Ct. App. 1999) ; In re ACandS, Inc., 311 B.R. 36, 41 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004) ; Elliott v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 434 F.Supp. 2d 483, 491 (N.D. Ohio 2006) ; Egger v. Gulf Ins. Co., 588 Pa. 287, 903 A. 2d 1219, 1223, 1226–28 (2006) ; Pilkington N. Am., Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., 112 Ohio St.3d 482, 861 N.E. 2d 121, 126, 129 (2006) ; In re Ambassador Ins. Co., 184 Vt. 408, 965 A. 2d 486, 490–91 (2008) ; Viking Pump, Inc. v. Century Indem. Co., 2 A. 3d 76, 107 (Del. Ch. 2009) ; Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 357 Ill.Dec. 141, 962 N.E. 2d 1042, 1050, 1055 (2011), appeal denied, 360 Ill.Dec. 2, 968 N.E. 2d 81 (2012) ; and Narruhn v. Alea London, Ltd., 404 S.C. 337, 745 S.E. 2d 90, 94 (2013) ).--------

Ct. App. 1999); In re ACandS, Inc., 311 B.R. 36, 41 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004); Elliott v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 434 F. Supp. 2d 483, 491 (N.D. Ohio 2006); Egger v. Gulf Ins. Co., 903 A.2d 1219, 1223, 1226-28 (Pa. 2006); Pilkington N. Am., Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., 861 N.E.2d 121, 126, 129 (Ohio 2006); In re Ambassador Ins. Co., 965 A.2d 486, 490-91 (Vt. 2008); Viking Pump, Inc. v. Century Indem. Co., 2 A.3d 76, 107 (Del. Ch. 2009); Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 962 N.E.2d 1042, 1050, 1055 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011), appeal denied, 968 N.E.2d 81 (Ill. 2012); and Narruhn v. Alea London, Ltd., 745 S.E.2d 90, 94 (S.C. 2013)). --------

In the bankruptcy context, Rockwell cites In re Residential Capital, LLC, No. 12-12020, 2012 WL 12906668 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012), and In re Dura Automotive Systems, Inc., No. 06-11202, 2007 WL 7728109 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 15, 2007). In the non-bankruptcy context, Rockwell cites Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Commerce and Industry Insurance Co., 357 Ill.Dec. 141, 962 N.E.2d 1042 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011), Woodcrest Associates v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 775 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. App. 1989), and First State Bank v. Dorst, 843 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. App. 1992).

¶ 19 In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court must consider only those facts apparent from the face of the pleadings, judicial admissions in the record and matters subject to judicial notice. Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Commerce & Industry Insurance Co., 2011 IL App (1st) 093084, 357 Ill.Dec. 141, 962 N.E.2d 1042. We review the circuit court's grant of judgment on the pleadings de novo.

nd commentators agree that post-loss assignment of payment under an insurance policy is not subject to a consent-to-assignment clause” and holding that under an occurrence-based policy, the insurer's potential liability to indemnify the insured “arose when parties were injured by [the insured's] products. Although the exact amount of [the insurer's] liability is not known because all of the suits against [the insured] have not been reduced to distinct monetary awards, [the insurer's] obligation to insure the risk has not been altered ... however much [this amount] eventually may be.”]; Viking Pump, Inc. v. Century Indemnity Co. (Del.Ch.2009) 2 A.3d 76, 107 [enforcing postloss assignments of rights to invoke coverage under third party liability insurance despite a consent-to-assignment clause and even though at the time of the assignments the amount of the liabilities was unknown, observing that “the mechanism by which the extent of those liabilities would be determined was the same”]; Illinois Tool Works v. Commerce & Industry Ins. Co. (Ill.App.Ct.2011) 357 Ill.Dec. 141, 962 N.E.2d 1042, 1050, 1055 [enforcing postloss assignment of rights to invoke coverage under third party liability policies to a successor in the face of a consent-to-assignment clause even though the insured's “right to be defended and indemnified by the insurers for qualifying occurrences happening during the policy periods ... were not yet due at the time of the assignment” and even though the extent of damages caused by the damage resulting in loss may not be known or knowable until long after assignment; and following the “ ‘ “great weight of authority” ’ ” in holding that a consent-to-assignment clause should be given no effect when rights to invoke liability insurance coverage were assigned after damage or injury resulting in loss had already occurred]; see also Narruhn v. Alea London, Ltd. (2013) 404 S.C. 337, 745 S.E.2d 90, 94 [discussing and following the general rule, and approving assignment over the insurer's objection, observing that “ ‘[a]fter the loss was incurred, the issue became not an assign

