Opinion
B228130
08-09-2011
IMPERIAL CAPITAL BANK, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SHASHIKANT J. JOGANI, Defendant and Appellant.
Law Office of Philip H. Dyson and Philip H. Dyson; Miranda Marie Bordson for Defendant and Appellant. Marcin Lambirth, John B. Marcin and Michael S. Robinson for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC416036)
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Amy D. Hogue, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Office of Philip H. Dyson and Philip H. Dyson; Miranda Marie Bordson for Defendant and Appellant.
Marcin Lambirth, John B. Marcin and Michael S. Robinson for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Shashikant J. Jogani ("Jogani") appeals from an order awarding $163,787 in attorneys' fees to respondent City National Bank ("City National Bank"), successor-in-interest to Imperial Capital Bank ("Imperial Capital Bank.") Jogani claims that City National Bank did not meet the burden of proof required to establish its entitlement to an award of attorneys' fees, and also that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding manifestly excessive fees. As we shall explain, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its award of attorneys' fees. Further, City National Bank provided adequate proof for its claim of fees. Consequently, we affirm.
Imperial Capital Bank is not a party to this appeal.
Shortly before oral argument, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on equitable grounds, claiming that appellant had violated several lower court orders and was in contempt of court. In view of our conclusion affirming the judgment we do not reach the merits and deny the motion as moot.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Underlying Dispute. On October 7, 2005, Imperial Capital Bank loaned $3,578,050 to Pickwick Arms Estates LLC. On the same day, Jogani executed and delivered an instrument in writing guaranteeing payment of all obligations created by this loan. On November 9, 2005, Imperial Capital Bank loaned $3,887,000 to Eagle Point Estates LLC. Later that day, Jogani executed and delivered an instrument in writing guaranteeing payment of all obligations created by this loan. Both guarantee instruments had provisions allowing for the recovery of attorneys' fees and costs Imperial Capital Bank might incur in the collection of payments.
It is unclear what Jogani's relationship is to Eagle Point LLC and Pickwick Arms Estates LLC.
The Litigation. On June 17, 2009, Imperial Capital Bank filed a complaint against Jogani alleging his breach of guaranty on both loans. On February 11, 2010, the court granted Imperial Capital Bank's motion for summary judgment. The court's order awarded Imperial Capital Bank $8,145,114.26 against Jogani, and also provided that attorneys' fees and costs would be determined at a later date.
For the collection of attorneys' fees and costs, Imperial Capital Bank assigned the action to City National Bank. City National Bank sought attorneys' fees under Civil Code section 1717 as a prevailing party. The motion sought fees from the instant action as well as fees incurred in two separate but related actions. City National Bank submitted redacted billing statements and attorney declarations to support its claim of costs. Jogani filed an opposition to the motion for attorneys' fees, arguing that City National Bank was not entitled to recover costs from other lawsuits. He further alleged that City National Bank's requested fees were unreasonably high.
On August 11, 2010, the court granted City National Bank's motion for attorneys' fees and costs, but only for the instant action. City National Bank obtained attorneys' fees of $163,787 and costs of $2,485.65.
Jogani filed a notice of appeal the same day.
DISCUSSION
Before this court, Jogani contends that the trial court abused its discretion in granting City National Bank's motion for attorneys' fees because City National Bank failed to meet the burden of proof required to establish its entitlement to an award, and the fees awarded were manifestly excessive. Jogani claims that the billing statements submitted by City National Bank were so heavily redacted that it was impossible for him to accurately assess the amount of hours that were reasonably expended. Additionally, Jogani contends that 641.8 hours expended for two similar breach of guaranty claims is manifestly excessive, considering that the work was performed by attorneys experienced in business litigation and was disposed of on summary judgment in less than a year.
City National Bank responds that the attorney declarations it submitted in support of the motion satisfy the burden of proof required to establish its entitlement to the attorneys' fees award. Further, City National Bank argues that the amount of hours expended on the current litigation was not excessive. The amount in controversy was over $8 million, the discovery process necessitated numerous motions to compel, and because the matter was disposed of only a month before trial, it required trial preparation. As we shall explain, City National Bank is correct.
When a contract provides for the award of attorneys' fees and costs to the prevailing party, Civil Code section 1717 provides that the trial court shall determine the reasonable attorneys' fees. The court uses a lodestar calculation to determine the fee award. The lodestar analysis consists of a base calculation of the hours expended multiplied by the basic hourly fee for comparable legal services in the community. It can be further adjusted by the court to account for factors such as the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved in the litigation; the skill counsel displayed in presenting them; the extent to which the nature of the work precluded other employment by the attorneys involved; and the contingent nature of the fee award. (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.)
