Opinion
No. 100,362
Opinion filed: August 27, 2010.
1. Because there is a statutory right to court-appointed counsel in sexually violent predator proceedings, there is a correlative right to competent, effective counsel.
2. A person confined in the Kansas Sexual Predator Treatment Program may bring a habeas corpus petition alleging due process violations.
3. It is a due process violation to have ineffective assistance of counsel in sexually violent predator determinations.
4. The Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act, K.S.A. 59-29a01 et seq., is constitutional even though the Act contains no specific statute allowing a respondent to challenge the effectiveness of court-appointed counsel.
5. When a K.S.A. 60-1501 habeas corpus petition raising the issue of the effectiveness of court-appointed counsel in a sexually violent predator proceeding has not been filed, this court has the option, when the issue is raised for the first time on appeal, to remand the matter to the district court for the limited purpose of making inquiries and findings concerning the effectiveness of counsel. If the district court finds counsel was effective, the case returns to this court and any issues arising from the remand proceedings are included in the briefing and are subject to review by this court.
6. Because proceedings to determine whether a respondent is a sexually violent predator are civil actions, courts will review the cases to determine if the respondent received a fair trial. An evaluation of prejudice to the respondent is the central consideration in such a determination.
7. It is highly improper for the court to permit counsel to read or even refer to the contents of written matter not in evidence for the purpose of impeachment.
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; BENJAMIN L. BURGESS, judge. Opinion filed August 27, 2010. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Michael P. Whalen, of Law Office of Michael P. Whalen, of Wichita, for appellant.
Kris Ailslieger, assistant attorney general, and Marc Bennett, special assistant attorney general, for appellee.
Before STANDRIDGE, P.J., GREEN and HILL, JJ.
SUMMARY
In the jury trial of this sexually violent predator case, the parties agreed to have many records available so the two experts could refer to them. The documents were not meant for jury consideration, and the court did not admit them into evidence but did preserve them for the appellate record. Contrary to this agreement, the State's attorney used the documents 12 times during the cross-examination of the respondent, Robert Ontiberos. By doing so, he made the content of some of the records available to the jury. Further, the State's attorney used a nonexistent prison disciplinary report involving a weapon to discredit the respondent. Respondent's court-appointed lawyer never objected to any of the State's actions. Our Supreme Court has ruled that for impeachment, it is highly improper for counsel to read or refer to the contents of written matters not in evidence. Based on the conduct of the State's attorney, combined with the inaction of Ontiberos's defense counsel, we hold Ontiberos did not receive a fair trial. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
There is an order to our tasks. First, we examine and reject Ontiberos's claim that the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act, K.S.A. 59-29a01 et seq., is unconstitutional because it contains no way to contest the competence of his court-appointed counsel. After all, Ontiberos has successfully done just that in this appeal. Next, based on our Supreme Court's ruling that the appointment of an attorney should not be an empty gesture in prisoner habeas corpus actions, we hold that attorneys representing respondents in sexually violent predator cases must also be effective and competent. Then, we offer a brief review of the relevant trial testimony. Finally, we examine the performances of the attorneys who tried this case.
The Act is constitutional even though it contains no specific statute that allows a respondent to contest the competence of court-appointed counsel.
