In Matter of Complaint of Andrew Harnett

Full title: IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT of Andrew Harnett as owner of Vessel M/V…

Court: United States District Court, S.D. New York

Date published: Jul 14, 2010

06-cv-0699 (LMM), consolidated with: 06-cv-3061 (LMM) and 06-cv-3062 (LMM) (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 14, 2010)

Opinion

06-cv-0699 (LMM), consolidated with: 06-cv-3061 (LMM) and 06-cv-3062 (LMM).

July 14, 2010

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LAWRENCE McKENNA, District Judge

Petitioner Andrew Harnett ("Petitioner"), the owner of the vessel Ready Jet Go ("Ready Jet Go"), brings this claim for exoneration from, or limitation of, liability for maritime accident under 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501-12. The claim is in regards to a collision between Ready Jet Go and a 45-foot rowing shell (the "Shell"). Petitioner moves for summary judgment in his favor pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion is opposed by claimants in the action, the New York Rowing Association ("NYRA") and Nina and Lee Runsdorf (the "Runsdorf Estate") (collectively, "Claimants"), as well as by the Peter J. Sharp Boathouse (the "Sharp Boathouse").

For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner's motion is DENIED.

I. Background

In the early morning of October 24, 2005, Petitioner navigated Ready Jet Go, a 29-foot Hinckley, Talaria jet boat, which he owned and operated, through the Harlem River. (Ex. A to Affidavit of Lawrence B. Brennan, dated April 16, 2010 ("Brennan Aff.") at 33.) Petitioner was joined by one passenger, Richard Brady. (Id.)

At approximately 6 a.m., Ready Jet Go collided with the Shell, owned by the NYRA and operated by four rowers. (Brennan Aff. Ex. A at 33.) When Ready Jet Go struck the Shell, the rowing vessel flipped over. (Declaration of Vincent Houston ("Houston Decl.") at 3, Dec. 21, 2006.) James Runsdorf, the rower seated in the forward-most position of the Shell, could not be immediately found, and it was later discovered that he lost his life in the collision. (Brennan Aff. Ex. A at 33.) Following the collision, Petitioner ferried the three surviving rowers to shore. (Id.)

Petitioner moves for summary judgment on the grounds that the Shell was solely responsible for the collision. (Pet'r's Mem. at 1-2.)

II. Discussion A. The Limitation of Liability Act

As noted, Petitioner brings this claim under the Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501-12. The statute restricts the possible liability of the owner of a vessel for claims "occasioned, or incurred, without the privity or knowledge of the owner." Id. The phrase "privity or knowledge" is a "`term of art meaning complicity in the fault that caused the accident.'" In re Complaint of Messina, 574 F.3d 119, 126 (2d Cir. 2009) (quotingBlackler v. F. Jacobus Transp. Co., 243 F.2d 733, 735 (2d Cir. 1957)); see also, Potomac Transp., Inc. v. Ogden Marine, Inc., 909 F.2d 42, 46 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Privity and knowledge under the statute have been construed to mean that a shipowner knew or should have known that a certain condition existed."). "In the case of individual owners, it has been commonly held or declared that privity as used in the statute means some personal participation of the owner in the fault or negligence which caused or contributed to the loss or injury." Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406, 411 (1943) (citing The 84-H, 296 F. 427, 431 (2d Cir. 1923)). If the owner "by prior action or inaction set into motion a chain of circumstances which may be a contributing cause even though not the immediate or proximate cause of a casualty, the right to limitation is properly denied." Tug Ocean Prince, Inc. v. United States, 584 F.2d 1151, 1159 (2d Cir. 1978). Thus, the statute allows Petitioner to affirmatively avoid liability if he can prove that he does not bear any fault for the collision.

B. Summary Judgment Standard of Review

Summary judgment is properly granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Rule 56 mandates the entry of summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). When deciding a summary judgment motion, the Court must assess "the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and resolve ambiguities and draw reasonable inferences against the moving party." Abramson v. Pataki, 278 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, to withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must affirmatively set forth facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). Thus, only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Id. at 248. Additionally, the dispute over the material fact must be genuine; that is, the evidence must be such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id.

C. Summary Judgment Standard as Applied to Limitation of Liability Claim

Summary judgment is inappropriate here because a genuine dispute exists as to facts material to Petitioner's limitation of liability claim. Specifically, Claimants offer evidence that, if found to be true, could establish that Petitioner's own negligence contributed to the collision. Contributory negligence on the part of the owner of a vessel will result in the denial of a petition for limitation. See, e.g., Tug Ocean Prince, 584 F.2d at 1158; Coryell, 317 U.S. at 411.

In fact, the parties come to very little consensus on the facts material to Petitioner's contributive negligence. Most significantly, the parties dispute the time of the collision and the amount of light present at that time. Petitioner argues that the collision occurred earlier, and that there was a lack of light at the time. (Pet'r's Mem. 2-3.) Claimants offer testimony of the surviving rowers who assert that the casualty occurred later and that the morning twilight and glow from the buildings facilitated visibility. (Houston Decl. at 3.) A factual determination of the truth on this matter is key because a bright sky might indicate a lack of due diligence on the part of Petitioner, where a darker sky might suggest that the rowers possessed insufficient lighting and were thus wholly responsible for the casualty.

Petitioner also argues that Ready Jet Go was traveling at a safe speed of sixteen to eighteen miles per hour against a strong current when the collision occurred. (Pet'r's Mem. at 2.) Claimants assert, however, that Ready Jet Go was "speeding" and appeared to be running at "full throttle." (Brennan Aff. Ex. A at 32-33.) The question of whether Petitioner contributed to the collision depends heavily on the factual determination of whether Ready Jet Go proceeded at a safe speed against the current or at a faster, more dangerous pace.

Furthermore, Claimants allege a build-up of dirt and water-spray on Ready Jet Go's windshield. (Declaration of Captain Joseph Ahlstrom ("Ahlstrom Decl.") at 8, Oct. 24, 2005.) They insist that Petitioner should have known to prevent the build-up with wipers; that the build-up is proof that Petitioner's view was obscured; and that this temporary blindness caused the casualty. (Runsdorf Estate Mem. at 8.) Conversely, Petitioner contends that Ready Jet Go was seaworthy (Pet'r's Mem. at 5.) Whether Petitioner allowed the windshield to become dirty, and the degree to which the resulting opacity may have contributed to the collision, are both factual questions that must be resolved in order to determine Petitioner's limitation of liability claim.

Additionally, Claimants present evidence that Ready Jet Go was navigating through the center of the Harlem River. (Brennan Aff. Ex. A at 33.) Petitioner again responds that he acted with due diligence. (Pet'r's Mem. at 5.) The Coast Guard Navigation Rules require that "a vessel proceeding along the course of a narrow channel or fairway shall keep as near to the outer limit of the channel or fairway which lies on her starboard side as is safe and practicable." 33 C.F.R. § 83.09 (1981). The Second Circuit has held that the Harlem River is a narrow channel for purposes of this rule, but in the same case it established that when "blind adherence [to the rule] will produce disaster, it is not only the right but the duty of the navigator to disregard it."The Three Brothers, 170 F. 48, 50 (2d Cir. 1909). Therefore, a factual determination must be made as to whether Ready Jet Go navigated the riverside — or whether the circumstances warranted departure from the rule — in order to accurately assess Petitioner's liability.

Thus, the factual disputes concerning the time, light conditions, speed, adequacy of windshield visibility, and whether or not Ready Jet Go traversed too closely to the center of the Harlem River must be resolved in order for the Court to ascertain whether or not Petitioner may exercise a right to limitation of liability. As such, Petitioner's motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.