Ill. Commerce Com. v. N.Y.C.R.R. Co.

15 Citing cases

  1. Chicago Junc. Ry. Co. v. Commerce Com

    107 N.E.2d 758 (Ill. 1952)   Cited 32 times
    In Chicago Junction Railway Co. v. Commerce Com. 412 Ill. 579, 588, we held that the use of the word "shall" instead of "may" in the paragraph would have reduced the area of the Commission's discretion by making it "mandatory upon the Commission to assess every party who could conceivably be affected by reconstruction, alteration, relocation, or improvement."

    Having decided that the facts found support the order, the statute and prior decisions require that we determine whether the findings are based on substantial evidence. ( Commerce Com. v. New York Central Railroad Co. 398 Ill. 11; O'Keefe v. Chicago Railways Co. 354 Ill. 645; Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railway Co. v. Road Dist. No. 10, 353 Ill. 160.) In Chicago, North Shore and Milwaukee Railroad Co. v. Commerce Com. ex rel. Department of Public Works, 354 Ill. 58, 73, we commented, "From the mere fact that the order of the Commerce Commission does not comment upon the evidence of the railroad companies it does not follow that such evidence was not considered by the commission.

  2. C.B. Q.R.R. Co. v. Commerce Com

    101 N.E.2d 92 (Ill. 1951)   Cited 4 times

    This court has frequently held that the commission, in the exercise of its power to regulate grade crossings in the interest of public safety, necessarily possesses a wide discretion and may determine what the public interests require and also what measures are necessary for the protection and promotion of those interests. ( Commerce Commission v. New York Central Railroad Company, 398 Ill. 11.) Section 68 of the Public Utilities Act provides that, "The findings and conclusions of the Commission on questions of fact shall be held prima facie to be true and as found by the Commission; and a rule, regulation, order or decision of the Commission shall not be set aside unless it clearly appears that the finding of the Commission was against the manifest weight of the evidence." (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, chap.

  3. N-Ren Corp. v. Commerce Com

    423 N.E.2d 1386 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)   Cited 8 times

    " 374 Ill. 60, 64-65. The same views were expressed by our supreme court in Illinois Commerce Com. v. New York Central R.R. Co. (1947), 398 Ill. 11. In connection with an order of the Commission requiring work to be done on certain grade crossings by the railroad, which order the circuit court found to be unlawful and void, the supreme court said, in upholding the circuit court's decision:

  4. P. ex Rel. Hartigan v. Ill. Commerce Com

    510 N.E.2d 865 (Ill. 1987)   Cited 37 times
    In People ex rel. Hartigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n (1987), 117 Ill.2d 120 (Hartigan I), this court affirmed the circuit court's reversal of the Commission's Rate Order I. The court agreed with the circuit court holding that the Commission had applied an improper standard in determining which costs of Byron I were reasonable and includable in the new rate base.

    ( Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Com. (1973), 55 Ill.2d 461; Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Com. (1944), 387 Ill. 256, 275.) In the ratemaking scheme, the Commission and not the court is the fact-finding body. ( Illinois Commerce Com. v. New York Central R.R. Co. (1947), 398 Ill. 11, 16.) Apart from examining whether the Commission acted within the scope of its authority or infringed upon a constitutional right, a court is limited to reviewing whether the Commission set out findings of fact supporting its decision and whether the findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. (See Cerro Copper Products v. Illinois Commerce Com. (1980), 83 Ill.2d 364.)

  5. Newkirk v. Bigard

    109 Ill. 2d 28 (Ill. 1985)   Cited 66 times
    Holding that the mining board had jurisdiction as long as the matter fell within the general class of cases within its province

    Plaintiffs' brief cites numerous decisions concerning Commerce Commission orders wherein the courts have stated that the partial invalidity of an order will render the entire order invalid. (See Illinois Commerce Com. v. New York Central R.R. Co. (1947), 398 Ill. 11, 19; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Terminal Railroad Association (1942), 379 Ill. 403, 407; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Elgin, Joliet Eastern Ry. Co. (1940), 374 Ill. 60, 62-65.) The cases cited by plaintiffs are inapplicable because they deal with statutory certiorari under the Public Utilities Act, wherein the power of the courts to review the orders is limited by statute and the court had no authority to declare an order only partially invalid.