Ontiberos argues the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act is unconstitutional because it does not provide a remedy for the effects of incompetent counsel. Because there are other methods to test the effectiveness of court-appointed counsel, such as the procedure followed in this case, we reject Ontiberos's argument. We hold the Act is not unconstitutional simply because it contains no specific method for redressing the incompetence of court-appointed attorneys. Obviously, the procedures of the Kansas Act have twice been examined by the United States Supreme Court and been approved. See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 151 L. Ed. 2d 856, 122 S. Ct. 867 (2002); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 138 L. Ed. 2d 501, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
One of the characteristics of actions under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act is that they are civil in nature. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369. Therefore, respondents resisting commitment do not have a constitutional right to counsel but do have a statutory right. See K.S.A. 59-29a06(b); Brown v. State, 278 Kan. 481, 483, 101 P.3d 1201 (2004). But the legal force impelling the appointment of counsel makes no difference in terms of the effectiveness of appointed counsel. An example of this principle is found in the law of criminal appeals, also an area where there is a statutory right to counsel. Our United States Supreme Court has held: "A first appeal as of right therefore is not adjudicated in accord with due process of law if the appellant does not have the effective assistance of an attorney." Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396, 83 L. Ed. 2d 821, 105 S. Ct. 830, reh. denied 470 U.S. 1065 (1985). This holding has been adopted in Kansas in Laymon v. State, 280 Kan. 430, 439-40, 122 P.3d 326 (2005).
We extend the principle further from criminal cases to prisoner habeas corpus actions. When analyzing the right to counsel in proceedings under K.S.A. 60-1507, our Supreme Court recognized that when there is a statutory right to counsel, there is, by necessity, a right to effective counsel. The court noted that appointment of counsel would be a useless formality if counsel were not required to be effective and competent. Brown, 278 Kan. at 484. The court reiterated Brown's holding in Robertson v. State, 288 Kan. 217, 228, 201 P.3d 691 (2009). There is merit in applying the ruling here.
Court-appointed counsel must be effective and competent.
The reasoning found in Brown should apply here. Both the habeas corpus and the sexually violent predator statutes call for the mandatory appointment of counsel. In fact, in sexually violent predator cases, the law requires appointment of counsel at all stages of the proceedings, while the law only requires appointment of counsel in habeas corpus cases after the prisoner has shown a substantial issue of law or fact thus compelling the court to appoint counsel. See K.S.A. 59-29a06; K.S.A. 22-4506. The policy set out in Brown requiring effective assistance and providing a remedy for counsel's failure to provide such assistance is equally applicable here. We hold that because there is a statutory right to counsel in these proceedings, there is a correlative right to effective counsel and a remedy for counsel's failure in that regard.
We look now at the possible methods to test counsel's performances and to provide a remedy if necessary. First, there is habeas corpus relief under K.S.A. 60-1501. Our Supreme Court has ruled a person confined as a sexually violent predator can use this statute to redress due process violations:
"K.S.A. 60-1501 allows any person confined in Kansas to prosecute a writ of habeas corpus in the county in which such restraint is taking place. Based on the broad language of K.S.A. 60-1501, a person confined in Kansas' Sexual Predator Treatment Program is included within the purview of K.S.A. 60-1501, and, as a result, may bring a habeas corpus petition alleging due process violations." (Emphasis added.) Johnson v. State, 289 Kan. 642, Syl. ¶ 1, 215 P.3d 575 (2009).
Logically, if part of the legal process due a respondent in a sexually violent predator case is the appointment of effective competent counsel, failure to provide such assistance would be a due process violation. For if it is a due process violation to have ineffective appellate counsel, then it must be a due process violation to have ineffective counsel in sexually violent predator proceedings. Thus, we disagree with Ontiberos's contention to the contrary in his brief. Such questions are valid subjects for habeas corpus petitions. Next, we look at the steps taken in this case.
When Ontiberos raised the question of the competence of his attorney at the start of this appeal, this court used a method frequently employed in criminal cases to deal with this issue. In cases where there is an issue of court-appointed counsel's competence raised by the appellant, our Supreme Court in State v. Van Cleave, 239 Kan. 117, 119-20, 716 P.2d 580 (1986), adopted a remand procedure which avoids the delay and expense of a separate action under K.S.A. 60-1507 and also a separate appeal. Accordingly, in such cases this court delays acting on the appeal and we remand the matter to the district court for the limited purpose of making inquiries and findings concerning the effectiveness of counsel. If the court finds counsel was effective, the case returns to the appellate court and any issues arising from the remand proceedings are included in the briefing and are subject to the ultimate ruling of the court. We used such a procedure here. Thus, Ontiberos has had the opportunity to contest the efficacy of his counsel and obtain appellate review of the district court's ruling on the matter. Since such a remand procedure was available, the question of attorney competence can be raised and adjudicated.
