Having decided that the facts found support the order, the statute and prior decisions require that we determine whether the findings are based on substantial evidence. ( Commerce Com. v. New York Central Railroad Co. 398 Ill. 11; O'Keefe v. Chicago Railways Co. 354 Ill. 645; Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railway Co. v. Road Dist. No. 10, 353 Ill. 160.) In Chicago, North Shore and Milwaukee Railroad Co. v. Commerce Com. ex rel. Department of Public Works, 354 Ill. 58, 73, we commented, "From the mere fact that the order of the Commerce Commission does not comment upon the evidence of the railroad companies it does not follow that such evidence was not considered by the commission.
This court has frequently held that the commission, in the exercise of its power to regulate grade crossings in the interest of public safety, necessarily possesses a wide discretion and may determine what the public interests require and also what measures are necessary for the protection and promotion of those interests. ( Commerce Commission v. New York Central Railroad Company, 398 Ill. 11.) Section 68 of the Public Utilities Act provides that, "The findings and conclusions of the Commission on questions of fact shall be held prima facie to be true and as found by the Commission; and a rule, regulation, order or decision of the Commission shall not be set aside unless it clearly appears that the finding of the Commission was against the manifest weight of the evidence." (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, chap.
" 374 Ill. 60, 64-65. The same views were expressed by our supreme court in Illinois Commerce Com. v. New York Central R.R. Co. (1947), 398 Ill. 11. In connection with an order of the Commission requiring work to be done on certain grade crossings by the railroad, which order the circuit court found to be unlawful and void, the supreme court said, in upholding the circuit court's decision:
( Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Com. (1973), 55 Ill.2d 461; Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Com. (1944), 387 Ill. 256, 275.) In the ratemaking scheme, the Commission and not the court is the fact-finding body. ( Illinois Commerce Com. v. New York Central R.R. Co. (1947), 398 Ill. 11, 16.) Apart from examining whether the Commission acted within the scope of its authority or infringed upon a constitutional right, a court is limited to reviewing whether the Commission set out findings of fact supporting its decision and whether the findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. (See Cerro Copper Products v. Illinois Commerce Com. (1980), 83 Ill.2d 364.)
Plaintiffs' brief cites numerous decisions concerning Commerce Commission orders wherein the courts have stated that the partial invalidity of an order will render the entire order invalid. (See Illinois Commerce Com. v. New York Central R.R. Co. (1947), 398 Ill. 11, 19; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Terminal Railroad Association (1942), 379 Ill. 403, 407; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Elgin, Joliet Eastern Ry. Co. (1940), 374 Ill. 60, 62-65.) The cases cited by plaintiffs are inapplicable because they deal with statutory certiorari under the Public Utilities Act, wherein the power of the courts to review the orders is limited by statute and the court had no authority to declare an order only partially invalid.
In the exercise of its power to regulate grade crossings in the interest of public safety, the Commission is vested with wide discretion to determine what the public interests require and what measures are necessary for the protection and promotion of those interests. ( Chicago, Burlington Quincy R.R. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Com. (1951), 410 Ill. 60, 64; Illinois Commerce Com. v. New York Central R.R. Co. (1947), 398 Ill. 11, 18.) The controlling portion of section 58 provides that "the commission may direct such reconstruction, alteration, relocation or improvement to be made in such manner and upon such terms and conditions as may be reasonable and necessary." Implicit in plaintiff's argument is that responsibility for actual performance of the work, as opposed to the cost of the work, is to be determined solely according to which party technically owns the particular portion of the grade crossing involved.
In our opinion, the purpose of the statute is to grant to the courts a full scope of review to administer the relief appropriate to the cause. The plaintiff further argues that the courts will not modify the order of a public administrative body; citing Roseburg Lumber Company v. State Tax Commission, 223 Or. 294, 355 P.2d 606; Illinois Commerce Com. v. New York Central R.R. Co., 398 Ill. 11, 75 N.E.2d 411. The law of the case of Illinois Commerce Com. v. New York Central R.R. Co., supra, is not applicable under the appellate review procedure provided in this state for appeals from rulings of the Public Utilities Commissioner.
( Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Commerce Com. 411 Ill. 526; Chicago West Towns Railways, Inc. v. Commerce Com. 397 Ill. 460.) If the findings support the order, then the court examines the evidence to ascertain if the facts found are supported thereby; but if the findings do not support the order, then the court is not called upon to examine the evidence to determine whether it discloses facts which, if they had been found by the commission, would sustain its decision. ( Illinois Commerce Com. v. New York Central Railroad Co. 398 Ill. 11.) The court will not enter upon an independent investigation of the evidence to develop new facts, not found by the commission, to sustain its order. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. v. Commerce Com. 346 Ill. 412; Kewanee and Galva Railway Co. v. Commerce Com. ex rel. Dohrn Transfer Co. 340 Ill. 266.
The statute was not intended to empower the commission to order installation of new and different equipment unless additional protection is required for such purpose. ( Commerce Com. v. New York Central Railroad Co. 398 Ill. 11.) In the case at bar the commission made no finding whatever that the additional protection is necessary to preserve or promote health.
This argument is completely refuted by the law of this State as stated in the cases of appellee on this point. Where the section of the act cited by appellant was directly concerned, we have held that, except in those cases where the commission has refused to receive evidence properly proffered, the court on review must either confirm or set aside the order as a whole, since the invalidity of a part renders the entire order void. Commerce Com. v. New York Central Railroad Co. 398 Ill. 11. The factual argument of appellant has no merit. It is apparent that to allow the service from Red Bud to Belleville to East St. Louis would be to allow competition from Red Bud to East St. Louis at, using the words of appellant, no increase in mileage.