Opinion
Case No. 03-CV-71973-DT.
July 19, 2004
ORDER DENYING "AMENDED PETITION TO AWARD AND PAY ESPOUSAL CLAIM"
Pending before the court is Petitioner Arthur Johnson, III, D.D.S., "Amended Petition to Award and Pay Espousal Claim," filed on June 7, 2004. Inasmuch as the petition is dispositive of the underlying matter, the court construes it as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. As such, it will be denied.
I. STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "Where the moving party has carried its burden of showing that the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits in the record construed favorably to the nonmoving party, do not raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial, entry of summary judgment is appropriate." Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1536 (6th Cir. 1987) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)).
Summary judgment is not appropriate when "the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). The existence of some factual dispute, however, does not defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment; the disputed factual issue must be material. See id at 252 ("The judge's inquiry, therefore, unavoidably asks whether reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict — `whether there is [evidence] upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.'").
II. DISCUSSION
Petitioner Arthur Johnson, III, D.D.S., has been appointed as the personal representative of the Estate of Arthur Johnson, Jr., who died on October 3, 2002. Petitioner seeks dispersal of a portion of the proceeds from the sale of a home belonging to decedent to Wilhelmina Johnson, Petitioner's mother, who was decedent's wife prior to a divorce in March 1987. In support of his request, Petitioner claims that Wilhelmina Johnson is entitled to one half of all proceeds of the sale of the couple's marital home, 19756 Strathmoor Road, Detroit, Michigan, less the first $10,700.00 as specified in the divorce judgment. (Petitioner's Ex. A.) The divorce judgment states:
[I]t is ORDERED that the marital home, commonly known as 19756 Strathmoor, Detroit, Michigan . . . shall be forthwith placed in the market for sale, and, after all costs of the sales of the property have been paid, the proceeds divided between the Plaintiff, WILHELMINA JOHNSON, and Defendant, ARTHUR JOHNSON, JR., with the first TEN THOUSAND SEVEN 00/100 ($10,700.00) DOLLARS being awarded to the Defendant, ARTHUR JOHNSON, JR., and the balance being divided equally between the parties.
( Id.)
The home was sold to an unrelated third party on July 22, 2003 for $130,721.21, which was placed in an escrow account pursuant to the court's July 22, 2003 order. After the Johnsons' divorce, but before the sale of decedent's home, a Notice of Federal Tax Lien with respect to decedent's unpaid taxes for 1989, 1990, and 1991 (in the amount os $505,783.57) was filed with the Register of Deeds for Wayne County. The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") discharged its lien on the property in favor of attaching the lien to the proceeds of the sale. (07/22/03 Order at 1.) Petitioner and the IRS now dispute whether the IRS lien against the proceeds take priority over Wilhelmina Johnson's right, if any, to a portion of the proceeds. There is no dispute that the IRS has a valid lien on the proceeds from the sale of the Strathmoor property. Further, in his filing, Petitioner stated that Wilhelmina Johnson divested her interest in the Strathmoor property in 1987, approximately six months after the divorce, by deed to Arthur Johnson, Jr. ( See Pet. at ¶ 6.)
The court will not grant Petitioner summary judgment because he has not supported his petition with a legal basis for finding that Wilhelmina Johnson's alleged right takes precedence over that of the IRS. Moreover, even if Wilhelmina Johnson would legally have priority on the proceeds of the sale, there is an issue of fact regarding her entitlement to any proceeds. She transferred, by deed, her right to the Strathmoor property to decedent. (Pet. at ¶ 6.) There is no evidence in the record describing this transfer or indicating whether Mrs. Johnson received compensation for the deed transfer, gave the deed as a gift, or transferred the deed to facilitate the sale contemplated in the divorce judgment. Mrs. Johnson has provided no affidavit explaining the transfer, and without such evidence, the court cannot rule as a matter of law that Mrs. Johnson has a right to the sale proceeds. Accordingly, Petitioner has not carried his burden for purposes of summary judgment.
III. CONCLUSION
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner's "Amended Petition to Award and Pay Espousal Claim" [Dkt. # 7] is DENIED.