Opinion
1-12-0549WC
01-07-2013
ILLINOIS STATE TREASURER, as ex officio Custodian of the Injured Workers' Benefit Fund, Appellant, v. THE ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al. (Joseph Meuse, et al., Appellees).
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court
of Cook County, Illinois
Appeal No. 1-12-0549WC
Circuit No. 10-L-51111
Honorable
Margaret Ann Brennan,
Judge, Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Hoffman, Hudson, Turner, and Stewart concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The Commission's conclusion that the claimant's injuries arose out of her employment was against the manifest weight of the evidence because there was no evidence supporting a reasonable inference that the claimant's employment exposed her to a risk not shared by the general public. ¶ 2 The claimant, Janina Zakarzecka, filed an application for adjustment of claim under the Workers' Compensation Act (the Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2006)) seeking benefits for injuries to her wrists which she allegedly sustained while working as a caregiver and companion in a private home. Because her employer was uninsured for workers' compensation, the claimant sought compensation from the Injured Workers' Benefit Fund (Fund). After conducting a hearing, an arbitrator found that the claimant's injuries were caused by an accident that arose out of and in the course of her employment, and awarded the claimant temporary total disability (TTD) benefits, permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits, and medical expenses. ¶ 3 The Illinois State Treasurer (Treasurer), as ex officio custodian of the Fund, appealed the arbitrator's decision to the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission (the Commission). The Commission unanimously affirmed and adopted the arbitrator's decision. ¶ 4 The Treasurer sought judicial review of the Commission's decision in the circuit court of Cook County, which confirmed the Commission's decision. This appeal followed.
¶ 5 FACTS
¶ 6 In early 2007, the claimant worked as a home healthcare provider and companion to Joseph Meuse, an elderly man who was legally blind. She worked 10 hours per day Monday through Friday and 4 to 5 hours on Saturdays. ¶ 7 According to her employment contract with Meuse, the claimant was to serve as Meuse's caregiver and companion and do some light housekeeping. The claimant's essential responsibilities, as she understood them, were to be on time, to be kind, and to do whatever Meuse directed her to do. On a typical day, she would help Meuse shower and dress and would apply lotion to his skin for dryness. She prepared his breakfast, made his bed, and straightened up around the house. She also served Meuse lunch, which came from Meals on Wheels, and cooked and served his dinner before she left for the evening. She did Meuse's laundry approximately once per week, unless he had accidents that required her to do laundry more frequently. ¶ 8 Another of the claimant's job responsibilities was to pick up Meuse's mail. In order to retrieve the mail, the claimant had to walk down a flight of stairs to the front door. The claimant testified that Meuse had his medication delivered through the mail and that she "always need[ed] to go downstairs to pick up the medication." She also testified that Meuse received audio cassettes through the mail and that it was part of her job to retrieve these cassettes and all of Meuse's regular mail because Meuse could not walk downstairs by himself to pick it up. ¶ 9 On May 10, 2007, the claimant was injured while working for Meuse. Sometime that afternoon, the doorbell rang. While the doorbell was ringing, the claimant went to Meuse and told him that someone was delivering something for him and that she needed to go downstairs to pick it up. According to the claimant, Meuse said "Okay. Let's go." The claimant testified that, before she went downstairs, she tried to change from house slippers, which she normally wore in Meuse's house, to regular shoes, which she normally wore when she went downstairs. While she was trying to put her regular shoes on, she fell, hit her head against a wall, and lost consciousness. She injured both of her wrists in the fall. When she regained consciousness, she crawled on her knees and elbows to the telephone to call Meuse's sister-in-law, Marilyn Arnoux. The claimant did not tell Meuse what had happened because she did not want to "scare" him. Approximately 10 minutes later, Arnoux arrived, explained the situation to Meuse, and drove the claimant to the emergency room. ¶ 10 By the time she arrived at the hospital, the claimant was experiencing severe burning pain in both of her wrists. Doctors determined that she had broken both wrists. One wrist was broken in one place and the other in two places. The claimant saw an orthopedist and underwent physical therapy. However, she was unable to continue working for Meuse due to her injuries. She began working for another client on November 20, 2007, more than six months after her accident. At that time, she continued to suffer pain when attempting to lift or twist. Because of her inability to lift or twist, the range of home health jobs that she could accept was limited. ¶ 11 The claimant filed an Application for Adjustment of Claim seeking benefits for her injuries and naming Meuse as the employer/respondent. Meuse died while her claim was pending. The claimant subsequently amended her claim to add Meuse's estate and Ken Schechtel as respondents. She also added the Fund as a respondent because Meuse did not have workers' compensation insurance at the time of the claimant's injury. ¶ 12 The claimant and Schechtel testified during the arbitration hearing. After considering the witness testimony and other record evidence, the arbitrator found that the claimant's accident arose out of and in the course of her employment with Meuse. The arbitrator awarded the claimant TTD benefits, medical expenses, and compensation for the permanent and partial loss of both of her hands. ¶ 13 The Treasurer, acting as ex officio custodian of the Fund, appealed the arbitrator's decision to the Commission, which unanimously affirmed and adopted the arbitrator's decision. The Treasurer then sought judicial review of the Commission's decision in the circuit court of Cook County, which confirmed the Commission's ruling. This appeal followed.