Lastly, Ontiberos's argument is not logical because it proceeds from the specific to the general. After all, if someone convicted of theft has suffered from the incompetence of court-appointed counsel, it does not follow that the criminal code is unconstitutional. Likewise, if a respondent in a sexually violent predator case is prejudiced by ineffective court-appointed counsel, it does not follow that the Sexually Violent Predator Act is unconstitutional. We know of no law or court ruling requiring an act of the legislature to contain a method for contesting the effectiveness of counsel in order for the act to pass constitutional muster. The competence of an attorney's performance is determined in each specific case. To make such an assessment, a court requires no general legislative act for authority, since it is simply a part of the determination courts must make when deciding due process questions.
The State alleged in the petition that Ontiberos must be committed.
When the State sought to commit Ontiberos for treatment as a sexually violent predator, it claimed he had convictions for two sexually violent crimes; an attempted rape in 1983 and an aggravated sexual battery in 2001. Additionally, the State alleged Ontiberos's sexual activities were caused by a mental abnormality or personality disorder making it difficult for him to control his behavior. Also, the State contended he was likely to reoffend and that his release from prison was imminent.
The parties agreed to have a large number of documents available for the experts at the trial.
As the trial was starting, the State's attorney, Special Assistant Attorney General Marc Bennett, and Ontiberos's attorney, Greg Barker, stipulated to the foundation of almost 3,000 pages of records relied on by doctors in evaluating Ontiberos. These documents included police reports, records of prior legal proceedings, Department of Correction records, and mental health records. The parties agreed the documents would be admitted for the limited purpose of an appellate record and use by either of the two doctors that were going to testify:
"THE COURT: . . . Mr. Bennett, you have some documents that you wish to have admitted for the purposes of the record, but not to be submitted for the jury's consideration; is that an accurate statement?
"MR. BENNETT: That's correct, Your Honor. The case — or excuse me, the statutory authority for the testimony of an expert requires that they be — any records about which they are testifying, they need to be able to be presented with those documents in Court. And so by agreement of the parties, before we began, there was a stipulation to both foundation for those records and then, also, that they would be admitted for the appellate record only, in the event that either doctor needs to be presented with something admitted.
. . . .
"THE COURT: Mr. Barker, do you have any objection to the admission of Exhibit 1?
"MR. BARKER: No. Pursuant to the stipulation as just announced, with — and those limitations, no objection.
"THE COURT: And just so that the record will be clear, although the exhibit is being admitted for the purpose of the record, the Court does not intend to take actual possession of the exhibit, we'll have it remain in the possession of Mr. Bennett and in the event an appellate record may later be needed, it will be available by Mr. — well, through Mr. Bennett."
The court admitted the records collectively as Exhibit 1. (Individual pages of the documents within the exhibit were numbered.) With the identification of Exhibit 1, the parties offered testimony.
The State calls one witness, a psychologist who had evaluated Ontiberos.
The State called Dr. Deborah McCoy, a clinical psychologist employed at Larned State Hospital. Dr. McCoy evaluated Ontiberos by reviewing his prison records, all of his psychological evaluations, and conducting a personal interview. Also, she gave two "actuarial-risk" tests to Ontiberos. Based on all of this, McCoy reported that Ontiberos had substance abuse problems and had attended seven drug and alcohol treatment programs over the years. Additionally, because of his sex crimes, Ontiberos had engaged in two sex offender treatment programs. Dr. McCoy then told the jury about Ontiberos's crimes.
