Generally, the "family court possesses wide discretion in making its decisions and those decisions will not be set aside unless there is a manifest abuse of discretion." In re Jane Doe, Born on May 22, 1976, 84 Haw. 41, 46, 928 P.2d 883, 888 (1996) (quoting In re Jane Doe, Born on February 22, 1987, 77 Haw. 109, 115, 883 P.2d 30, 36 (1994)) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, we will not disturb the family court's decisions on appeal "unless the family court disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant . . . [and its] decision clearly exceed[ed] the bounds of reason."
Generally, the "family court possesses wide discretion in making its decisions and those decisions will not be set aside unless there is a manifest abuse of discretion." In re Jane Doe, Born on May 22, 1976, 84 Haw. 41, 46, 928 P.2d 883, 888 (1996) (quoting In re Jane Doe, Born on February 22, 1987, 77 Haw. 109, 115, 883 P.2d 30, 36 (1994)) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, we will not disturb the family court's decisions on appeal "unless the family court disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant . . . [and its] decision clearly exceed[ed] the bounds of reason."
Furthermore, the Hawai'i Supreme Court has held that chapter 587 should be liberally construed to serve the best interest of the child. In re Doe, 84 Hawai'i 41, 51-52, 928 P.2d 883, 893-94 (1996). The Child Protective Act was first enacted in 1983 by Act 171 and was codified as HRS chapter 587. 1983 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 171, at 320-45.
Therefore, Male Child does not support the ICA's invocation of the Family Court Provision to affirm the family court's improper termination of Father's parental rights under the CPA Provision. The ICA also cited our decision in In re Doe Born on May 22, 1976, 84 Hawai‘i 41, 928 P.2d 883 (1996) to conclude that the CPA Provision and the Family Court Provision are not mutually exclusive. In Doe, an action was initiated involving a minor under certain family court provisions.
This court reviews the family court's legal conclusions de novo.See In re Doe, 84 Haw. 41, 46, 928 P.2d 883, 888 (1996). C. Findings of Fact
But here, we are not even reviewing the merits of the actual custody or "best interests" decision, but rather, the family court's denial of Father's request for a continuance to seek counsel.We also note that in In re Jane Doe, Born on May 22, 1976, 84 Hawai‘i 41, 46, 928 P.2d 883, 888 (1996) which the dissent cites and which states that family courts have wide discretion in making decisions that will not be set aside without a manifest abuse of discretion, we actually held that the family court abused its discretion in denying a motion for new trial, which resulted in the exclusion of testimony inferentially bearing upon the best interests of a child. This case involved Mother's motion to relocate to North Carolina with the children and their soon to be step-father, a potentially significant deprivation of Father's fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of his children.
Generally, the "family court possesses wide discretion in making its decisions and those decisions will not be set aside unless there is a manifest abuse of discretion." In re Doe, 95 Hawai‘i at 189, 20 P.3d at 622 (citing In Interest of Doe, 84 Hawai‘i 41, 46, 928 P.2d 883, 888 (1996) ). "Under the abuse of discretion standard of review, the family court's decision will not be disturbed unless the family court disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant[, and its] decision clearly exceed[ed] the bounds of reason." In Interest of Doe, 84 Hawai‘i at 46, 928 P.2d at 888 (alterations in original).
The [circuit] court's [findings of fact (]FOFs[)] are reviewed on appeal under the "clearly erroneous" standard. [ In re Jane Doe, Born on May 22, 1976, 84 Hawai'i 41, 46, 928 P.2d 883, 888 (1996)] (citing State v. Naeole, 80 Hawai'i 419, 423 n. 6, 910 P.2d 732, 736 n. 6 (1996)). A FOF "is clearly erroneous when (1) the record lacks substantial evidence to support the finding, or (2) despite substantial evidence in support of the finding, the appellate court is nonetheless left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."
Generally, the "family court possesses wide discretion in making its decisions and those decisions will not be set aside unless there is a manifest abuse of discretion." In re Jane Doe, Born on May 22, 1976, 84 Hawai'i 41, 46, 928 P.2d 883, 888 (1996) (quoting In re Jane Doe, Born on February 22, 1987, 77 Hawai'i 109, 115, 883 P.2d 30, 36 (1994)) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, we will not disturb the family court's decisions on appeal "unless the family court disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant . . . [and its] decision clearly exceed[ed] the bounds of reason."
The [circuit] court's [findings of fact (]FOFs[)] are reviewed on appeal under the "clearly erroneous" standard. [In re Jane Doe, Born on May 22, 1976, 84 Haw. 41, 46, 928 P.2d 883, 888 (1996)] (citing State v. Naeole, 80 Haw. 419, 423 n. 6, 910 P.2d 732, 736 n. 6 (1996)). A FOF "is clearly erroneous when (1) the record lacks substantial evidence to support the finding, or (2) despite substantial evidence in support of the finding, the appellate court is nonetheless left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."