  6. City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce Com

    402 N.E.2d 595 (Ill. 1980)   Cited 20 times
    In City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n (1980), 79 Ill.2d 213, 402 N.E.2d 595, the Commission had issued a rule requiring public bodies, at their expense, to place and maintain signs on railroad overpasses at crossings indicating the clearance available for vehicles using the crossing.

    In the exercise of its power to regulate grade crossings in the interest of public safety, the Commission is vested with wide discretion to determine what the public interests require and what measures are necessary for the protection and promotion of those interests. ( Chicago, Burlington Quincy R.R. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Com. (1951), 410 Ill. 60, 64; Illinois Commerce Com. v. New York Central R.R. Co. (1947), 398 Ill. 11, 18.) The controlling portion of section 58 provides that "the commission may direct such reconstruction, alteration, relocation or improvement to be made in such manner and upon such terms and conditions as may be reasonable and necessary." Implicit in plaintiff's argument is that responsibility for actual performance of the work, as opposed to the cost of the work, is to be determined solely according to which party technically owns the particular portion of the grade crossing involved.

  7. Mitchell Bros. Trk. Lines v. Hill

    227 Or. 474 (Or. 1961)   Cited 11 times
    Concluding that the purpose of the PUC judicial review statute was “to grant to the courts a full scope of review to administer the relief appropriate to the cause”

    In our opinion, the purpose of the statute is to grant to the courts a full scope of review to administer the relief appropriate to the cause. The plaintiff further argues that the courts will not modify the order of a public administrative body; citing Roseburg Lumber Company v. State Tax Commission, 223 Or. 294, 355 P.2d 606; Illinois Commerce Com. v. New York Central R.R. Co., 398 Ill. 11, 75 N.E.2d 411. The law of the case of Illinois Commerce Com. v. New York Central R.R. Co., supra, is not applicable under the appellate review procedure provided in this state for appeals from rulings of the Public Utilities Commissioner.

  8. Brinker Trucking Co. v. Commerce Com

    166 N.E.2d 18 (Ill. 1960)   Cited 16 times
    In Brinker Trucking Co. v. Illinois Commerce Com. (1960), 19 Ill.2d 354, 166 N.E.2d 18, the finding involved merely stated that "sufficient evidence * * * was presented to establish proof for the need of the proposed service and the proposed service is consistent with public interest."

    ( Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Commerce Com. 411 Ill. 526; Chicago West Towns Railways, Inc. v. Commerce Com. 397 Ill. 460.) If the findings support the order, then the court examines the evidence to ascertain if the facts found are supported thereby; but if the findings do not support the order, then the court is not called upon to examine the evidence to determine whether it discloses facts which, if they had been found by the commission, would sustain its decision. ( Illinois Commerce Com. v. New York Central Railroad Co. 398 Ill. 11.) The court will not enter upon an independent investigation of the evidence to develop new facts, not found by the commission, to sustain its order. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. v. Commerce Com. 346 Ill. 412; Kewanee and Galva Railway Co. v. Commerce Com. ex rel. Dohrn Transfer Co. 340 Ill. 266.

  9. C.B. Q.R.R. Co. v. Commerce Com

    116 N.E.2d 392 (Ill. 1953)   Cited 1 times

    The statute was not intended to empower the commission to order installation of new and different equipment unless additional protection is required for such purpose. ( Commerce Com. v. New York Central Railroad Co. 398 Ill. 11.) In the case at bar the commission made no finding whatever that the additional protection is necessary to preserve or promote health.

  10. Gulf Transport Co. v. Commerce Com

    83 N.E.2d 336 (Ill. 1948)   Cited 14 times

    This argument is completely refuted by the law of this State as stated in the cases of appellee on this point. Where the section of the act cited by appellant was directly concerned, we have held that, except in those cases where the commission has refused to receive evidence properly proffered, the court on review must either confirm or set aside the order as a whole, since the invalidity of a part renders the entire order void. Commerce Com. v. New York Central Railroad Co. 398 Ill. 11. The factual argument of appellant has no merit. It is apparent that to allow the service from Red Bud to Belleville to East St. Louis would be to allow competition from Red Bud to East St. Louis at, using the words of appellant, no increase in mileage.