In Interest of Doe

48 Citing cases

  1. In re Doe

    95 Haw. 183 (Haw. 2001)   Cited 241 times
    Holding that the record contained substantial evidence to support "the family court's determination that Mother [was] not willing and able to provide" a safe environment for the child

    Generally, the "family court possesses wide discretion in making its decisions and those decisions will not be set aside unless there is a manifest abuse of discretion." In re Jane Doe, Born on May 22, 1976, 84 Haw. 41, 46, 928 P.2d 883, 888 (1996) (quoting In re Jane Doe, Born on February 22, 1987, 77 Haw. 109, 115, 883 P.2d 30, 36 (1994)) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, we will not disturb the family court's decisions on appeal "unless the family court disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant . . . [and its] decision clearly exceed[ed] the bounds of reason."

  2. In re Doe

    101 Haw. 220 (Haw. 2003)   Cited 24 times
    Determining that because mother did not show that the family court did not consider HRS section 571-46(b) factors in coming to its conclusion, the Family Court did not abuse its discretion in deciding not to modify legal and physical custody of a child

    Generally, the "family court possesses wide discretion in making its decisions and those decisions will not be set aside unless there is a manifest abuse of discretion." In re Jane Doe, Born on May 22, 1976, 84 Haw. 41, 46, 928 P.2d 883, 888 (1996) (quoting In re Jane Doe, Born on February 22, 1987, 77 Haw. 109, 115, 883 P.2d 30, 36 (1994)) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, we will not disturb the family court's decisions on appeal "unless the family court disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant . . . [and its] decision clearly exceed[ed] the bounds of reason."

  3. In re R Children

    NO. CAAP-16-0000441 (Haw. Ct. App. Sep. 12, 2018)

    Furthermore, the Hawai'i Supreme Court has held that chapter 587 should be liberally construed to serve the best interest of the child. In re Doe, 84 Hawai'i 41, 51-52, 928 P.2d 883, 893-94 (1996). The Child Protective Act was first enacted in 1983 by Act 171 and was codified as HRS chapter 587. 1983 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 171, at 320-45.

  4. In re Interest of R.

    454 P.3d 418 (Haw. 2019)   Cited 7 times

    Therefore, Male Child does not support the ICA's invocation of the Family Court Provision to affirm the family court's improper termination of Father's parental rights under the CPA Provision. The ICA also cited our decision in In re Doe Born on May 22, 1976, 84 Hawai‘i 41, 928 P.2d 883 (1996) to conclude that the CPA Provision and the Family Court Provision are not mutually exclusive. In Doe, an action was initiated involving a minor under certain family court provisions.

  5. In re Doe Children

    96 Haw. 272 (Haw. 2001)   Cited 40 times
    Explaining that the appellate courts “give deference to decisions of the family court to issue orders that are in the best interests of a child”

    This court reviews the family court's legal conclusions de novo.See In re Doe, 84 Haw. 41, 46, 928 P.2d 883, 888 (1996). C. Findings of Fact

  6. DJ v. CJ

    464 P.3d 790 (Haw. 2020)   Cited 6 times
    Arguing that the family court erred in considering a custody evaluator's report that omitted arguably relevant information went to the report's weight, not its admissibility

    But here, we are not even reviewing the merits of the actual custody or "best interests" decision, but rather, the family court's denial of Father's request for a continuance to seek counsel.We also note that in In re Jane Doe, Born on May 22, 1976, 84 Hawai‘i 41, 46, 928 P.2d 883, 888 (1996) which the dissent cites and which states that family courts have wide discretion in making decisions that will not be set aside without a manifest abuse of discretion, we actually held that the family court abused its discretion in denying a motion for new trial, which resulted in the exclusion of testimony inferentially bearing upon the best interests of a child. This case involved Mother's motion to relocate to North Carolina with the children and their soon to be step-father, a potentially significant deprivation of Father's fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of his children.

  7. LC v. MG

    430 P.3d 400 (Haw. 2018)   Cited 13 times
    Holding that wife of a child's mother was presumed to be a legal parent of a child born during same-sex marriage pursuant to marital presumption under the UPA

    Generally, the "family court possesses wide discretion in making its decisions and those decisions will not be set aside unless there is a manifest abuse of discretion." In re Doe, 95 Hawai‘i at 189, 20 P.3d at 622 (citing In Interest of Doe, 84 Hawai‘i 41, 46, 928 P.2d 883, 888 (1996) ). "Under the abuse of discretion standard of review, the family court's decision will not be disturbed unless the family court disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant[, and its] decision clearly exceed[ed] the bounds of reason." In Interest of Doe, 84 Hawai‘i at 46, 928 P.2d at 888 (alterations in original).

  8. HONDA v. ERS

    108 Haw. 212 (Haw. 2005)   Cited 15 times
    Holding that plaintiff who requested and relied upon defendant's retirement estimates and informational pamphlets “was not aware at the time the [employee retirement] contract was made that he had only limited knowledge with respect to the facts to which the mistake relates.”

    The [circuit] court's [findings of fact (]FOFs[)] are reviewed on appeal under the "clearly erroneous" standard. [ In re Jane Doe, Born on May 22, 1976, 84 Hawai'i 41, 46, 928 P.2d 883, 888 (1996)] (citing State v. Naeole, 80 Hawai'i 419, 423 n. 6, 910 P.2d 732, 736 n. 6 (1996)). A FOF "is clearly erroneous when (1) the record lacks substantial evidence to support the finding, or (2) despite substantial evidence in support of the finding, the appellate court is nonetheless left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."

  9. In re Doe Children

    105 Haw. 38 (Haw. 2004)   Cited 26 times
    Holding that the complainant could not avail herself of the "futility exception" because she could have requested an impartial due process hearing but chose not to do so

    Generally, the "family court possesses wide discretion in making its decisions and those decisions will not be set aside unless there is a manifest abuse of discretion." In re Jane Doe, Born on May 22, 1976, 84 Hawai'i 41, 46, 928 P.2d 883, 888 (1996) (quoting In re Jane Doe, Born on February 22, 1987, 77 Hawai'i 109, 115, 883 P.2d 30, 36 (1994)) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, we will not disturb the family court's decisions on appeal "unless the family court disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant . . . [and its] decision clearly exceed[ed] the bounds of reason."

  10. Troyer v. Adams

    102 Haw. 399 (Haw. 2003)   Cited 85 times
    Approving a settlement contribution bar and finding no due process issue when statutory provision afforded non-settling party notice and an opportunity to object

    The [circuit] court's [findings of fact (]FOFs[)] are reviewed on appeal under the "clearly erroneous" standard. [In re Jane Doe, Born on May 22, 1976, 84 Haw. 41, 46, 928 P.2d 883, 888 (1996)] (citing State v. Naeole, 80 Haw. 419, 423 n. 6, 910 P.2d 732, 736 n. 6 (1996)). A FOF "is clearly erroneous when (1) the record lacks substantial evidence to support the finding, or (2) despite substantial evidence in support of the finding, the appellate court is nonetheless left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."