There were two actuarial-risk assessment tests, the first called the Static-99 and the second known by the acronym MnSOST. According to the Static-99 test, Ontiberos's chances of reconviction were 39 percent after 5 years, 45 percent after 10 years, and 52 percent after 15 years. In Dr. McCoy's view, this put Ontiberos in the high-risk category. The MnSOST test results placed Ontiberos in a moderate risk category. That test predicted Ontiberos had a 29 percent chance of being rearrested for a sexual offense. The testimony then moved on to Dr. McCoy's diagnosis.
Dr. McCoy's diagnosis of Ontiberos was paraphilia not otherwise specified, with themes of exhibitionism and nonconsent, as well as a personality disorder not otherwise specified, with antisocial features, polysubstance dependence, and sexual abuse of an adult. She noted that Ontiberos's paraphilia and personality disorder were both "not otherwise specified," meaning the conditions did not fit into specific diagnostic categories found in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, DSM-IV. Dr. McCoy testified that, while Ontiberos's substance abuse was part of his inability to control his sexual behavior, it was not the cause of that behavior. Finally, Dr. McCoy concluded that she believed Ontiberos met the definition of a sexually violent predator.
Ontiberos presented the testimony of two witnesses.
Ontiberos testified about his crimes. Regarding the 2001 aggravated sexual battery of his mother-in-law, Ontiberos said he had been drinking and smoking crack cocaine with his father-in-law and that his father-in-law actually suggested that Ontiberos have sex with his mother-in law. Ontiberos repeated his claim that he did not remember the details of his assault on his mother-in-law. Ontiberos admitted he is an alcoholic and a drug addict but believed he could lead a productive life so long as he abstained from drugs and alcohol and kept himself in a positive environment. Ontiberos expressed remorse for his offenses, as well as a desire to continue substance abuse treatment. Next, the State proceeded with his cross-examination.
State's attorney Bennett cross-examined Ontiberos about his crimes and his mental health treatment history. Bennett used several documents from Exhibit 1 during much of his cross-examination. For example, Bennett first questioned Ontiberos about his version of the attempted rape conviction in 1983 and contrasted Ontiberos's version with that contained in the bill of particulars filed by the Ford County district attorney. Bennett worked to undermine Ontiberos's credibility by challenging his asserted lack of memory of the assault. Bennett also challenged Ontiberos's characterization of the victim as a close friend with whom he had had prior sexual relations by referring to a 1983 clinical evaluation that indicated the victim was a "casual acquaintance." Ontiberos testified that he did not remember telling the psychiatrist in 1983 that the victim picked up a knife. Bennett did not limit his use of documents from Exhibit 1 to the bill of particulars. He used other records as well.
Bennett relied on a police affidavit in questioning Ontiberos on the 2001 offense. He twice asked Ontiberos about his recollection of telling police that he either "wanted to get some pussy" or "was going to get some pussy." When questioning Ontiberos's recollection, Bennett again asked him about yelling, "I want sex, I want pussy." Ontiberos stated that he did not remember saying that.
Next, Bennett confronted Ontiberos with a Department of Corrections document from Exhibit 1 in which Ontiberos gave his version of the 2001 assault. The document indicated that Ontiberos blamed his father-in-law for the incident and that he refused to take responsibility for his conduct. Ontiberos testified that he has since taken responsibility for his actions.
Once again, Bennett used a document from Exhibit 1 when he asked Ontiberos about a 1991 report that indicated his dissatisfaction at having to undergo sex offender treatment since he had previously completed treatment. Ontiberos testified that he was indeed unhappy to have to undergo treatment again.
Bennett then questioned Ontiberos about inconsistencies between his criminal history and what he told Dr. Barnett. Ontiberos testified that he told Dr. Barnett he had not been accused of any sexual offenses other than those in 1983 and 2001. Bennett then cross-examined Ontiberos about several uncharged sexual incidents that occurred in 1983, 1991, 1998, and 1999.
