Opinion
A23-1610
01-31-2024
Michael Collins Iheme, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-08-37043
Considered and decided by Segal, Chief Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and Bratvold, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
Susan L. Segal Chief Judge
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. On April 9, 2009, the Hennepin County District Court convicted appellant Michael Collins Iheme of second-degree intentional murder and sentenced him to 367 months in prison. Appellant filed a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction, which this court affirmed on June 8, 2010. State v. Iheme, No. A09-1225, 2010 WL 2265667 (Minn.App. June 8, 2010), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 10, 2010). Following the Minnesota Supreme Court's denial of his petition for further review in that appeal, appellant filed four separate petitions for postconviction relief, each of which the district court denied. The current appeal concerns the most recent of these orders, filed on September 5, 2023.
2. In his most recent petition for postconviction relief, appellant argues that he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, that his trial and conviction violated due process and other constitutional rights, that he received an unlawful upward sentencing departure, and that the judicial officer presiding over his trial and sentencing was biased.
3. In denying relief without a hearing, the district court determined that the petition was time-barred pursuant to the two-year limitation period imposed by Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4 (2022), and that the claims asserted in the petition were procedurally barred from consideration by State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1976). Appellant argues generally on appeal that the district court erred in these determinations.
4. This court reviews the denial of a petition for postconviction relief for abuse of discretion. Hannon v. State, 957 N.W.2d 425, 432 (Minn. 2021). "A court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record." Riley v. State, 792 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Minn. 2011).
5. Minnesota Statutes section 590.01, subdivision 4, provides that a petition for postconviction relief may not be filed more than two years following the final disposition of the petitioner's direct appeal. The final disposition of a direct appeal occurs 90 days after a decision by the Minnesota Supreme Court, once the time to petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court has expired. Hannon, 957 N.W.2d at 435. In appellant's case, the availability of postconviction relief expired on November 8, 2012- two years and 90 days after the Minnesota Supreme Court's order denying further review of his direct appeal. Accordingly, appellant's petition was presumptively untimely and not properly before the district court.
6. An otherwise untimely petition may nevertheless be considered by the district court if the petitioner establishes that one of the statutory exceptions to the timebar applies. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b). Appellant, however, does not argue on appeal that any such exception is applicable to his case, and our independent review satisfies us that none in fact do. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that appellant's petition for postconviction relief was time-barred.
7. "[O]nce a direct appeal has been taken, all claims raised in that appeal, known at the time of appeal, or that should have been known at the time of appeal will not be considered in a subsequent petition for postconviction relief." Allwine v. State, 994 N.W.2d 528, 536 (Minn. 2023) (citing Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d at 741). And any "claims asserted in a second or subsequent postconviction petition are procedurally barred if they could have been raised on direct appeal or in the first postconviction petition." Schleicher v. State, 718 N.W.2d 440, 449 (Minn. 2006).
8. Minnesota recognizes two exceptions to the application of this prohibition, however: "(1) a novel legal issue is presented that was unavailable at the time of the direct appeal; or (2) the interest of justice requires review." Chavez-Nelson v. State, 948 N.W.2d 665, 673 (Minn. 2020). In this context, "[t]he interests-of-justice exception applies only when the claim has substantive merit and the petitioner did not deliberately and inexcusably fail to raise the claim" in previous proceedings. Thoresen v. State, 965 N.W.2d 295, 304 (Minn. 2021) (quotations omitted).
9. As to appellant's claims that he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, that his trial violated constitutional protections, and that the presiding judicial officer was biased, they all were either raised or could have been raised in prior postconviction proceedings. And because appellant does not argue that his claims are novel and could not have been raised earlier, or that he did not deliberately or inexcusably fail to raise them earlier, consideration of these claims was barred by Knaffla. We thus discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in denying relief on this basis.
10. Appellant, however, also appears to argue for the first time in his most recent petition for postconviction relief that his sentence constituted an unlawful upward durational departure. Because a district court may correct an unlawful sentence "at any time," Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03. subd. 9, this claim may not be subject to application of the statutory time-bar of section 590.01, Reynolds v. State, 888 N.W.2d 125, 133 (Minn. 2016), and is not forfeited by a defendant's failure to raise it in a prior proceeding, State v. Pugh, 753 N.W.2d 308, 311 (Minn.App. 2008), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 23, 2008).
11. The district court sentenced appellant to 367 months for his conviction for second-degree intentional murder. Based upon the sentencing guidelines applicable to appellant's offense, the presumptive sentencing range for this offense and for a defendant with a criminal-history score of zero is between 261 and 367 months. Minn. Sent'g Guidelines IV, VI (Supp. 2007). Because appellant received a sentence within the presumptive range prescribed by the guidelines, his sentence did not constitute a departure and so was not unlawful for this reason.
12. Because we conclude that appellant would not have been entitled to relief on his sentencing claim had it been considered by the district court, and because the remainder of appellant's claims were time-barred and Knaffla-barred, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's petition for postconviction relief without a hearing. See Blanche v. State, 988 N.W.2d 486, 491 (Minn. 2023) ("A district court need not hold an evidentiary hearing if the alleged facts, when viewed in a light most favorable to the petitioner, together with the arguments of the parties, conclusively show that the petitioner is not entitled to relief." (quotation omitted)).
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The postconviction court's order denying postconviction relief is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.