The trial court is in the best position to assess the value of legal services. (See Children's Hosp. and Medical Center v. Bonta (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 777.) Consequently, a fee award will be upheld unless it is apparent that the lower court abused its discretion. The decision must stand unless "the amount awarded is so large or small that it shocks the conscience and suggests that passion and prejudice influenced the determination." (Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1134.) Though the trial court has wide discretion to determine the proper amount of a fee award, it still must bear some rational relationship to the lodestar calculation. (Press v. Lucky 34 Cal.3d 311, 324.)
The party opposing the fee award is responsible for furnishing an adequate record on appeal. (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1296.) The trial court is not obligated to explain the rationale for its decision unless requested to do so. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140.) On appeal, all facts are presumed in favor of the judgment unless the record indicates otherwise. (Denham v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)
In view of these concepts, we first examine whether City National Bank provided sufficient documentation in support of their attorneys' fees, and then turn to Jogani's claim as to the excessiveness of the fees.
A. Whether City National Bank Provided Sufficient Evidence to Support Its Motion for Attorneys' Fees.
Below and here, Jogani contends that City National Bank provided insufficient documentation of the legal work done on both breach of guaranty cases. Jogani claims that the billing statements are so heavily redacted that it was impossible to formulate specific objections to them. Further, Jogani claims that the billing statements are so ambiguous that the trial court could not have performed the proper lodestar analysis. We do not agree. On the contrary, City National Bank supplied sufficient evidence to support its motion for attorneys' fees.
Jogani misinterprets case law pertaining to the documentation required to support a fees motion. Although Jogani asserts that information such as number of hours worked, billing rates, types of issues, and appearances made on the client's behalf are necessary to aid the trial court in its lodestar analysis, Jogani fails to acknowledge that billing statements are not the only means to provide such information. (See Martino v. Denvi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) Attorney declarations attesting to the number of hours spent and the hourly billing rates are sufficient to inform a lodestar analysis. (Ibid.)Here, City National Bank provided detailed attorney declarations which contain the information to support a determination of fees, and thus, renders the billing statements superfluous.
Although the record does not affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court expressly undertook the lodestar analysis in calculating attorneys' fees, Jogani's claim still lacks merit. When the trial court record is silent on an issue, on appeal this court must presume all facts in favor of the judgment. As the opposing party, it was Jogani's responsibility to request a statement of decision with specific findings from the lower court because the court does not have to explain its reasoning absent an explicit request to do so. (Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1140.) Jogani did not do so.
In sum, not only did City National Bank provide sufficient evidence as to its attorneys' fees via attorney declarations, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the court did not use the lodestar analysis. Because we presume all facts in favor of the judgment on appeal, we presume the trial court properly employed the lodestar analysis.
B. Whether the Trial Court Awarded Manifestly Excessive Attorney Fees.
Appellate courts are reluctant to overturn awards of attorneys' fees that bear some rational relationship to the lodestar figure. Typically, the discrepancy between the lodestar figure and the amount awarded must be quite drastic for the appellate court to reverse the lower court's award. For example, attorneys' fees that were 1.4 times (Serrano v. Priest, supra, 20 Cal.3d at pp. 48-49) and two times (Coalition for Los Angeles County Planning in the Public Interest v. Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles County (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 241, 251) the lodestar amounts were considered reasonable. In Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc., the court reversed a fees award because the court awarded 185 times less than the base lodestar figure. (Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311, 324.) Here, the fees were not nearly as disparate.
The trial judge is capable of deciding the amount of attorneys' fees to award. The trial court observes all of the proceedings and is privy to discovery issues that can transform a relatively straightforward case into a lengthy, convoluted, and expensive battle. (Children's Hosp. and Medical Center v. Bonta, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 777.) In the present case, the discovery process included five motions to compel. Further, City National Bank prepared a successful motion for summary judgment in addition to preparing for trial. The motion for summary judgment was granted only a month before the trial.
Taking these events into account, Jogani's method of pointing out specific billing entries that he feels were for excessive amounts of time is inadequate. Beyond claiming that this is a "simple case," Jogani does not express any substantive complaints. Even his assertion that this is a "simple case" seems to be contradicted by the case's history. Simply pointing out examples of what he feels to be excessive amounts of time spent on discrete tasks without further analysis is insufficient to rebut City National Bank's attorney declarations. (Avikian v. WTC Financial Corp. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1119.)
In addition, in reaching this conclusion we also note Los Angeles Superior Court Local Rule 3.2 provides a schedule of attorneys' fees based upon the amount in controversy. Pursuant to the rule, when justice so requires, an award may be as high as 39 times larger than the base lodestar amount. (Cruz v. Ayromloo (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1270.) In the present case, under the schedule of fees, the award would be approximately $166,000. The amount awarded here is less.
In short, Jogani has failed to carry his burden to demonstrate that the fee award was excessive.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to its costs on appeal.
WOODS , J.
We concur:
PERLUSS, P. J.
JACKSON, J.