Opinion
No. 00-1492
July 12, 2001
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by defendants Northwest Airlines, Inc. and KLM-Royal Dutch Airlines (rec. doc. 7). The motion was set for hearing on June 20, 2001 and was taken on the papers without oral argument. The Court has considered the pleadings, memoranda and relevant law and finds for the reasons that follow.
Background
The facts leading up to this litigation are relatively few and essentially undisputed. On April 1, 1999 plaintiff, Odinma Ijedinina, took an international flight departing from New Orleans, Louisiana and destimed for Lagos, Nigeria in order to attend her mother's funeral. See Defendants' Statement of Material Fact #5; Plaintiffs petition at ¶ III. Prior to landing in Nigeria, the plane made stop overs in Minneapolis, Minnesota and Amsterdam. Id. Prior to boarding the plane, plaintiff was told by airline personnel that she was required to check three excess bags for transit through to Lagos. See Defendants' Statement of Material Fact #6; Plaintiffs petition at ¶ IV. According to the plaintiff, the Northwest Airlines ticket agent acted in a rude and hostile fashion in directing plaintiff to check her bags. Ultimately, plaintiffs flight landed in Lagos, however, two of the three checked bags did not. Defendants tendered plaintiff a draft in the amount of $1280.00. Plaintiff took possession of the tendered amount but did not cash the check, arguing that the items lost, including a substantial amount of cash, jewelry, and traditional Nigerian burial garments are considerably more valuable than the amount offered.
On March 31, 2000 plaintiff filed suit in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans. The matter was subsequently removed to this Court on May 22, 2000. The core of defendants' current motion is that plaintiffs right to relief is limited by the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation By Air, 49 Stat. 3000; TS 876, reprinted in note to 49 U.S.C. § 40105 ("Warsaw Convention"). Defendants contend that their business practice in checking and handling luggage meets all requirement of the Convention and that as a result they are protected by the liability limiting provisions of the Warsaw Convention. As such, they argue that the amount tendered is the maximum recovery permitted by the Warsaw Convention and that plaintiff has no further right to relief. Plaintiff argues that federal cases relied upon by defendants are not persuasive in that they do not arise from within the Eastern District of Louisiana. It further claims that the Warsaw Convention does not apply to luggage lost or damaged while still on the ground, and that property damages are not capped by the Warsaw Convention. With these thoughts in mind, the Court turns to the relevant legal standards.
Standard for Motion for Summary Judgment
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment should be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "An issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action." Daniels v. City of Arlington. Texas, 246 F.3d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 2001). The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.Stults v. Conoco, 76 F.3d 651,656 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). In reviewing the motion, the Court considers the record as a whole, disregarding evidence that the jury is "not required to believe." Thomas v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company. Inc., 233 F.3d 326, 329 (5th Cir. 2000). When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. The nonmoving party must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986); Beck v. Texas State Board of Dental Examiners, 204 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir. 2000). Thus, where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no "genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986). Finally, the court notes that the substantive law determines materiality of facts and only "facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248(1986). The court now turns to the merits of the arguments with these standards in mind.
Analysis
The Warsaw Convention, to which the United States has been a party since 1934, was designed to accomplish two primary objectives: (I) legal and administrative uniformity in international air travel and(2)limiting the liability of air carriers in the case of accident. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld and Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 497, 498-99 (1967). "As a quid pro quo for limiting recovery, the treaty creates a presumption of airline liability in favor of passengers." Republic National Bank of New York v. Eastern Airlines. Inc., 815 F.2d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1987). It applies to all international air transportation of persons, baggage, or goods when either the place of departure and place of destination are within signatory countries or when the travel is entirely within a single signatory country. Article I(1)-(2). Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution the treaty preempts state laws in the areas covered, U.S. Const art. VI, cl. 2; Boehringer-Mannheim Diagnostics v. Pan American World Airways. Inc., 737 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1984), and it must be interpreted broadly to advance its goals. Potter v. Delta Airlines. Inc., 98 F.3d 881 (5th Cir. 1996).
