Opinion
Case No. 20050100-CA.
Filed March 31, 2005. (Not For Official Publication).
Appeal from the Third District Juvenile, Salt Lake Department, The Honorable Kimberly K. Hornak.
Jeffrey J. Noland, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and John M. Peterson, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Martha Pierce and Kristen Fadel, Salt Lake City, Guardians Ad Litem.
Before Judges Billings, Bench, and Orme.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
The juvenile court "may terminate all parental rights with respect to a parent if it finds any one of" the enumerated grounds for termination. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407(1) (2002).
S.P. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the grounds for termination. Specifically, he contends that the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) did not make "reasonable efforts to assist [him] in evaluating and addressing the concerns the trial court had as to the father's ability to parent the child." "[I]f the juvenile court has ordered DCFS to provide reunification services to a parent, then the juvenile court must make a finding that DCFS `made reasonable efforts to provide those services' prior to terminating that parent's rights under `[s]ubsection (1)(b), (c), (d), (e), (f), or (h)' of the statute." In re F.C. III, 2003 UT App 397, ¶ 6, 81 P.3d 790 (citation omitted). The juvenile court did not order DCFS to provide reunification services based upon S.P.'s conduct. In addition, abandonment is not one of the grounds on which the court would have been required to make the reasonable efforts finding even if services had been ordered. See id. (stating that the ground of abandonment did not require reasonable efforts finding). Accordingly, the juvenile court was not required to make a finding that DCFS provided reasonable efforts to assist S.P. in becoming an adequate parent. We next consider his challenge to the evidence supporting abandonment.
It was undisputed that, due to his repeated criminal conduct, S.P. was frequently incarcerated and was unavailable to parent F.P. for lengthy periods of time during the first four years of F.P.'s life up to the time of trial. Although S.P. filed an affidavit acknowledging paternity of F.P. shortly after the child's birth, there was no credible evidence that S.P. provided financial support or had any significant contact with F.P. We defer to the juvenile court's determination that the testimony of the mother that S.P. had visited whenever possible and had provided food or supplies was not credible. See In re E.R., 2001 UT App 66, ¶ 11, 21 P.3d 680 (stating that juvenile court is given wide latitude of discretion based on opportunity to judge credibility firsthand). However, we also note that the mother testified that she did not know how to reach F.P. from February 2003 until July 2004, and had only two or three contacts with him during that period. She further testified that she told S.P. to contact DCFS. There was no evidence from any source indicating that S.P. contacted DCFS, even though he was aware that his child was in the custody of the State. The evidence was sufficient to establish abandonment as a ground for termination of parental rights. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to consider the additional grounds for termination.
We affirm the order terminating S.P.'s parental rights.
Judith M. Billings, Presiding Judge, Russell W. Bench, Associate Presiding Judge, Gregory K. Orme, Judge.