Opinion
No. 04-05-00731-CV
Delivered and Filed: June 28, 2006.
Appeal from the 386th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, Trial Court No. 2005-Juv-02274, Honorable Laura Parker, Judge Presiding.
Affirmed.
Sitting: Sarah B. DUNCAN, Justice, Karen ANGELINI, Justice, Phylis SPEEDLIN, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
J.C.L. appeals the judgment adjudicating him delinquent and committing him to the Texas Youth Commission. He argues the court abused its discretion in committing him "because the record indicates that probation would have been a more appropriate disposition." We disagree and affirm the trial court's judgment.
Under section 54.04(d)(2) of the Family Code, the trial court may commit a juvenile to TYC if the juvenile has perpetrated a felony. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.04(d)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2005). Commitment to TYC is proper if: (1) it is in the child's best interests to be placed outside the home; (2) reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for the child's removal from the home and to make it possible for the child to return to the child's home; and (3) the child, in the child's home, cannot be provided the quality of care and supervision that the child needs to meet the conditions of probation. Id. § 54.04(i). Because "[a] juvenile judge has broad discretion to determine the proper disposition of a child who has been adjudicated as engaging in delinquent behavior," her determination on this question will not be disturbed absent an abuse of this discretion. In re K.J.N., 103 S.W.3d 465, 465 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion when it "acts unreasonably or arbitrarily and without reference to guiding rules and principles." Id. at 466. "The guiding rules and principles in juvenile cases involving commitment outside the child's home are found in the Family Code." Id. We must be mindful, however, that "the criminal abuse of discretion standard — divorced from evidentiary standards of legal and factual sufficiency — applies to a trial court's juvenile disposition order under 54.04(d)(2)." In re K.T., 107 S.W.3d 65, 74-75 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.). This standard requires us to "`to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling,' affording almost total deference to findings of historical fact that are supported by the record." Id. at 75 (quoting Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997)). But, "when the resolution of the factual issues does not turn upon an evaluation of credibility or demeanor, we review the trial court's determination of the applicable law, as well as its application of the appropriate law to the facts it has found, de novo. In re K.T., 107 S.W.3d at 75 (citing Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89).
At the adjudication hearing, J.C.L. pleaded true to three separate counts of felony aggravated robbery involving a weapon. Based upon these stipulations and the introduction of the offense reports, the court adjudicated J.C.L. delinquent on all three counts. Immediately thereafter, the court held the disposition hearing. J.C.L. argued for placement in a secure residential facility or probation with his mother. However, at the time of the hearing, J.C.L. was on felony probation for carrying a weapon in a prohibited place, and his probation officer testified that, despite the stable home environment J.C.L.'s mother provided and the progress J.C.L was making toward getting back to "regular probation," he believed commitment to TYC was the appropriate disposition. According to this probation officer's predisposition report, J.C.L. had violated five conditions of his probation, had not enrolled in school, had run away several times from home because he did not want to obey his mother, and claimed to be a member of two gangs. One of J.C.L.'s robbery victims also testified. He told the court that the robbery had so traumatized him that he had problems going home at night and was constantly looking over his back every ten seconds. This evidence demonstrates that J.C.L., while on probation under his mother's care, had neglected his education, failed to live up to the terms of his probation, and, more disturbingly, remained a menace to society by engaging in further criminal behavior involving weapons. In light of this evidence, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in committing J.C.L. to TYC.
The trial court's judgment is affirmed.