Arnoux had power of attorney for Meuse and wrote checks on his behalf, including checks to the claimant.
Ken Schechtel owned and operated the employment agency that placed the claimant with Meuse. After the claimant negotiated an independent employment contract with Meuse, she paid Schechtel's agency a finder's fee and terminated her relationship with the agency and Schechtel.
The Fund was established to provide workers' compensation benefits to injured workers whose employers have failed to provide coverage under the Act. See 820 ILCS 305/4(d) (2010). When the Commission collects penalties and fines from uninsured employers, it deposits those moneys into the Fund. Id. If the Fund has insufficient moneys to pay all claims at the end of each fiscal year, the Commission distributes a pro rata share to each eligible claimant. Id. The Commission may obtain reimbursement from the employer for compensation obligations paid by the Fund. Id.
¶ 14 ANALYSIS
¶ 15 The Treasurer argues that the Commission's finding that the claimant's injury arose out of her employment was both contrary to law and against the manifest weight of the evidence. We agree with the latter proposition. ¶ 16 A claimant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that her injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. 820 ILCS 305/2 (West 2006). Both elements must be present in order to justify compensation. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 131 Ill. 2d 478, 483 (1989). In this case, there is no doubt that claimant's injuries were sustained in the course of her employment, as the claimant's fall clearly occurred on the employer's premises while she was working. The issue is whether her injuries arose out of her employment. ¶ 17 "Arising out of" the employment refers to the origin or cause of a claimant's injury. Baldwin v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 409 Ill. App. 3d 472, 478 (2011). An injury "arises out of" the employment if it originates from "some risk connected with, or incidental to, the employment," thereby creating a causal connection between the employment and the accidental injury. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 129 Ill. 2d 52, 58 (1989); Restaurant Development Group v. Hee Suk Oh, 392 Ill. App. 3d 415, 420 (2009). Thus, in order to determine whether a claimant's injury arose out of her employment, we must first categorize the risk to which she was exposed. Baldwin, 409 Ill. App. 3d at 478; see also First Cash Financial Services v. Industrial Comm'n, 367 Ill. App. 3d 102, 105 (2006). ¶ 18 The risks to which an employee may be exposed are categorized into three groups: (1) risks distinctly associated with employment; (2) risks personal to the employee, such as idiopathic falls, and (3) neutral risks that have no particular employment or personal characteristics. Baldwin, 409 Ill. App. 3d at 478; First Cash Financial Services, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 105. An injury resulting from a neutral risk to which the general public is equally exposed does not arise out of the employment. Baldwin, 409 Ill. App. 3d at 478. For example, walking up or down a staircase at the employer's place of business, by itself, does not expose an employee to a risk greater than that faced by the general public. See, e.g., Baldwin, 409 Ill. App. 3d at 478; Knox County YMCA v Industrial Comm'n, 311 Ill. App. 3d 880, 885 (2000); Nabisco Brands, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 266 Ill. App. 3d 1103, 1107 (1994). ¶ 19 To prove that an injury caused by a fall arose out of the employment, a claimant must present evidence which supports a reasonable inference that the fall stemmed from a risk associated with her employment. First Cash Financial Services, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 106; Builders Square, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 339 Ill. App. 3d 1006, 1010 (2003). Employment-related risks are those to which the general public is not exposed, such as the risk of tripping on a defect at the employer's premises, falling on uneven or slippery ground at the work site, or performing some work-related task which contributes to the risk of falling (First Cash Financial Services, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 106), such as carrying work-related items that inhibit one's ability to navigate stairs (see, e.g., Nabisco Brands, 266 Ill. App. 3d at 1107; Knox County YMCA, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 885) or walking quickly down steps while rushing to complete a work-related task (see, e.g., Nascote Industries v. Industrial Comm'n, 353 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1061 (2004); William G. Ceas & Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 261 Ill. App. 3d 630, 636-37 (1994)). ¶ 20 Whether an employee's injury arose out of and in the course of his employment is a question of fact for the Commission, and the Commission's resolution of the issue will not be disturbed on review unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Johnson Outboards v. Industrial Comm'n, 77 Ill. 2d 67, 70-71 (1979); Tower Automotive v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 407 Ill. App. 3d 427, 434 (2011); Hee Suk Oh, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 421. A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. City of Springfield v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 388 Ill. App. 3d 297, 312-13 (2009). When the Commission's finding that the claimant's injuries arose out of her employment is not supported by the record evidence, it is the duty of the reviewing court to set the Commission's award aside. