Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. MSN08-0658.
Haerle, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant, Donovan Bruce (Bruce), appeals from the trial court’s order denying his motion to vacate a sister-state judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 1710.40. Finding that the trial court did not err, we affirm the order.
All further citations are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff and respondent, Impreso, Inc. (Impreso), operates in Texas and was contacted by Bruce via telephone calls and e-mails to Impreso in Texas. Ultimately, Bruce supplied Impreso with “corporate cut business cards.” However, after Avery Denison Office Products Company and Avery Denison Corporation threatened to sue Impreso for infringement of patents for Impreso’s use of this product, Impreso destroyed the business cards, at a loss of $69,529.70.
Impreso then sued Bruce in Dallas County, Texas, seeking to recover its losses. Bruce did not respond to this suit and, ultimately, Impreso obtained a final judgment against Bruce on February 14, 2005. In its written “Interlocutory Judgment by DeFault, ” the Texas court held that, “after considering the Court’s file, Plaintiffs’ pleadings, the Citation with the Officer’s Return, and the evidence presented at the hearing on Defendant Donavan Bruce’s default, [the court] determines that it has jurisdiction over both the subject matter and parties to the proceeding.”
The court awarded Impreso $74,529.70 in principal, with prejudgment interest in the amount of $7,559.15, attorney fees and costs in the amount of $4,304.94, together with post-judgment interest at the rate of 10 percent per annum until fully paid.
On April 22, 2008, a Notice of Entry of Judgment on Sister-State Judgment was filed with regard to the Texas judgment. This notice was personally served on Bruce on May 15, 2008.
The notice of entry of judgment provides, in bold print as follows: “A sister-state judgment has been entered against you in a California court. Unless you file a motion to vacate the judgment in this court within 30 DAYS after service of this notice, this judgment will be final.” This admonition is further highlighted by the fact that it is placed within a bold-faced box. It is very difficult to miss it.
Nevertheless, Bruce did not file a motion to vacate the judgment within 30 days. Rather, he waited over a full year to do so, filing his motion to vacate on May 21, 2009. Bruce’s principal argument for vacating the judgment was that the Texas court had no personal jurisdiction over him because he did not have minimum contacts with that state.
Not surprisingly, on July 2, 2009, the trial court denied Bruce’s motion. The court held that the motion was untimely and it could not reexamine the Texas court’s determination that it did indeed have jurisdiction over Bruce. We affirm that decision.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Appealability
Before we reach the merits of Bruce’s appeal, we must first consider Impreso’s contention that the court’s order denying his motion to vacate is not appealable. We disagree with this argument. An order denying a statutory motion to vacate, such as this one, is an appealable order. (Bice v. Stevens (1958) 160 Cal.App.2d 222, 225; see also 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 200, p. 275.) Courts routinely consider appeals from orders denying motions to vacate sister state judgments. (Liquidator of Integrity Ins. Co. v. Hendrix (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 971; Magalnick v. Magalnick (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 753; Harris v. EMI Television Programs, Inc. (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 214.) Similarly, orders granting such motions are also appealable. (Liebow v. Superior Court (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 573.)
The case on which Impreso relies in arguing the order is not appealable does not involve the denial of a motion to vacate a sister-state judgment. (Rojes v. Riverside General Hospital (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1151, overruled on other grounds in Passavanti v. Williams (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1602, 1607.) In light of the substantial case law supporting an appeal from such a denial, we reject Impreso’s contrary argument.
B. Denial of Motion to Vacate
Bruce argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to vacate the default judgment. We disagree.
In our analysis of this contention, we follow well-established rules, beginning with the principle that the denial of a motion to vacate is within the sound discretion of the trial court. “We will not reverse the exercise of such discretion except when there is clear abuse. [Citation.] We view all factual matters in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.” (State of Arizona ex rel. Arizona Dept. of Revenue v. Yuen (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 169, 178.)
The rules that govern the deadlines for filing a motion to vacate a sister-state judgment are similarly well-established. A judgment creditor such as Impreso may seek entry in California of a sister-state money judgment. (§ 1710.15, 1710.20) After the judgment is entered, and the judgment creditor has given proper notice to the judgment debtor, the debtor has thirty days from the date of service to bring a motion to vacate the judgment. (§ 1710.40, subd. (b).)
Bruce was personally served on May 15, 2008. His motion was filed on May 21, 2009. The trial court, therefore, properly found it untimely.
Bruce does not deny that he filed his motion to vacate a year after he was served with notice of the entry of judgment. Indeed, he acknowledges that “it would have been better to have done so [i.e., bring the motion] earlier.” Instead, Bruce argues that the Texas court lacked jurisdiction over him and, therefore the judgment it rendered was void. Such a judgment, therefore, can be challenged by filing a motion to vacate at any time.
At the initial oral argument, we asked for further briefing from the parties on the applicability of a recent case, Airlines Reporting Corporation v. Renda (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 14 (Airlines Reporting) to the question of the timeliness of Bruce’s motion to vacate. In Airlines Reporting, the trial court vacated a $2.6 million sister state default judgment against a California defendant. The court found that, when a sister state judgment is void for lack of personal jurisdiction, the 30-day time limit for filing a motion to vacate under section 1710.40, subdivision (b) is inapplicable. (Airlines Reporting at p. 17.)
In Airlines Reporting, because the sister state court did not consider the issue of whether it had personal jurisdiction over the California debtor and, therefore, the judgment debtor was “ ‘free to ignore the judicial proceedings, risk a default judgment, and then challenge that judgment on jurisdictional grounds in a collateral proceeding.’ ” (Airlines Reporting, supra, 177 Cal.App.4that p. 20.) A different result obtains, however, when the sister state court “has fully and fairly litigated its jurisdiction, and has finally decided the question....” In that case, “a second state may not reexamine the question but must give the judgment of the first state full faith and credit.” (St. Sava Mission Corp. v. Serbian Easter Orthodox Diocese (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1354, 1364; Craig v. Superior Court (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 675, 680 [citing “the general rule that a judgment is entitled to full faith and credit – even as to questions of jurisdiction – when the second court’s inquiry discloses that those questions have been fully and fairly litigated and finally decided in the court which rendered the original judgment.”].)
The Texas court ruled it had personal as well as subject matter jurisdiction. It did so after considering “the Court’s file, Plaintiff’s pleadings, the Citation with the Officers’ Return, and the evidence presented at the hearing” on the default. This jurisdictional question, therefore, was “fully and fairly” litigated and the California court’s ruling that the Texas court had already considered the issue of jurisdiction and, therefore, it was required to give the judgment full faith and credit was not in error.
IV. DISPOSITION
The order appealed from is affirmed.
We concur: Kline, P.J., Richman, J.