(Dkt. 16-2 at 12, § 20) (defining “Loan Servicer” as the entity “that collects Periodic Payments due under the Note, this Security Instrument, and Applicable Law”). Along with these facts, the Court finds such language in the mortgage assigns the loan servicer an “identifiable interest” in the mortgage; or in other words, an “assignment.” See Rodriguez v. Rushmore Loan Mgmt. Servs. LLC, 2019 WL 423375, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 4, 2019) (quoting Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Comm. and Indus. Ins. Co., 962 N.E.2d 1042, 1048 (Ill.App.Ct. 2011)). And pursuant to § 13 of the mortgage, all “covenants and agreements of this Security Instrument shall bind . . . and benefit the successors and assigns of Lender,” granting Selene Finance the ability to enforce the notice and cure provision. (Dkt. 16-2 at 11, § 13).

Once the loss or breach occurs, "it becomes a chose in action, which is assignable[.]" Ginsburg, 328 Ill. at 573; see also State St. Furniture Co. v. Armour & Co., 345 Ill. 160, 162 (Ill. 1931) ("the right of the employee to those wages is a chose in action and as such may be assigned"); Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Commerce and Industry Ins. Co., 962 N.E.2d 1042, 1053 (Ill.App.Ct. 1st Dist. 2011) ("Once a covered loss has occurred, the insured's assignment of its right to liability coverage or a defense relating to those losses does not require consent from the insurer because the assignment is essentially the assignment of payment of a claim already accrued[.]"). The Seventh Circuit has provided this analogy:

See [28] at 3, ¶¶ 13, 15. Further, Defendant's representation that it is an assign under the Mortgage is consistent with other language in section 20 of the Mortgage, which according to Plaintiff "defines 'Loan Servicer' as the entity that collects periodic payments 'due under the Note, this Security Instrument, and Applicable Law.'" [37] at 6. The Mortgage gives Defendant, as the loan servicer, an "identifiable interest" interest in the Mortgage—i.e. "[a]n assignment." Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Commerce and Industry Ins. Co., 962 N.E.2d 1042, 1048 (Ill. App. 2011). Plaintiff appears to have abandoned the position she took in her Complaint that Defendant "is not an assign of the lender to which the alleged debt was incurred."

First-party insurance policies are agreements between the insurer and the insured (i.e., the "first" party), to protect the insured from its own losses; third-party insurance, by contrast, protects the insured from losses arising from its liability to other ("third") parties. See 14 Couch on Insurance § 198:3 (2016); Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Commerce & Industry Ins. Co., 962 N.E.2d 1042, 1053-54 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). The relevant portion of the "Warehouse Legal Liability Policy" issued to Double D provided third-party coverage: it required Lexington to indemnify Double D for losses the warehouse operator incurred as a result of liability to its customers.

An anti-assignment clause does not prohibit assignment of a claim for a loss under the policy once a claim has arisen, as that constitutes an assignment of policy proceeds. Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 962 N.E.2d 1042, 1054, 2011 IL App (1st) 093084, 357 Ill. Dec. 141 (2011) ("[N]otwithstanding the existence of an anti-assignment or consent provision, a policy may be assigned after a loss without notice to or consent of the insurer[.]"); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Am. Hardware Mfrs. Ass'n, 898 N.E.2d 216, 234, 387 Ill. App. 3d 85, 325 Ill. Dec. 483 (2008) (allowing assignee to pursue insured's right to defense costs from insurer despite existence of anti-assignment clause).