The final witness was Dr. Robert Barnett, a clinical psychologist who had evaluated Ontiberos. Dr. Barnett based his evaluation of Ontiberos on an interview, Ontiberos's clinical history, a mental status exam, and some "short testing," as well as a review of all of his records from Larned State Hospital. Barnett diagnosed Ontiberos with "chronic and severe polysubstance abuse and dependence" and a mild cognitive disorder.
Respondent's counsel, Barker, asked Dr. Barnett if the cross-examination of Ontiberos affected his evaluation. It did not. The psychologist said that although Ontiberos appeared truthful during the interview, he noted that most defendants omit or sugarcoat certain facts and he considers those while making his evaluation. Dr. Barnett testified that he did not believe Ontiberos had a sexual dysfunction diagnosis and that the incidents disclosed to him for the first time in the cross-examination would have no effect on his diagnosis because it appeared that all of these incidents occurred while Ontiberos was intoxicated. He maintained that substance abuse, not sexual dysfunction, was the problem.
Then, Dr. Barnett talked about the actuarial risk assessment tests conducted by Dr. McCoy. He testified that these tests aggregate historical data and group people together based upon similarities in their backgrounds to predict future behavior. The problem with such tests, Dr. Barnett said, is that the prediction is "basically nonsense." For example, Dr. Barnett stated in a hypothetical group where an offender is predicted to have a 50 percent chance of reoffending, it is impossible to determine whether a specific offender will be in the half that reoffends or the half that will not. He testified further that both tests often come up with different scores for the same person and have limited utility because they only account for static traits and have no mechanism to reflect personality or psychological changes over time. Consequently, Dr. Barnett believed that both tests are misleading.
On cross-examination, Dr. Barnett stated that Ontiberos had not told him about some uncharged sexual incidents in 1983, 1991, and 1999. The State's attorney also asked if Ontiberos had told Dr. Barnett about a 2003 prison incident where Ontiberos fashioned a knife out of a pen and duct tape. Dr. Barnett said this was new information to him but if it was done while Ontiberos was intoxicated, it would not change his opinion that Ontiberos suffered from substance abuse issues rather than a sexual disorder. Dr. Barnett then repeated his disapproval of the actuarial risk tests. Dr. Barnett concluded that if Ontiberos stayed sober he would be all right, but "he's a threat to the community," if he did not.
After the appeal was docketed, we remanded the case for a determination by the trial court of the effectiveness of trial counsel.
Prior to briefing, Ontiberos filed a motion to remand the case to the district court for a Van Cleave hearing and rule on Ontiberos's newly asserted claim of ineffective assistance by his trial counsel Barker. The motion alleged that Barker stipulated to the admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence and allowed that evidence to be used against Ontiberos. We granted the motion and, while retaining jurisdiction, remanded the matter to the district court to make further inquiries.
On remand, the district court entertained evidence on the ineffective counsel claims. First, State's attorney Bennett testified that he and Ontiberos's attorney, Barker, had agreed to stipulate to the admission of Exhibit 1 prior to trial. According to Bennett, they made the stipulation so that both attorneys would be able to confront the expert witnesses with the documents they relied upon in evaluating Ontiberos. Bennett stated that although much of the material in Exhibit 1 may have been hearsay, he was prepared to call witnesses to establish foundation for the evidence so that it could be admitted independently. Bennett also said that both he and Barker wanted to avoid calling so many witnesses, including the victims of prior crimes, to lay foundation. Bennett testified that he had sent an email to Barker stating that he intended to introduce Ontiberos's prior uncharged offenses, asking Barker if he had any hearsay objection, and informing Barker that he was prepared to introduce foundation evidence. A copy of that email was admitted at the remand hearing but is not included in the record on appeal. Bennett admitted he confronted Ontiberos with documents from Exhibit 1 during cross-examination. Finally, Bennett admitted that, upon review of Exhibit 1, he was unable to locate any reference to a 2003 disciplinary report that alleged Ontiberos used a knife in a prison fight.
Ontiberos testified he has never received a disciplinary report involving a weapon.
