§ 20-1-107(1), C.R.S. (2005). This legislative declaration arguably conflicts with this court's statement in In Interest of J.E.S., 817 P.2d 508 (Colo. 1991), that the inherent powers of the judiciary include "`[a]ll powers reasonably required to enable a court to perform efficiently its judicial functions, to protect its dignity, independence, and integrity, and to make its lawful actions effective.'" Id. at 511 (quoting Pena v. District Court, 681 P.2d 953 (Colo.
Even after dismissal, however, a court retains jurisdiction to enforce its prior orders. In re 817 P.2d 508, 513 (Colo. 1991); see also Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990) ("It is well established that a federal court may consider collateral issues after an action is no longer pending."). Thus, as we have noted, "Once jurisdiction has been granted to a court, it must have the requisite power to enforce its orders.
The moment the courts of the United States were called into existence and invested with jurisdiction over any subject, they became possessed of this power. Ex Parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 510 (1873); see also In the Interest of J.E.S., 817 P.2d 508, 511 (Colo. 1991) ("The judiciary's authority to punish for contempt of court has long been recognized as an inherent power essential to the effective administration of justice."); I ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Special Functions of the Trial Judge, Standard 6-4.1 (2d ed. 1980 1986 Supp.) (discussing the inherent power of the court to punish for contempt). To shield "judicial power from legislative control under the separation of powers doctrine," the Chief Judge had his contempt power to force the Sheriff to provide security.
¶ 33 In our view, by providing that a restitution order is a "final civil judgment" that "remains in force until restitution is paid in full," the plain language of section 18-1.3-603(4)(a) makes clear that if necessary, such an order remains in effect beyond the completion of a deferred judgment: the order remains in force until restitution is paid in full, and a court, of course, has the authority to enforce such a pending order. See In the Interest of J.E.S., 817 P.2d 508, 513 (Colo. 1991) (agreeing that a court with jurisdiction over a matter has the requisite power to enforce its orders and that a court may not be placed in a situation in which it lacks the authority to do so). Consequently, we conclude that the district court retained the authority to collect the $815.
¶33 In our view, by providing that a restitution order is a "final civil judgment" that "remains in force until restitution is paid in full," the plain language of section 18-1.3-603(4)(a) makes clear that if necessary, such an order remains in effect beyond the completion of a deferred judgment: the order remains in force until restitution is paid in full, and a court, of course, has the authority to enforce such a pending order. See In the Interest of J.E.S., 817 P.2d 508, 513 (Colo. 1991) (agreeing that a court with jurisdiction over a matter has the requisite power to enforce its orders and that a court may not be placed in a situation in which it lacks the authority to do so). Consequently, we conclude that the district court retained the authority to collect the $815.95 in restitution that Pineda-Liberato still owes to Rent-A-Center. ¶34 This conclusion not only is consistent with the plain language of the restitution statute, but also it is consistent with the purposes of both restitution and deferred sentencing.
The power of contempt falls within a court's broad authority. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343-4, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970); In re J.E.S., 817 P.2d 508, 511 (Colo. 1991). A court may hold a party in contempt for any conduct which interferes with the court's administration of justice, is derogatory to the dignity of the court, or tends to bring the judiciary into disrespect.
The statutory regulation must preserve to the court sufficient power to protect itself from indignities and to enable it effectively to administer its judicial functions." In re J.E.S., 817 P.2d 508, 512 (Colo. 1991) (quoting State ex rel. Bliss v. Greenwood, 315 P.2d 223, 227 (N.M. 1957)). Here, the ICA extrapolated from HRS § 571-32(e) and the federal statute and its supplementary regulations numerous limitations on the court's contempt authority.
Although the power to punish for contempt is an inherent power of the courts, the legislature may establish alternative procedures and penalties that do not unduly restrict or abrogate the courts' contempt powers. See Young, 481 U.S. at 799; Walker v. Bentley, 678 So.2d 1265, 1267 (Fla. 1996) (holding that "[a]ny legislative enactment that purports to do away with the inherent power of contempt directly affects a separate and distinct function of the judicial branch, and, as such, violates the separation of powers doctrine . . . of the Florida Constitution"); State ex rel. Lanning v. Lonsdale, 4 N.W. 390 (Wis. 1880), reaffirmed in State v. Lehman, 403 N.W.2d 438 (Wis. 1987); In the interest of J.E.S., 817 P.2d 508 (Colo. 1991) (holding that a statute that was amended to abrogate a court's power to incarcerate juveniles who act in violation of a court order was unconstitutional as violative of the separation of powers doctrine); In re Baker, 376 N.E.2d 1005 (Ill. 1978) (holding that a court may impose incarceration for contempt in juvenile proceedings despite statute requiring a different means of enforcing a court order); cf. Balucan, 44 Haw. at 277, 353 P.2d at 635 (noting that Revised Laws of Hawai'i § 269-5 (1955), required that the circumstances of contempt be set forth in the judgment and mittimus). In distinguishing criminal from civil contempt, a court's inquiry is focused upon the character and purpose of punishment and not upon the punishment itself.
Jurisdictions which have recognized the inherent power of contempt generally have limited that power to circumstances when all less restrictive options have failed in order to prevent bootstrapping. See, e.g., L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827 (Alaska 1976); In re Michael G., 44 Cal.3d 283 (1988); In re J.E.S., 817 P.2d 508 (Colo. 1991); G.S. v. State, 709 So.2d 122 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (statute provides that juveniles may be held in contempt and placed in secure detention as permissible alternative); In re G.B., 88 Ill.2d 36 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 963 (1982); In re B.L., 688 N.E.2d 1311 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997); State ex rel. L.E.A. v. Hammergren, 294 N.W.2d 705 (Minn.
The juvenile court appropriately noted that the offense of possession of a handgun by a juvenile is a "status" offense — an offense consisting of conduct that would not constitute an offense if engaged in by an adult. In re J.E.S., 817 P.2d 508, 512 n. 6 (Colo. 1991). The presumption statute establishes a presumption that any juvenile alleged to have committed one of several enumerated offenses will be presumed to be a danger to himself or herself or the community, warranting further detention.