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 129 Ill. 2d at 63; see also First Cash Financial Services, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 106-07 (reversing Commission's award of benefits where the evidence did not support a reasonable inference that the claimant's injuries arose out of her employment). ¶ 21 In this case, the Commission's finding that the claimant's injuries arose out of her employment has no support in the record. The claimant testified that she fell while attempting to change her shoes so that she could go downstairs to answer the doorbell and pick up the mail. None of these tasks involved risks unique to her employment. Members of the general public regularly perform the same actions. The claimant presented no evidence suggesting that the risks of performing these ordinary activities were somehow heightened by virtue of her employment. For example, she did not testify that she fell while navigating a defect on the employer's premises or that her ability to change her shoes was somehow encumbered or made more difficult due to the demands of her employment. She simply testified that she fell while attempting to change her shoes. Such testimony does not support a reasonable inference that her fall arose out of a risk related to her employment. ¶ 22 The claimant argues that the evidence before the arbitrator suggested that the claimant was exposed to a neutral risk to a greater degree than the general public. Specifically, the claimant maintains that, based upon her testimony, the Commission could have reasonably inferred that: (1) the claimant wore house slippers "under her employer's direction" or "for her employer's benefit," and she had to change from slippers to regular shoes before descending the staircase to retrieve the mail, thereby increasing her risk of falling; (2) at the time of her fall, the claimant was "in a hurry to answer the door and fulfill her employment duties"; and (3) the claimant's employment duties required her to traverse stairs more frequently than the general public. ¶ 23 We disagree. Each of these inferences is wholly speculative and without evidentiary support. Although the claimant testified that she normally wore house slippers in Meuse's house and that she normally worse regular shoes when she went downstairs, she did not explain why she did this. She did not testify that Meuse required her to wear slippers in the house or that she worse slippers for Meuse's benefit. Nor did she testify that Meuse required her to wear regular shoes when answering the mail. Accordingly, any inference that the claimant's need to change shoes before descending the stairs was somehow occasioned by her employment would be pure speculation; it is equally likely that the claimant chose to wear slippers for her own comfort and that her need to change shoes was therefore occasioned by a personal decision unrelated to her employment. ¶ 24 Moreover, there is no evidence supporting a reasonable inference that the claimant was in a hurry at the time of her accident. The claimant did not testify that she was rushing to answer the door, that she was worried about missing the delivery, or that the delivery was urgently needed. Although she testified that Meuse received medication by mail, she did not testify that she had to sign for each delivery. Thus, it is possible that the medication would have been left at the door even if she did not meet the delivery person at the time of delivery. In any event, nothing in the claimant's testimony suggested that she was rushing, that she was in danger of missing the delivery if she did not hurry, or that she was otherwise under any type of unusual stress at the time of her fall. This distinguishes the claimant's case from Nascote Industries and William G. Ceas & Co. In each of those cases, there was extensive evidence that the claimant was injured while rushing to complete work-related tasks. In the case at bar, the claimant failed to present any such evidence. ¶ 25 Nor was there any evidence that the claimant was required to traverse stairs more frequently than the general public. Although the claimant testified that Meuse received medication and audio cassettes by mail, she did not testify how frequently he received these deliveries. Nor did she state how often she was required to walk up and down the stairs. There is simply no evidence supporting any reasonable inference on this issue. ¶ 26 The claimant bore the burden of proving that her accident arose out of her employment. In order to meet that burden, the claimant had to present evidence supporting a reasonable inference that her injuries stemmed from a risk associated with her employment, not merely a possible inference. First Cash Financial Services, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 106. A reasonable inference must be based on "existing evidentiary facts" (Builders Square, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 1012), not mere speculation (see, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor, 129 Ill. 2d at 61; First Cash Financial Services, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 106). As noted above, the evidentiary facts presented in this case do not support a reasonable inference that the claimant's injuries stemmed from a risk associated with her employment. Accordingly, the Commission's finding that the claimant's accident arose out of her employment is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
In Nascote Industries, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 1057, we affirmed the Commission's finding that the claimant's accident arose out of her employment where the claimant fell as she stepped off a platform while rushing to keep up with an automated press. The claimant testified that her work was fast-paced. Id. Her job was to retrieve a bumper placed by a robot on a table, take the bumper to a trimming station, trim off any excess flash, inspect it, cover some parts, place it on a rack some distance away, step down off the rack, return to the table before the robot set down another bumper, and repeat the cycle. Id. The claimant testified that, in order to keep up with the automated press, she had to complete each cycle within 70-75 seconds. Id. at 1058. The employer's occupational nurse acknowledged that the claimant was required to keep pace with the press. Id. at 1059. Similarly, in William G. Ceas & Co., 261 Ill. App. 3d at 636, we affirmed the Commission's finding that the claimant's decedent's accident arose out of her employment because she fell while rushing down stairs to deliver federal express envelopes at her boss's direction. The claimant (the decedent's husband) testified that his wife had complained that her boss regularly gave her things to do right before quitting time (id.), and the testimony of several witnesses who saw the claimant immediately before or after her fall supported the inference that she fell while rushing to deliver federal express envelopes on her boss's behalf (id. at 636-37).
Because the Treasurer's appeal may be decided on this basis, we do not need to address the Treasurer's alternative argument that the Commission erred as a matter of law by failing to consider whether the claimant's employment created a risk of injury not faced by the general public.
--------
¶ 27 CONCLUSION
¶ 28 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County, which confirmed the Commission's finding that the claimant's injuries arose out of her employment. ¶ 29 Reversed.