Barker testified that he stipulated to the admission of Exhibit 1 because he "didn't want to have up to maybe half-a-dozen other prosecution witnesses coming in essentially piling on cumulative evidence, which in [his] opinion would have been devastating to [Ontiberos's] case." Barker recalled Bennett's use of documents from Exhibit 1 during his cross-examination of Ontiberos but did not believe that Bennett violated the stipulation by doing so. He stated that the two attorneys had stipulated to foundation and Bennett "asked questions of a historical or factual nature" that were not objectionable.
Barker also testified about his defense tactics. Barker intended to undermine the validity of the Static-99 risk assessment test because he did not believe that it was an "accurate . . . determinative tool." He discussed the strategy with his expert, Dr. Barnett. He relied on Dr. Barnett's expertise to execute his plan of attack. Barker stated that he reviewed Exhibit 1 for any information that might be helpful to Ontiberos's defense, but he found nothing. During the remand hearing, Ontiberos's current counsel presented Barker with a prior Static-99 assessment found in Exhibit 1 that indicated a lower risk than that predicted by Dr. McCoy. Barker explained why he did not use the results. Barker testified that the strategy he and Dr. Barnett had devised to attack the validity of the test itself dictated that he could not attack one score and then present another more favorable score as if it were accurate. According to Barker, "It's either a reliable system or it isn't, and we all have to chose [ sic] tactics in our trials. I chose the tactic of attacking the very validity of the Static-99 itself." Barker also testified that he had, at best, a rudimentary understanding of the workings of the Static-99 and relied on Dr. Barnett in forming his argument about the test's reliability. Barker testified that another aspect of his strategy was to argue that Ontiberos's conduct was caused by alcohol and drug addiction rather than a sexually related mental abnormality.
The district court denied Ontiberos's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, finding that Barker made the stipulation to Exhibit 1 after thorough consideration. Further, even if there was no stipulation, the foundation for the documents in Exhibit 1 could have been proven and the documents admitted anyway. The judge noted that Barker had pointed out inconsistencies in the actuarial risk assessments. Finally, the court held that Barker's representation was not deficient or prejudicial to Ontiberos.
Ontiberos has a right to a fair trial.
Complaints of prosecutorial misconduct, common in our criminal jurisprudence, do not apply in sexually violent predator proceedings. Even though someone committed for treatment under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act may remain in treatment for the rest of his or her life, such an outcome does not equate with criminal punishment because the Act does not seek retribution or deterrence. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361-62. Therefore, due to the unique position sexual predator actions have in our jurisprudence, courts do not apply many of the rules that traditionally arise from criminal procedures to those cases. Our Supreme Court has ruled that claims of prosecutorial misconduct, such as those arising in criminal proceedings, are not appropriate in a civil action such as this case. In re Care Treatment of Foster, 280 Kan. 845, 853, 127 P.3d 277 (2006). Consequently, the two-step analysis taken in criminal prosecutorial misconduct claims is inapplicable. Foster, 280 Kan. at 853; see State v. McReynolds, 288 Kan. 318, 323, 202 P.3d 658 (2009). We look instead at whether the respondent received a fair trial.
Notably, a fair trial was the concern of our Supreme Court in Foster, where the court held that in a sexually violent predator proceeding, remarks by counsel might result in reversible error when those remarks have deprived the respondent of a fair trial. 280 Kan. at 857. While not establishing a clear test for making such a determination, Foster indicates that prejudice to the respondent is the central consideration in such a case. 280 Kan. at 861. We will follow the instruction found in Foster.
