Ikbal, v. United States

5 Citing cases

  1. Ikbal v. United States

    558 U.S. 849 (2009)

    Sameena IKBAL, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.Case below, 304 Fed.Appx. 604. Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.

  2. Singh v. United States

    Case No. 3:13-cr-00118-LRH-WGC (D. Nev. Jun. 9, 2020)

    Delays for similar lengths of time have precluded coram nobis relief. See, e.g., United States v. Njai, 312 Fed. App'x. 953, 954 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming denial of coram nobis relief where the defendant waited more than four years after defendant entered his plea and was convicted, noting that no valid reason was offered for the delay); Ikbal v. United States, 304 Fed App'x. 604, 606 (9th Cir. 2008) (denying defendant's coram nobis petition as untimely where defendant's conviction was final in January 2002 and her July 2005 petition claimed she had not learned about an exculpatory letter until July 2004, noting that "even after being reminded of the letter on July 19, 2004, Ms. Ikbal waited nearly a year" to petition for coram nobis). Singh has not offered any facts relating to his five-year delay with sufficient specificity to permit the Court to assess the justification for such a lengthy delay.

  3. Shin v. United States

    CRIM. NO. 04-00150 SOM (D. Haw. Jun. 28, 2017)   Cited 1 times

    828 F.2d at 604; see also United States v. George, 676 F.3d 249, 258 (1st Cir. 2012) ("[A]n error of the most fundamental character must denote something more than an error simpliciter" (citation and internal quotations omitted)). The Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have identified a limited number of fundamental errors, including ineffective assistance of counsel, see United States v. Ifenatuora, 586 F. App'x 303, 304 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1750 (2015); a federal criminal trial without defense counsel and without a competent and intelligent waiver of counsel, see Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512; a guilty plea induced by a bargain that was not kept, see Holloway v. United States, 393 F.2d 731, 732 (9th Cir. 1968); an erroneous jury instruction relieving the prosecution of the burden of proving an essential element of the offense, see United States v. McClelland, 941 F.2d 999, 1003 (9th Cir. 1991); and the nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady, see Ikbal v. United States, 304 F. App'x 604, 606-07 (9th Cir. 2008). The only error Shin initially identified that falls within the errors described above is what he alleges was the Government's Brady violation.

  4. Shin v. United States

    CRIM. NO. 04-00150 SOM (D. Haw. Sep. 1, 2016)

    See Morgan, 346 U.S. 502; Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 604; see also United States v. George, 676 F.3d 249, 258 (1st Cir. 2012) ("an error of the most fundamental character must denote something more than an error simpliciter" (citation omitted)). The Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have identified a limited number of fundamental errors, including ineffective assistance of counsel, see United States v. Ifenatuora, 586 Fed. Appx. 303, 304 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 1750 (2015), a federal criminal trial without defense counsel and without a competent and intelligent waiver of counsel, see Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512, a guilty plea induced by a bargain that was not kept, see Holloway v. United States, 393 F.2d 731, 732 (9th Cir. 1968), an erroneous jury instruction relieving the prosecution of proving an essential element of the offense, see McClelland, 941 F.2d at 1003, and the nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83(1963), see Ikbal v. United States, 304 Fed. Appx. 604, 606 (9th Cir. 2008). Shin fails to establish that there is a fundamental error that rendered his conviction irregular and invalid.

  5. Urbina-Gutierrez v. United States

    Case No. 12cv01000 BTM (S.D. Cal. Dec. 26, 2012)

    "A writ of coram nobis is a highly unusual remedy, available only to correct grave injustices in a narrow range of cases where no more conventional remedy is applicable, and only where the petitioner has exercised due diligence in bringing her concern promptly to the attention of the courts." Ikbal v. United States, 304 F. App'x 604, 606 (9th Cir. 2008) (quotations, alterations, and citations omitted). In general, circumstances justifying delay include: when the applicable law was recently changed and made retroactive; when new evidence was discovered that the petitioner could not reasonably have located earlier; and when the petitioner was improperly advised by counsel not to pursue habeas relief. See United States v. Riedl, 496 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 2007).