Similarly, this court has always allowed the trial court open discretion in determining the effective date of the division. See generally Breitenstine v. Breitenstine, 2003 WY 16, 62 P.3d 587 (Wyo. 2003); McCulloh v. Drake, 2001 WY 56, 24 P.3d 1162 (Wyo. 2001); Bailey v. Bailey, 954 P.2d 962 (Wyo. 1998); Neuman, at 582; Overcast v. Overcast, 780 P.2d 1371 (Wyo. 1989); Sellers v. Sellers, 775 P.2d 1029 (Wyo. 1989); Igo v. Igo, 759 P.2d 1253 (Wyo. 1988); David v. David, 724 P.2d 1141 (Wyo. 1986); Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814 (Wyo. 1984); Paul v. Paul, 616 P.2d 707 (Wyo. 1980); and Parsons v. Parsons, 189 P.2d 159 (Wyo. 1948). Further, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114 (Lexis 1999) demands such an approach.

Klatt v. Klatt, 654 P.2d 733, 735 (Wyo. 1982); Paul, 616 P.2d 707, 712 (Wyo. 1980). From that perspective, the trial court is afforded considerable discretion to frame a distributive scheme appropriate to the peculiar circumstances of any individual case, and we will not disturb such a scheme absent a showing that the trial court clearly abused its discretion. Sellers v. Sellers, 775 P.2d 1029, 1030 (Wyo. 1989); Igo v. Igo, 759 P.2d 1253, 1255 (Wyo. 1988). The district court weighed all the factors required to be weighed in deciding how best to distribute the marital estate, namely, the ages of the parties, the length of the marriage and its separation, the assets and liabilities brought into the marriage including Mr. Carlton's contributions to the corporation, the entire financial impact on both parties, the abilities of the parties to earn a living, and the health of the parties.

Judicial discretion is "`"a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously * * *."'" Id. (quoting Igo v. Igo, 759 P.2d 1253, 1255 (Wyo. 1988) and Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986)). IV. DISCUSSION

But see Clay v Clay, 550 S.W.2d 730 (Tex Civ App, 1977) (where in a divorce granted on a no-fault ground, the trial court, in dividing property, could consider the jury's finding that the wife was guilty of cruelty); Hourigan v Hourigan, 635 S.W.2d 556 (Tex App, 1981) (where a divorce is based on both no-fault and fault grounds, the court could consider the fault of one spouse in breaking up a marriage in making the property division). Wyoming: See Grosskopf v Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 818 (Wyo, 1984) (because the Wyoming no-fault statute states that divorce may be decreed upon "'the complaint of the aggrieved party,'" [emphasis added] this term necessarily implies that one party is to blame, and therefore the trial court could consider fault of respective parties together with all other facts and circumstances surrounding dissolution of a marriage for purposes of determining the division of property, alimony, and an award of attorney fees); Igo v Igo, 759 P.2d 1253 (Wyo, 1988) (the court has discretion, in the division of property, to consider the fault of the respective parties). Alabama, Connecticut, Missouri, Rhode Island, Texas, and Wyoming.

Hance v. Straatsma, 721 P.2d 575, 578 (Wyo. 1986). And see Igo v. Igo, 759 P.2d 1253 (Wyo. 1988), involving the same issue as here presented. Under the circumstances of this case, it cannot be said that the trial court acted in a manner which exceeded the bounds of reason.

The district court in the case at hand clearly exercised its discretion and authority well within the perimeters of the statutes. Its discretion and judgment should not and cannot be interfered with unless there is a clear showing of an unjust or inequitable division of the property or unless the court has acted arbitrarily and capriciously. Igo v. Igo, 759 P.2d 1253 (Wyo. 1988); Young v. Young, 472 P.2d 784 (Wyo. 1970); Karns v. Karns, 511 P.2d 955 (Wyo. 1973). As to child support, again there is no showing that the trial court abused its discretion or failed to take into consideration relevant factors in determining the amount of support.

We therefore hesitate to disturb such a scheme absent a showing that the trial court clearly abused its discretion. Sellers v. Sellers, 775 P.2d 1029, 1030 (Wyo. 1989); Igo v. Igo, 759 P.2d 1253, 1255 (Wyo. 1988); David v. David, 724 P.2d 1141, 1142-43 (Wyo. 1986). To constitute an abuse of that discretion, the trial court's distribution of the marital property must shock the conscience and appear so unfair and inequitable that reasonable persons could not abide it. Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 820 (Wyo. 1984); Klatt, 654 P.2d at 735-36.

CONTESTED DIVORCE DECREE PROVISIONS We first note our standard on appeal as recently stated in Igo v. Igo, 759 P.2d 1253, 1255 (Wyo. 1988): On appeal we review the evidence in favor of [the prevailing party], giving that evidence every reasonable inference that can be drawn and ignoring * * * evidence [of the losing party].