The first matter we must deal with is the lack of an objection by Ontiberos to the conduct of the State's attorney. Simply put, Ontiberos did not object to Bennett's violation of their stipulation to the limited use of Exhibit 1 at trial. In criminal cases, this failure would be fatal to Ontiberos's claims. See State v. King, 288 Kan. 333, 349, 204 P.3d 585 (2009). But those standards do not apply here. To the contrary, Foster indicates the failure of the defense to lodge a contemporaneous objection to alleged misconduct is not fatal to an appellate review of such a claim. 280 Kan. at 854; see also In re Care Treatment of Ward, 35 Kan. App. 2d 356, 374-75, 131 P.3d 540, rev. denied 282 Kan. 789 (2006) (applying the ruling in Foster and holding that conduct not objected to could be considered on appeal). As a result, we address the merits of Ontiberos's claims. Ontiberos complains about the State's use of Exhibit 1.
Ontiberos correctly asserts Exhibit 1 was introduced for the limited purpose of providing the two expert witnesses access to documents they may have used in evaluating Ontiberos. Also, the documents would be available for the appellate record. The record clearly shows the documents were not meant for the jury. During the remand hearing, both attorneys said they made this stipulation to avoid calling several witnesses to establish foundation testimony for all of the documents in Exhibit 1. But the fundamental fact is clear; the documents contained in Exhibit 1 were not admitted into evidence and the State's attorney used them to cross-examine Ontiberos and his expert witness as if they were. The court explicitly stated the documents were not to be considered by the jury. We believe the prejudicial use of these records by the State was improper and denied Ontiberos a fair trial.
Fundamental fairness calls for evidence to be presented in open court through the application of correct legal procedures where it can be tested by adversarial examination. In State v. Gauger, 200 Kan. 515, 520-21, 438 P.2d 455 (1968), disapproved on other grounds in State v. Schoonover, 281 Kan. 453, 133 P.3d 48 (2006), the court dealt with prior inconsistent statements and held:
"Where the impeaching statement is written, and the witness, although admitting that he gave a statement, cannot remember the contents thereof, or will neither admit nor deny the same, there is ample foundation for admitting the statement itself or at least the impeaching portion thereof into evidence. [Citations omitted.] . . .
". . . Counsel may comment on the credibility of a witness where his remarks are based on facts appearing in the evidence; but it is highly improper for the court to permit counsel to read or even refer to the contents of written matter not in evidence for the purpose of impeachment." (Emphasis added.)
While dealing with prior inconsistent statements of two witnesses, the court reported that the record on appeal in Gauger did not disclose that either witness had an opportunity to look at or identify the written statement allegedly given by him to the police. The contents of the purported statements were revealed only in the form of questions read by the county attorney in cross-examining the witnesses. That is very similar to what happened in this case.
The most striking example of the improper use of the documents occurred when the State's attorney cross-examined Ontiberos about uncharged sexual incidents in 1983, 1991, 1998, and 1999. The 1983 incident allegedly occurred at a residence in Dodge City where Ontiberos took off his clothes in the presence of a couple and made sexually obscene comments about the wife. Relying on a police report, Bennett then asked Ontiberos about an incident in 1991, where Ontiberos was accused of standing naked on a woman's porch and looking through the sliding glass door. Next was an uncharged sexual assault Ontiberos allegedly committed against his wife in 1998, where an intoxicated Ontiberos allegedly tried to have sex with his wife against her will. Finally, the attorney questioned Ontiberos about a 1999 incident where he approached a woman at her residence and told her, "I want some pussy." None of these reports were admitted into evidence. If the State wanted to use them to impeach Ontiberos, they should have been offered for that purpose. The broad rule found in 88 C.J.S., Trial § 181, states: "Where evidence is offered and admitted for the purpose of impeachment, it must be restricted to such purpose." Every one of those reports may be true and accurate, but the only way to legally determine if that is so is by following the proper procedures for admitting the reports into evidence, having an adversary question them, and then allow the jury to give them whatever weight they deserve.
