Opinion
No. COA09-444.
Filed September 1, 2009.
Chatham County No. 07 JA 14-16.
Appeal by respondent-mother from order entered 13 January 2009 by Judge Beverly Scarlett in Chatham County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 August 2009.
Carol J. Holcomb and Samantha H. Cabe, for petitioner-appellee, Chatham County Department of Social Services. Robin E. Strickland, for respondent-appellant. Pamela Newell Williams, for the Guardian ad Litem.
Respondent-mother ("respondent") appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her children. Dalton S., the father of C.P. and A.S., relinquished his rights and is not a party to this appeal. Shady T., the father of J.P., is also not a party to this appeal. We affirm.
I. Facts
Respondent is the biological mother of C.P., born in 2000; A.S., born in 2001; and, J.P., born in 2002. On 1 March 2007, the Chatham County Department of Social Services ("CCDSS") filed juvenile petitions alleging that C.P., A.S., and J.P. were abused and neglected juveniles. The petition alleged that C.P. was brought to the Siler City Police Department after a fight between respondent and Dalton S., that C.P. had been whipped with a belt, and that respondent and Dalton S. were intoxicated during the domestic violence incident. The petition further alleged that the children had witnessed serious ongoing domestic violence between respondent and Dalton S., and that the children had been physically abused by respondent and Dalton S. CCDSS took nonsecure custody of the juveniles. By order filed 20 July 2007, the trial court adjudicated C.P. an abused and neglected juvenile, and adjudicated A.S. and J.P. neglected juveniles.
The trial court entered a custody review order on 31 December 2007 and continued custody with CCDSS. As to placement, the trial court found: (1) C.P.'s placement shall continue in the Level 2 therapeutic foster home with foster parents experienced in caring for children exposed to sexual abuse/sexualized behavior; (2) A.S. shall continue to live in the home of kinship placement providers and continue to receive in-home therapeutic support; and (3) J.P. shall continue to live with his godparents and continue to receive in-home therapeutic support. The trial court held a permanency planning hearing on 25 January 2008. By order filed 18 February 2008, the trial court found that further efforts to reunify or place the children with respondent and Dalton S. would be futile; that "it may take Respondent mother a significant period of time to address her own issues which she must [do] in order to have the capacity to parent her children[;]" and that "[Dalton S.] intends to relinquish his parental rights." The court further found that the children should remain in their current placements and that the permanent plan for the children be adoption.
CCDSS subsequently filed a motion in the cause for termination of parental rights of respondent. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion in October 2008. By order filed 13 January 2009, the trial court found grounds existed to terminate respondent's parental rights based upon neglect and abuse (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1)), and on the ground that respondent is incapable of providing for the proper care and supervision of the children (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(6)). The trial court also concluded that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate the parental rights of respondent. Respondent appeals.
II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Respondent first contends the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to terminate her parental rights to J.P. because the initial juvenile petition for J.P. was neither signed nor verified in accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-403. We disagree.
"A trial court's subject matter jurisdiction over all stages of a juvenile case is established when the action is initiated with the filing of a properly verified petition." In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. 588, 593, 636 S.E.2d 787, 792 (2006). The Juvenile Code states that a juvenile petition alleging dependency, abuse, or neglect "shall be drawn by the director, verified before an official authorized to administer oaths, and filed by the clerk, recording the date of filing." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-403(a) (2007). We have held that a juvenile petition is properly "drawn" if the petition contains sufficient information to permit the trial court to determine that the person initiating and signing the petition is the director or a duly authorized representative of the director of a department of social services. In re Dj.L., 184 N.C. App. 76, 79-80, 646 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2007).
Here, the record shows that the verification section of J.P.'s original juvenile petition, filed 1 March 2007, is signed by an individual named "Sharon W. Lee" ("Ms. Lee"), and the petition identifies the petitioner as "Chatham County Department of Social Services." The verification fails to indicate whether Ms. Lee is the director or an authorized representative of a director of a department of social services. However, "[t]he fact that the petition [does] not explicitly state that [the signer] was an `authorized representative' of the director does not create a jurisdictional defect." In re D.D.F., 187 N.C. App. 388, 393, 654 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2007).
In the instant case, attached to the signed and verified petition is a statement concerning reports received by the Chatham County Department of Social Services regarding domestic violence and physical abuse. No argument has been made that Ms. Lee lacked authority to initiate the juvenile petition. The juvenile petition is sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction over J.P. upon the trial court. Accordingly, respondent's assignment of error is overruled.
III. Grounds to Terminate Respondent's Parental Rights
Respondent argues the trial court erred by finding that grounds exist to terminate her parental rights. We disagree.
