniles. DSS additionally alleged that respondent-mother had
in no way contributed to the [juveniles] financially or emotionally due to her continued poor decision making, continuous criminal charges, and periods of incarceration. She has not inquired regarding the [juveniles'] situation or well-being or sent any cards or letters to the [juveniles] since her release, and has effectively abandoned [the juveniles] since [they] came into care.
On 12 February 2008, S.E.P. and L.U.E. were adjudicated neglected and dependent juveniles. DSS was granted custody of the juveniles and relieved of reunification efforts with respondent-mother. On 18 April 2008, the trial court established that the permanent plan for the juveniles was "a sole plan of TPR/Adoption."
On 7 July 2009, DSS filed petitions to terminate respondent-mother's parental rights to S.E.P. and L.U.E. DSS alleged five grounds for termination: (1) respondent-mother had neglected the juveniles within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15); (2) respondent-mother had willfully left the juveniles in foster care for more than twelve months without showing that reasonable progress under the circumstances had been made in correcting those conditions that led to the juveniles' removal; (3) respondent-mother, for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the filing of the petitions, had willfully failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for the juveniles although physically and financially able to do so; (4) respondent-mother failed to demonstrate her ability to provide proper care and supervision of the juveniles, such that S.E.P. and L.U.E. were dependent juveniles within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(9), and there was a reasonable probability that such incapability would continue for the foreseeable future; and (5) respondent-mother willfully abandoned the juveniles for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the petitions.
After hearings were held on the petitions, the trial court concluded that grounds existed pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3) and (a)(7) to terminate respondent-mother's parental rights. The trial court further concluded that it was in the juveniles' best interests that respondent-mother's parental rights be terminated. Accordingly, on 24 March 2010, the trial court terminated respondent-mother's parental rights. Respondent-mother appeals.
Respondent-mother's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that it was in the best interests of the juveniles to terminate her parental rights. After careful review of the record, briefs, and contentions of the parties, we affirm.
"The trial court has discretion, if it finds that at least one of the statutory grounds exists, to terminate parental rights upon a finding that it would be in the child's best interests." In re Nesbitt, 147 N.C. App. 349, 352, 555 S.E.2d 659, 662 (2001). Factors the trial court must consider in making a determination regarding the juvenile's best interests include:
(1) The age of the juvenile.
(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile.
(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile.
(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent.
(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other permanent placement.
(6) Any relevant consideration.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2009). The court is to take action "which is in the best interests of the juvenile" when "the interests of the juvenile and those of the juvenile's parents or other persons are in conflict." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1100(3) (2009). "We review the trial court's decision to terminate parental rights for abuse of discretion." In re Anderson, 151 N.C. App. 94, 98, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002).
In the instant case, the trial court made extensive findings regarding the respective relationships between the juveniles and their foster parents. The court also made findings regarding the age of the children, their lengthy stay in foster care, and the fact that they had resided with their respective foster parents almost their entire lives. Furthermore, the court expressly stated in its order that it had considered the factors set forth in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a), and found:
29. That the likelihood of adoption is high because these children are currently in placements where they have resided for a great length of time and the foster parents desire to adopt them. There are no known impediments to adoption.
30. That terminating the Respondent Mother's parental rights will aid in the accomplishment of the current permanent plan of care for the minor children, which is a concurrent plan of TPR/adoption and guardianship with a court-approved caretaker.
31. That the bond between each of the minor children and the Respondent Mother is nonexistent; there just is not one; the minor children do not even know the Respondent Mother as their mother and have had very little contact with her. . . .
32. That the quality of the relationship between the minor children and the caretakers is very high . . .; that each of the foster parents participates in the minor children's activities and they treat the minor children as their biological children.
33. That other relevant considerations include the fact that the Respondent Mother is currently working toward reunification with [two of her other children], and she is currently living in a shelter. That even the Respondent Mother admits and the Court finds that it is very unlikely that she could regain custody of the two children at issue in this TPR proceeding within a reasonable time period.
Respondent-mother claims that it was impossible for her to either form or maintain a bond with her children because the trial court ceased her visitation with the children in 2007. Respondent-mother thus contends the trial court abused its discretion by preventing her from having a relationship with her children, and then "using the resultant lack of a bond as part of the justification to sever their legal relationship as a parent and child." We are not persuaded. The unchallenged findings from the adjudication of respondent-mother's parental rights establish that respondent-mother committed numerous criminal offenses and her "visits with the minor children at issue in this action have been limited by her incarcerations." Moreover, additional unchallenged findings indicate that respondent-mother did not send cards, letters, or gifts to the children, and did not maintain consistent contact with DSS in order to inquire into the juveniles' well-being. Therefore, respondent-mother's lack of visitation and her resultant lack of bond with the juveniles was due to her own actions. Consequently, the trial court committed no abuse of discretion by considering the lack of bond between respondent-mother and the juveniles.
Respondent-mother additionally argues that the court should have considered the effect severance would have on the juveniles' relationship with their siblings. It is within the trial court's discretion to consider such factors as family integrity in making its decision of whether termination is in the best interests of the children. See In re Smith, 56 N.C. App. 142, 150, 287 S.E.2d 440, 445, cert. denied, 306 N.C. 385, 294 S.E.2d 212 (1982). However, here, as respondent-mother states and the findings demonstrate, S.E.P. and L.U.E. have no relationship with their siblings. Thus, while the court may consider family integrity when determining whether termination is in the best interests of the juveniles, the evidence and findings made by the trial court demonstrate that there is no bond between any of the siblings. Accordingly, after considering the factors set forth in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a), the trial court concluded that it was in the juveniles' best interest to terminate respondent-mother's parental rights. Based on the findings of fact made by the trial court after an extensive termination hearing, we discern no abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.
Judges McGEE and BRYANT concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).