Opinion
22A-JV-2265
02-06-2023
I.M.B., Appellant-Respondent, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner.
Attorney for Appellant Carlos I. Carrillo Carrillo Law LLC Greenwood, Indiana. Attorneys for Appellee Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Justin F. Roebel Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana.
Appeal from the Johnson Circuit Court Trial Court Cause No. 41C01-2206-JD-78, The Honorable Michael T. Bohn, Judge.
Attorney for Appellant Carlos I. Carrillo Carrillo Law LLC Greenwood, Indiana.
Attorneys for Appellee Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Justin F. Roebel Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana.
Brown and Weissmann, Judges concur.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
BAILEY, JUDGE.
Case Summary
[¶1] I.M.B. challenges his adjudication as a delinquent child, for having committed what would be Resisting Law Enforcement, as a Class A misdemeanor, if committed by an adult. I.M.B. contends that the juvenile court failed to advise him of his Constitutional rights as required by Indiana Code Section 31-37-12-5, and thus he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his Constitutional rights consistent with Indiana Code Section 31-32-5-1. We dismiss and remand for further proceedings.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] At around 3:00 a.m. on May 24, 2022, Johnson County Deputy Sheriff James Reese observed I.M.B. and a second juvenile walking on a county road. One of the juveniles was carrying a box of shoes. Deputy Reese interacted with the youths, inquiring if they "were okay," and receiving a response that the youths "were fine." (App. pg. 17.) As Deputy Reese attempted to check with dispatch, the youths ran into a field and ducked down. Deputy Reese activated his overhead lights, but the youths stood up and began to run. Deputy Reese followed in his vehicle, yelling at the youths to stop. Both were eventually detained, with the assistance of additional officers.
[¶3] On June 28, the State of Indiana alleged I.M.B. was delinquent, for having committed what would be Resisting Law Enforcement, if committed by an adult. At an adjudication hearing conducted on August 23, I.M.B. admitted to the allegation. On the same day, a dispositional hearing was conducted. In light of I.M.B.'s seventeen prior referrals, I.M.B.'s probation officer recommended placement in the Indiana Department of Correction ("DOC"). Observing that "we're out of options," Tr. at 22, the juvenile court awarded custody of I.M.B. to the DOC for an indeterminate term. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[¶4] Indiana Code Section 31-37-12-5 requires that certain advisements be given to a juvenile in delinquency proceedings:
The juvenile court shall inform the child and the child's parent, guardian, or custodian, if the person is present, of the following:
(1) The nature of the allegations against the child.
(2) The child's right to the following:
(A) Be represented by counsel.
(B) Have a speedy trial.
(C) Confront witnesses against the child.
(D) Cross-examine witnesses against the child.
(E) Obtain witnesses or tangible evidence by compulsory process.
(F) Introduce evidence on the child's own behalf.
(G) Refrain from testifying against himself or herself.
(H) Have the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the child committed the delinquent act charged.
(3) The possibility of waiver to a court having criminal jurisdiction.
(4) The dispositional alternatives available to the juvenile court if the child is adjudicated a delinquent child.
[¶5] Concerning waiver of the juvenile's rights, Indiana Code Section 31-32-5-1 provides:
Any rights guaranteed to a child under the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of Indiana, or any other law may be waived only:
(1) by counsel retained or appointed to represent the child if the child knowingly and voluntarily joins with the waiver;
(2) by the child's custodial parent, guardian, custodian, or guardian ad litem if:
(A) that person knowingly and voluntarily waives the right;
(B) that person has no interest adverse to the child;
(C) meaningful consultation has occurred between that person and the child; and
(D) the child knowingly and voluntarily joins with the waiver; or
(3) by the child, without the presence of a custodial parent, guardian, or guardian ad litem, if:
(A) the child knowingly and voluntarily consents to the waiver; and
(B) the child has been emancipated[.]
[¶6] Our Indiana Supreme Court has determined that Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) is the proper vehicle for making a claim that a juvenile admission is involuntary.
We held in Tumulty v. State, 666 N.E.2d 394 (Ind. 1996), that an adult criminal defendant cannot challenge the validity of his guilty plea on direct appeal. He must, instead, pursue post-conviction relief and raise in that proceeding any claims of error concerning his plea.
At issue here is whether to extend Tumulty to the juvenile-law counterpart to a criminal plea-namely, an agreed delinquency adjudication. We hold that juveniles cannot immediately challenge on direct appeal any errors concerning their agreed adjudication. But because juveniles are not eligible for post-
conviction relief, before pursuing their constitutional right to appeal, they must first assert any claims of error concerning their agreed judgment in a request for post-judgment relief filed with the juvenile court. . . .
What we have said about agreed dispositions in the civil and criminal sphere is no less true of such dispositions in juvenile cases - which are, after all, civil proceedings. Bible v. State, 253 Ind. 373, 381, 254 N.E.2d 319, 322 (1970). The same concerns of finality and freedom of the parties to settle their disputes counsel in favor of encouraging and enforcing juvenile agreements, too - including the delinquency agreement at issue here. As with other consent judgments, an agreed delinquency judgment limits the juvenile's ability to challenge the agreed judgment on direct appeal. . . .
[I]n both the civil and criminal contexts, challenging an agreed judgment generally requires a trial court to conduct additional fact-finding in connection with the formation of the parties' agreement. And that is no less true of challenges to agreed judgments in juvenile cases. Trial Rule 60(B) provides a fitting procedural mechanism for juveniles to challenge the validity of an agreed adverse judgment.
As mentioned, juveniles must have a suitable procedural vehicle for challenging an allegedly unlawful adjudication agreement, and that includes developing an adequate factual record to support their claims. Post-conviction proceedings will not suffice because they apply only to adult criminal convictions. Jordan v. State, 512 N.E.2d 407, 408 (1987). We hold that Trial Rule 60 is an appropriate avenue through which a juvenile must raise any and all claims premised on the illegality of an agreed delinquency adjudication. Under Rule 60, "the court shall hear any pertinent evidence, allow new parties to be served with summons, allow discovery, [and] grant relief." Ind. Trial Rule 60(D). And after
the trial court has ruled, a party aggrieved by the post-judgment ruling can then appeal. T.R. 60(C).J.W. v. State, 113 N.E.3d 1202, 1204 - 1208 (Ind. 2019).
[¶7] The J.W. Court clarified that an attempted direct appeal in such circumstances, including any and all claims, is to be dismissed without prejudice:
[T]he rule we announce today is a bright-line rule. A juvenile's claim that his agreed delinquency adjudication is unlawful, along with any claim premised on the agreement's illegality, cannot be raised on direct appeal. Such claims must first be brought in the juvenile court in a post-judgment motion under Rule 60. Moreover, in the interest of judicial economy, if a juvenile's direct appeal includes any claim subject to our extended Tumulty rule, the entire appeal shall be dismissed without prejudice so the so-called "Tumulty claims" can receive a full airing in the juvenile court. Only after the juvenile court has resolved the Tumulty claims in a post-judgment proceeding can the juvenile proceed on appeal with all his claims.Id. at 1208. Here, I.M.B. must first bring his claim of involuntariness due to lack of advisements in the juvenile court.
Conclusion
[¶8] I.M.B.'s attempted appeal is premature, as he must first seek relief from the trial court under Trial Rule 60(B). We thus dismiss the appeal without prejudice and remand to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
[¶9] Dismissed and remanded for further proceedings.
Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.