"The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases is whether the findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and whether these findings, in turn, support the conclusions of law." In re Shepard, 162 N.C. App. 215, 221, 591 S.E.2d 1, 6 (2004) (quoting In re Clark, 72 N.C. App. 118, 124, 323 S.E.2d 754, 758 (1984)). Conclusions of law are reviewable de novo by this Court on appeal. In re J.S.L., 177 N.C. App. 151, 154, 628 S.E.2d 387, 389 (2006).
Termination of parental rights is a two-step process governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-1109 and 7B-1110. In re Shepard, 162 N.C. App. at 221, 591 S.E.2d at 5. During the initial adjudication phase of the trial, the petitioner seeking termination must show by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that one or more of the statutory grounds for termination set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 exists. Id. If the petitioner succeeds in establishing the existence of any one of the statutory grounds listed in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111, the trial court then moves to the dispositional phase, where it determines whether termination is in the best interests of the child. Id.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(6) provides that a respondent's parental rights may be terminated upon a finding that the respondent "is incapable of providing for the proper care and supervision of the juvenile, such that the juvenile is a dependent juvenile within the meaning of G.S. 7B-101, and that there is a reasonable probability that such incapability will continue for the foreseeable future." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(6) (2007). Such incapability "may be the result of substance abuse, mental retardation, mental illness, organic brain syndrome, or any other cause or condition that renders the [respondent] unable or unavailable to parent the juvenile and the [respondent] lacks an appropriate alternative child care arrangement." Id. The trial court made numerous findings of fact to support its determination that respondent's parental rights should be terminated on this ground.
Respondent has a personality disorder, which makes her dysfunctional and resistant to change. Her psychological profile suggests that she has little insight into herself and that she "can be preoccupied with her own needs at the expense of the needs of others." Additionally, her disorder is significant enough to interfere with her ability to function effectively, and she cannot deny her own needs for the needs of her children. Given respondent's personality disorder and other parenting deficiencies, the trial court found that it is "not likely" that she could make real changes in her behavior to allow her to adequately parent and protect her children. On the basis of these findings of fact, the trial court properly concluded that respondent is incapable of providing for the care and supervision of her children and that such incapability will continue for the foreseeable future.
Respondent contends the trial court's findings of fact are not competent because they are based on information extracted from a 2007 psychological evaluation of respondent. According to respondent, while the information contained in this evaluation "may have been accurate and competent" in 2007, it is not accurate and competent as of the date of the termination hearing. This argument is without merit as clear, cogent, and convincing evidence exists to support the trial court's findings of fact.
The trial court's findings of fact addressed, in specific detail, the parameters of respondent's personality disorder as diagnosed by Dr. Mary Baker-Sinclair ("Dr. Baker-Sinclair"), whose psychological evaluation was incorporated by reference into the trial court's findings of fact. The trial court's findings were also amply supported by Dr. Baker-Sinclair's testimony at the termination hearing regarding respondent's personality disorder and how the disorder affects her ability to parent.
Dr. Baker-Sinclair testified that even if she were to test respondent on the date of the termination hearing, and even if some change may have occurred, a personality disorder of the type experienced by respondent is one of "lasting construct" which would more likely than not cause her to "regress to that same style-looking for stimulation, distraction . . . at risk for relapse with alcohol, which would put her right back where she was." Additionally, Dr. Baker-Sinclair testified that even if respondent stopped abusing alcohol, had clean drug screens and underwent various types of counseling, she still would not change her opinion as to respondent's ability to provide and care for her children. This opinion was based on the fact that the damage done to respondent's children was so severe that they were "fundamentally different children" such that respondent would not only be required to satisfy normal parenting requirements, but would have to parent three "high-risk" children along with a newborn baby. While respondent may be able to change, Dr. Baker-Sinclair testified her ability to parent remained inadequate under these circumstances.
Respondent offered no evidence to show that her personality disorder did not affect her ability to parent nor did she offer evidence that she is or will be capable of caring for her children, especially in light of their increased needs. As the trial court's findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, it was proper for the trial court to conclude that respondent's parental rights should be terminated pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(6).
A finding of any one of the separately enumerated grounds for termination of parental rights is sufficient to support a trial court's order terminating those rights. In re Taylor, 97 N.C. App. 57, 64, 387 S.E.2d 230, 233-34 (1990). Since we find that the trial court properly based termination on the ground set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(6), we need not address respondent's arguments regarding the remaining grounds for termination. See In re Shermer, 156 N.C. App. 281, 285, 576 S.E.2d 403, 407 (2003).
The trial court also concluded that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the best interests of her children. While respondent assigned error to this conclusion, she failed to argue it in her brief on appeal. Accordingly, pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6), this assignment of error is deemed abandoned. N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (2009). The trial court's order terminating respondent's parental rights is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges McGEE and JACKSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).