Chapter III of the Convention establishes liability rules, with Article 18 addressing loss or damage to checked baggage or goods and Article 22(2) setting the ceiling on reimbursement for such loss. However, in order to be shielded from unlimited liability, the carrier must comply with Article 4 of the Convention. Article 4 mandates that the carrier issue a baggage check for all baggage other than that which the passenger himself takes charge. Article 4(1). More precisely, the baggage check must contain the following: the place and date of issue; the place of departure and destination; the name and address of the carrier or carriers; the number of the passenger ticket; a statement that delivery of the baggage will be made to the bearer of the baggage check; the number and weight of the packages; the amount of the value declared in accordance with article 22(2) and; a statement that the transportation is subject to the rules relating to liability established by the convention. Article 4(3)(a)-(h). As a general rule, an irregularity in the baggage ticket is of little import, however, if the carrier accepts baggage without accepting the check or if it issues a check missing either(1)the number of the passenger ticket or(2)the limitation statement, then "the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of those provisions of the convention which exclude or limit his liability." Article 4(4). Before moving forward then, the Court shall determine if the bedrock Warsaw Convention prerequisites have been met.
The Moscow Convention as initially adopted also imposed an absolute requirement that the baggage ticket include the weight of the baggage. However, an amendment to the Convention eliminated this requirement effective March 4, 1999 See Montreal Protocol No. 4, S. Exec. Rep. No. 105-20 (1998); Spanner v. United Airlines, 177 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 1999);Perri v. Delta Air Lines. Inc., 104 F. Supp.2d 164 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
The United States and Nigeria are both parties to the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air. See United States Department of State Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United states in Force as of January 1. 2000, p. 344 (2000); Ajibola v. Sabena Belgium Airline, 1995 WL 552737 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Therefore, the Warsaw Convention provides the exclusive remedy for damages to plaintiffs property. Plaintiff does not dispute that she was issued a unified "passenger ticket and baggage check" which by definition included the number of the passenger ticket, and three baggage claim tags displaying the number of bags checked. It is further undisputed that the passenger ticket and baggage check included a notice that the terms of the Warsaw Convention applied. See Defendants' Statement of Material Facts; Affidavit of Jeanne M. Brown, and; exhibits 1-2 attached to defendants' motion. Absent a genuine issue of material fact as to any of the above, it is clear that defendant has proven that it is entitled to the limitation of liability provisions of the Warsaw Convention. Since plaintiffs exclusive remedy for all injury arising from her property loss is the Warsaw Convention, it is appropriate to determine whether defendant paid the correct compensation under Article 22.
Article 22(2)provides that "in the transportation of checked baggage and of goods, the liability of the carrier shall be limited to a sum of 250 francs per kilogram. . ." Article 22(2). The conversion rate established by the Government for purposes of the Warsaw Convention property damage limitation is $9.07 per pound. Trans World Airlines. Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 104 S.Ct. 1776 (1984); Fujitsu Limited v. Federal Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423 (2d Cir. 2001); Cruz v. American Airlines, 193 F.3d 526 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Defendants claim that the weight of each lost bag could not have exceeded seventy pounds as that is the federally restricted limit for check in baggage. That estimate is probably high considering that one of plaintiffs lost bags was originally intended to be a carry on. Nevertheless, plaintiff also does not oppose the seventy pound per bag calculation. Defendants' tender of $640 per bag, or a total of $1280 is sufficient compensation for lost luggage under the Warsaw Convention.
Plaintiffs argument that the Warsaw Convention does not apply to loss or damage of checked luggage until it is physically airborne flies in the face of the statutory language and case law. Apparently plaintiff bases her argument on Article 18(1)'s reference to "damage. . .tak[ing] place during transportation by air." Article 18(1). However, plaintiff fails to take notice of the definition provided in the following paragraph, which states that. "[t]he transportation by air within the meaning of the preceding paragraph shall comprise the period during which the baggage of goods are in the charge of the carrier. . ." Article 18(2). Such broad language certainly contemplates the point in time that the passenger initially entrusts his luggage to the carrier, despite the fact that all involved are currently on the ground. Arguments similar to that asserted by the plaintiff have been rejected by several courts.See,e.g., Pina v. American Airlines, 2000 WL 728007 (S.D. Fla. 5/31/00) (carry on baggage covered by Warsaw Convention even though stored on grounded airplane);Banihashemrad v. Lufthansa Cargo AG, 28 F. Supp.2d 1014 (W.D.Tex. 1998) (holding that Warsaw Convention applies to rugs in a warehouse at the airport); Kabbani v. International Total Services, 805 F. Supp. 1033 (D.D.C. 1992) (Warsaw Convention applies when baggage temporarily in charge of carrier's agent in airport, such as security service). Likewise, plaintiffs argument that jurisprudence from other federal courts "have little or no bearing on this court" with respect to the interpretation of a United States Treaty has no merit. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' request for costs and fees is DENIED.