We certainly understand that one of the acceptable techniques of impeachment is cross-examination of a witness about a prior inconsistent statement. But there are rules. Two statutes dealing with the credibility of witnesses are pertinent. Obviously, both statutes contemplate the admission of impeaching statements into evidence. K.S.A. 60-420 provides:
"Subject to [limitations about the use of criminal convictions] for the purpose of impairing or supporting the credibility of a witness, any party including the party calling the witness may examine the witness and introduce extrinsic evidence concerning any conduct by him or her and any other matter relevant upon the issues of credibility." (Emphasis added.) Then, in K.S.A. 60-422, the statute states:
"As affecting the credibility of a witness . . . (b) extrinsic evidence of prior contradictory statements, whether oral or written, made by the witness, may in the discretion of the judge be excluded unless the witness was so examined while testifying as to give him or her an opportunity to indentify, explain or deny the statement." (Emphasis added.)
Furthermore, even though Ontiberos's attorney expressed a contrary view at the remand hearing, the use of Exhibit 1 appears to be a clear violation of the agreement stated to the court, which is in the record on appeal. But there is another aspect of the State's attorney's conduct that is disturbing.
The State's use of a nonexistent Department of Corrections disciplinary finding, ostensibly painting Ontiberos as being violent because it involved a homemade prison shank, cannot be condoned in any fashion. Simply put, attorneys are not allowed to make up evidence and use it to advance their cause. Even though our rules of evidence provide that all relevant evidence is admissible, see K.S.A. 60-407(f), the evidence must be real. We can fathom no greater prejudice to a respondent than the use of nonexistent evidence by the State in the case against the respondent.
The attorney for Ontiberos passively allowed the State's attorney to proceed in apparent violation of the stipulation.
We find it regrettable that Barker refrained from objecting the 12 times the State used the documents in Exhibit 1 in violation of their agreement. By doing so, the State was given free rein to use reports meant only for the appellate record and not the jury. The State counters that it could have called all of the foundation witnesses necessary to admit the documents into evidence; thus, these violations of the stipulation were harmless error. The district court made a finding that the State could have called all of the foundation witnesses. We find it unpersuasive to speculate about what the State could have done. We must deal with what the State did. The State improperly used statements that had not been admitted into evidence to impeach a witness. This is clearly in violation of the ruling in Gauger, 200 Kan. at 520-21. We will not guess why Barker was unaware that the alleged weapon violation report was nonexistent. This was not a fair trial.
In addition to failing to object to the improper use of Exhibit 1, Barker's failure to use test results properly is troubling. Among the materials in Exhibit 1 is a sexual offender treatment program discharge summary from 2006. According to that report, Ontiberos's score on the Static-99 test indicated that he had a 9 percent risk of being reconvicted within 16 years. Dr. McCoy's report indicated that Ontiberos had a 39 percent chance of being reconvicted within 5 years and a 52 percent chance of reconviction in 15 years. The use of this report would have verified his own expert's assertion that the tests often come up with different scores for the same person. This use of the report would have been consistent with his basic strategy of discrediting the actuarial tests used by Dr. McCoy. Also, such a use of the report would have been consistent with the stipulation to Exhibit 1.
Along this same line, we must point out that Dr. Barnett testified that the penile plesythmograph is a more accurate test than the Static-99 test. When Dr. Barnett testified that he did not have access to a plesythmograph and did not understand why it was not used at Larned State Hospital, counsel for Ontiberos failed to show him data from a plesythmograph test performed on Ontiberos in 2005. We will not speculate what Dr. Barnett's response would be had he seen the results, but the fact that counsel did not question him about the results calls into question counsel's pretrial preparation in this regard. Obviously, such a line of inquiry would be consistent with counsel's avowed strategy of casting doubt on the validity of the tests used by the State's expert.
Conclusion
Even those accused of being sexually violent predators are entitled to a fair trial. When we take into account the State's improper use of evidence not admitted and the use of a nonexistent disciplinary report, ostensibly portraying Ontiberos as violent, coupled with the passivity of defense counsel and his apparent lack of preparation, we must conclude Ontiberos did not receive a fair trial.
We reverse the district court and remand the matter for a new trial.