Imperial Foods Supply, Inc. v. Purvis

8 Citing cases

  1. Thompson v. Princell

    304 Ga. App. 256 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 15 times
    Considering Georgia Administrative Code regulation in determining that trial court did not err in failing to charge the jury on general anesthesia in dental malpractice case

    Nor did Thompson properly enumerate such issue as error. See Imperial Foods Supply v. Purvis, 260 Ga. App. 614, 617 (4) ( 580 SE2d 342) (2003) ("[a]rguments raised in the appellate brief are not made issues on appeal unless they are properly enumerated as error") (punctuation and footnote omitted). Thus, her current reliance on OCGA § 43-11-1 (7) is waived because it was not raised at the trial level.

  2. Axcan Scandipharm v. Schwan's Home Service

    299 Ga. App. 49 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 2 times

    (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Imperial Food Supply v. Purvis, 260 Ga. App. 614, 616 ( 580 SE2d 342) (2003). Here, there was evidence upon which the jury could have found that ABF's actions in handling the 180 salvageable boxes of suppositories taken from the wreck was the sole proximate cause for Axcan's loss — specifically, that ABF left the same in open-air dumpsters in the rain constituted evidence of an intervening act not reasonably foreseeable to Schwan.

  3. Hart v. Shergold

    295 Ga. App. 94 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 8 times
    Stating that competent evidence must guide the jury to a reasonable value for future medical expenses

    See Council of Superior Court Judges, Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. I: Civil Cases, § 66.503 (5th ed. 2007).Imperial Foods Supply v. Purvis, 260 Ga. App. 614, 619-620 (6) ( 580 SE2d 342) (2003). charges were fairly covered in the trial court's instructions to the jury, the trial court did not err in failing to provide those charges.

  4. Horton v. Hendrix

    291 Ga. App. 416 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 21 times
    Noting that in an appeal of a civil jury trial, the evidence is construed in favor of the verdict

    Hitchcock v. Key, 163 Ga. App. 901, 903-904 (3, 4) ( 296 SE2d 625) (1982).Imperial Foods Supply v. Purvis, 260 Ga. App. 614, 619 (6) ( 580 SE2d 342) (2003). Charge No. 2 specified the ways that the jury might find undue influence generally was exercised; Charge No. 3 focused on ways that the jury might find that George in this particular trust agreement may have exercised undue influence; and Charge No. 4 instructed on the presumption of undue influence where a conveyance to a dominant fiduciary is executed by one with a weakened mind.

  5. Decatur's Best Taxi v. Smith

    639 S.E.2d 482 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 2 times
    In Decatur's Best Taxi Svc. v. Smith, 282 Ga. App. 731, 732 (639 SE2d 482) (2006), we found that "Georgia has not formally adopted a method by which a jury must calculate an award of damages in the event of a finding of comparative negligence "We find no error in the procedure employed by the trial court, whereby the court obtained separate verdicts on liability and damages, and then the court reduced the total amount of damages awarded by the jury in proportion to the degree of fault attributed by the jury to Turner.

    (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Imperial Foods Supply v. Purvis, 260 Ga. App. 614, 615 ( 580 SE2d 342) (2003). So long as there is some evidence to support the verdict, the denial of a motion for directed verdict will be upheld.

  6. Principle Sols. Grp. v. Ironshore Indem., Inc.

    944 F.3d 886 (11th Cir. 2019)   Cited 8 times   13 Legal Analyses
    Finding coverage under a similar policy because under Georgia law, the loss resulted directly from a fraudulent email and the employee's actions did not break the causal chain

    Georgia courts have held that intervening acts were foreseeable in more attenuated circumstances. See, e.g. , Imperial Foods Supply, Inc. v. Purvis , 260 Ga.App. 614, 580 S.E.2d 342, 345 (2003) (holding that it was foreseeable that the driver of a borrowed car would try to fix a broken door latch with a "makeshift, rigged mechanism" that did not perform reliably and caused injury). For the same reason, we are not persuaded by the dissent’s enumeration of eleven events that occurred between the fraudulent instruction and loss, such as each call that Lien made to Leach and Lien’s approval of the wire transfer.

  7. Moore v. United States

    1:16-cv-3875-WSD (N.D. Ga. Jun. 20, 2017)

    That John Doe 1 ordered Plaintiff to stand does not support that John Doe 1 caused Plaintiff's fall. Plaintiff fell when she attempted to sit down because Morales—not John Doe 1—moved Plaintiff's wheelchair. Plaintiff does not allege in her Complaint that John Doe 1 ordered Plaintiff to sit down, that he moved the wheelchair, or even that it was reasonably foreseeable to him that Morales would move the wheelchair. For this reason, Plaintiff's Complaint, as currently pled, fails to allege facts sufficient to show a causal connection between John Doe 1's conduct and Plaintiff's injuries, and Plaintiff fails to state a claim for negligence against the United States. See Bradley Ctr., 296 S.E.2d at 695; Tuggle, 499 S.E.2d at 368; see also Imperial Foods Supply, Inc. v. Purvis, 260 Ga. App. 614, 616 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) ("For an intervening act of a third party to become the sole proximate cause of a plaintiff's injuries, the intervening act must not have been foreseeable by defendant, must not have been triggered by defendant's act, and must have been sufficient by itself to cause the injury."). The United States' Motion to Dismiss Count II is granted, and Count II is dismissed.

  8. Willis v. Ralph Hardie's Restaurant #2, Inc.

    1:08-cv-3499-WSD (N.D. Ga. Oct. 9, 2009)

    Defendant seems to suggest that because some intervening act may have caused the pot to spill, Defendant is necessarily released from any liability. Even if Defendant were correct that there was an intervening cause — for instance, if one of the other children jostled the table and caused the pot to tip over — a trier of fact could still find that Defendant's employee's negligence was the proximate cause of Makoa's injuries. "[F]or an intervening act of a third party to become the sole proximate cause of a plaintiff's injuries, the intervening act must not have been foreseeable by defendant, must not have been triggered by defendant's act, and must have been sufficient by itself to cause the injury." Imperial Foods Supply, Inc. v. Purvis, 260 Ga. App. 614, 616 (Ga. App. 2003). The essence of Plaintiffs' case is that it was reasonably foreseeable that placing a pot of hot coffee two or three inches away from an infant child could result in serious injury and, in fact, made it more likely that injury would occur, regardless of how the coffee actually spilled.