Opinion
No. C9-97-376.
Filed July 15, 1997.
Appeal from the District Court, Hennepin County, File No. P39335498.
James S. Dahlquist, (for appellant).
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, John St. Marie, Assistant County Attorney, (for respondent).
Considered and decided by Davies, Presiding Judge, Toussaint, Chief Judge, and Harten, Judge.
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Daniel D. Gillham appeals from his commitment as mentally ill and the trial court order authorizing involuntary administration of neuroleptic medication. Gillham argues (1) the trial court determination as to the likelihood of harm failed to meet the statutory standard, and (2) his right to counsel was violated because the trial court allowed him partially to represent himself. Because (1) the trial court findings meet the statutory standards and show Gillham was likely to physically harm himself or others and (2) Gillham's attorney represented him, we affirm.
DECISION I.
Findings will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. In re McGaughey , 536 N.W.2d 621, 623 (Minn. 1995). A commitment will be reversed if the record does not show by clear and convincing evidence that the proposed patient meets the statutory standards. Id. at 624.
Gillham challenges only the trial court's determination that he poses a substantial likelihood of causing physical harm to himself or others. This must be shown by "a failure to obtain necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical care or by, likelihood of causing harm or by a recent attempt or threat to physically harm self or others." Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 13(b) (1996); see In re Knapp , 351 N.W.2d 391, 392-93 (Minn.App. 1984) (finding likelihood of harm shown by facts patient lived in car, was malnourished, had frostbite, was not taking prescribed medication, assaulted relative, and threatened others).
The trial court found that Gillham posed a substantial likelihood of causing himself physical harm as demonstrated by the fact that before his hospitalization, he was found wandering on icy streets with no coat and bare feet in a psychotic condition. Additionally, he engaged in several physical confrontations while hospitalized, including hitting a staff member in the nose, causing it to bleed.
Gillham acknowledges there is a consensus that he suffers from a major mental illness. However, he contends the proceedings failed to focus on his dangerousness, including whether his behavior prior to being hospitalized met the standard for commitment He asserts that the trial court improperly relied on the doctor's speculation that he needed hospitalization. See McGaughey , 536 N.W.2d at 623 (holding speculation as to likelihood of harm insufficient to commit).
Gillham both exposed himself to harm before hospitalization and assaulted another while hospitalized. The court's findings that Gillham posed a substantial likelihood of causing physical harm to himself or others was supported by clear and convincing evidence.
II.
The next issue concerns the right to counsel. A patient has the right to be represented by counsel. Minn. Stat. § 253B.03, subd. 9 (1996); Minn. R. Civ. Commitment 3.01. The intent of the act is that the patient should not be allowed to waive the right to representation. Minn. R. Civ. Commitment 3, cmt. B; see In re Irwin , 529 N.W.2d 366, 371 (Minn.App. 1995) (trial court did not abuse discretion when it denied patient's motion to represent himself, but allowed his participation in cross-examination of some witnesses), review denied (Minn. May 16, 1995).
We caution Gillham that before citing an unpublished case, the provisions of Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3(b)(5) (1996), must be followed.
Gillham told the trial court he wanted to represent himself, but now argues he should receive a new trial because the court failed to make a finding as to his capacity to represent himself. The trial court advised Gillham that he would be allowed to represent himself only with the attorney's assistance, and that the attorney must make legal determinations. At the hearing, Gillham questioned the witnesses only after his counsel's cross-examination was completed, and, in one instance, Gillham's counsel then engaged in further cross-examination. Gillham's right to counsel was not violated.