Opinion
No. 05-05-00743-CV
Opinion issued July 27, 2005.
On Appeal from the 254th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 02-12296-R.
Dismissed.
Before Justices MORRIS, LANG, and MAZZANT.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Father attempts to appeal the trial court's judgment terminating his parental rights to C.T., C.L., and S.L.T. Because father's notice of appeal was not timely, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Section 109.002(a) of the Texas Family Code provides that the appeal of a final order of termination of the parent-child relationship is an accelerated appeal, and the procedures for an accelerated appeal under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure apply. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(a) (Vernon 2004). Rule 26.1(b) of the rules of appellate procedure provides that the notice in an accelerated appeal must be filed within twenty days after the judgment or order is signed. Tex.R.App.P. 26.1(b). Absent a timely motion for extension of time, the deadline is strictly set at twenty days. In re K.A.F., 160 S.W.3d 923, 927 (Tex. 2005). Here, the trial judge signed the termination order on March 2, 2005, making father's notice of appeal due on or before March 22, 2005. Father did not file his notice of appeal until April 25, 2005. Although father filed a motion for new trial, it does not operate to extend the deadline for filing his notice of appeal. In re K.A.F., 160 S.W.3d at 927. And, because father's motion for extension of time was not filed until June 1, 2005, well outside the fifteen day window after the deadline for filing his notice of appeal, it was not timely. See Tex.R.App.P. 26.3. Thus, father's April 25, 2005 notice of appeal was untimely and did not invoke this Court's jurisdiction. Id.
In reaching this conclusion, we necessarily reject father's contention that he did not receive notice of the signed order until May 13, 2005, and should therefore be allowed to proceed with his appeal. Rule 306a of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure may operate to extend the start of the appellate timetable when a party does not receive notice of the judgment. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 306a(4); Womack-Humphreys Architects, Inc. v. Barrasso, 886 S.W.2d 809, 813 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied), overruled in part by John v. Marshall Health Serv., Inc., 58 S.W.3d 738, 741 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam). However, because father did not meet his burden to establish the applicability of rule 306a(4), he cannot now rely on it to extend the time for filing his notice of appeal. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 306a(5); Womack-Humphreys, 886 S.W.2d at 814.
Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.