“Direct evidence of discrimination does not require a factfinder to draw any inferences in order to conclude that the challenged employment action was motivated, at least in part, by unlawful discrimination.” Igwe v. Salvation Army, 790 Fed.Appx. 28, 34 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 865 (6th Cir. 2003)).
Race, national origin, color, and religious discrimination are, respectively, separate types of Title VII claims. Wakefield v. Child.'s Hosp., No. C2-06-1034, 2008 WL 3833798, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 13, 2008); see also Ang v. Procter & Gamble Co., 932 F.2d 540, 546 (6th Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by Igwe v. Salvation Army, 790 Fed.Appx. 28, 36 (6th Cir. 2019). Plaintiffs claim that they were discriminated against based only on their race as African Americans
Race, national origin, color, and religious discrimination are, respectively, separate types of Title VII claims. Wakefield v. Child.'s Hosp., No. C2-06-1034, 2008 WL 3833798, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 13, 2008); see also Ang v. Procter & Gamble Co., 932 F.2d 540, 546 (6th Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by Igwe v. Salvation Army, 790 Fed.Appx. 28, 36 (6th Cir. 2019). Plaintiffs must show direct or sufficient indirect evidence specific as to each type of claim in order to survive summary judgment as to claims of that type.
Race, national origin, color, and religious discrimination are, respectively, separate types of Title VII claims. Wakefield v. Child.'s Hosp., No. C2-06-1034, 2008 WL 3833798, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 13, 2008); see also Ang v. Procter & Gamble Co., 932 F.2d 540, 546 (6th Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by Igwe v. Salvation Army, 790 Fed.Appx. 28, 36 (6th Cir. 2019). Plaintiffs must show direct or sufficient indirect evidence specific as to each type of claim in order to survive summary judgment as to claims of that type.
"Direct evidence of discrimination does not require a factfinder to draw any inferences in order to conclude that the challenged employment action was motivated, at least in part, by unlawful discrimination." Igwe v. Salvation Army, 790 Fed.Appx. 28, 34 (6th Cir. 2019).
So evidence that an employer took adverse action against an employee because of his accent "can constitute direct evidence of national origin discrimination" when that evidence shows "an unmistakable intent to discriminate upon national origin." Igwe v. Salvation Army, 790 F. App'x 28, 34 (6th Cir. 2019). See, e.g.
See Imwalle, 515 F.3d at 545 (citing Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir. 1994)). See also Igwe v. Salvation Army, 2019 WL 5424692 at * 5 (6th Cir. Oct.2 3, 2019). The plaintiff may show that (1) the employer's stated reason for terminating the employee has no basis in fact, (2) the reason offered for terminating the employee was not the actual reason for the termination, or (3) the reason offered was insufficient to explain the employer's action.
Comments regarding an individual's accent can constitute direct evidence of national origin discrimination. Igwe v. Salvation Army, No. 19-1082, 2019 WL 5424692, at *4 (6th Cir. Oct. 23, 2019). However, "[i]solated and ambiguous comments are insufficient to support a finding of direct discrimination."