Opinion
No. 07-347.
Filed March 4, 2008.
Granville County No. 06CVS994.
Appeal by Petitioner from judgment entered 13 December 2006 by Judge Henry W. Hight, Jr. in Superior Court, Granville County. Heard in the Court of Appeals October 17, 2007.
Shelli Henderson Rice for Petitioner-Appellant. Cranfill, Sumner Hartzog, L.L.P., by M. Robin Davis and Norwood P. Blanchard, for Respondent-Appellee City of Oxford. Regina S. Adams for Respondent-Appellee Employment Security Commission of North Carolina.
Sharon B. Iglesias (Petitioner) began work at the City of Oxford Police Department as the administrative assistant to Chief of Police Roger Paul in December 1999. Petitioner continued serving as the administrative assistant to Chief of Police John Wolford (Chief Wolford) beginning in June 2000. One of petitioner's duties involved maintaining a ledger for a drug fund account used by officers for undercover drug purchases. Petitioner and Chief Wolford initially had a good working relationship. However, in March 2002, Petitioner began to suspect that Chief Wolford was taking money from the drug fund account for his own personal use. Petitioner first discussed her suspicions with one of her supervisors, Lieutenant Glen Boyd (Lieutenant Boyd), in early 2004. Petitioner also reported her suspicions to the city auditor, to City Manager Tommy Marrow (City Manager Marrow), and to Investigator Teresa West (Investigator West) with the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI). According to Petitioner, no investigation was made regarding her allegations against Chief Wolford.
Chief Wolford accused Petitioner in September 2004 of two breaches of confidentiality. The first concerned Petitioner's discussions of the drug ledger with persons outside the police department. The second involved an allegation that Petitioner had spread rumors about the employment status of another city employee. Petitioner was demoted and later placed on leave, but in October 2004 was reinstated to her administrative assistant position. In his letter reinstating Petitioner, City Manager Marrow warned Petitioner that this will . . . serve as a FINAL WARNING that you are not to discuss or disseminate, in any manner whatsoever, any confidential information that you obtain during the course and scope of your employment. . . . Any information you receive or overhear regarding but not limited to criminal investigations, confidential internal inquiries, drug investigations, and/or any personnel matters involving City employees in any department shall remain confidential and not passed on to other employees inside or outside the Police Department, or any persons outside the Department without a professional or legal interest in that information.
. . . If you find that you have obtained information that you believe warrants disclosure, you are only to disclose said information to your supervisor or to the Chief of Police, as appropriate, unless the information involves the Chief of Police, in which case disclosure shall be made to the City Manager.
This directive is not intended to, nor should it be construed as any impediment to . . . your right to speak on matters of legitimate public concern, as a citizen or otherwise[.]
After her reinstatement, Petitioner continued to have concerns that no one had investigated her suspicions regarding Chief Wolford's conduct. Petitioner eventually contacted a television news station around December 2005 to make her concerns public.
While performing a task regarding the police department payroll on 18 January 2006, Petitioner noticed that Lieutenant Boyd had changed certain information on a time sheet submitted by another police officer.
Petitioner informed the officer that Lieutenant Boyd had altered the officer's time sheet. Lieutenant Boyd and the officer later resolved the issue regarding the officer's time sheet. However, Lieutenant Boyd was displeased that Petitioner had addressed her concerns regarding the time sheet to the officer, rather than discussing the issue with Lieutenant Boyd. In an email sent to Petitioner on 20 January 2006, Lieutenant Boyd informed Petitioner:
FIRST AND FOREMOST IT IS NOT YOUR JOB TO CALL AN EMPLOYEE AND INFORM THEM OF ANYTHING. IT IS THE SUPERVISOR[']S RESPONSIBILITY. SECOND YOU DID IT IN SUCH AWAY [sic] THAT YOU MADE IT APPEAR THAT I WAS BEING SNEAKY REGARDING THIS MATTER. ON THE CONTRARY I AM NOT SNEAKY ABOUT ANYTHING. BECAUSE OF THE WAY YOU HANDLED THIS AND STEPPED OUTSIDE YOUR AUTHORITY WE HAVE AN EMPLOYEE THAT IS NOT HAPPY. . . . THIS IS EXACTLY THE CONDUCT THAT YOU HAVE BEEN WARNED ABOUT.
Later that day, Petitioner responded to Lieutenant Boyd's email. In her email, Petitioner defended her actions with regard to the time sheet and also told Lieutenant Boyd: " Before you start accusing others of being `sneaky' Glen maybe you should take a good look at your own behavior." Four days later, Chief Wolford terminated Petitioner from her employment with the Oxford Police Department. In his 24 January 2006 letter to Petitioner, Chief Wolford stated:
For some time now it has been obvious that you have a personal vendetta against me. . . . What I cannot and will not tolerate however is conduct which results in the disruption of the operations of the police department and which has a serious impact on the morale of the sworn officers[.]
In recent weeks your behavior in the workplace has been increasingly disruptive and disrespectful, both of me and the entire operations of the police department. Your open disdain and active disrespect for me as your commanding officer undermines my ability to effectively run the department. . . . In short, your recent conduct . . . has made it impossible for you to have a productive working relationship with anyone in the department.
Accordingly, at this point I have no choice but to terminate your employment with the Oxford Police Department.
Following her termination, Petitioner filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits with the Employment Security Commission (the Commission) on 12 February 2006. An adjudicator concluded that Petitioner was eligible for benefits. Respondent City of Oxford appealed the adjudicator's determination. An appeals referee reversed the adjudicator's decision on 29 June 2006, finding that Petitioner was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because she was discharged for misconduct connected with her work. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 96-14(2) (2007) ("An individual shall be disqualified for [unemployment insurance] benefits . . . if it is determined by the Commission that such individual is . . . unemployed because [she] was discharged for misconduct connected with [her] work."). Petitioner appealed, and the Commission affirmed the referee's decision on 29 August 2006, with the Commission adopting the referee's findings of fact as its own. Petitioner then petitioned the Granville County Superior Court for judicial review of the Commission's decision. The trial court entered judgment on 13 December 2006 affirming the Commission's decision. Petitioner appeals.
I.
Petitioner first argues that the trial court erred by finding that the Commission's findings of fact were supported by competent evidence. "The scope of our review is to determine whether the facts as found by the [Commission] are supported by competent evidence and if so, whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law." Fair v. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., 113 N.C. App. 159, 161, 437 S.E.2d 875, 876 (1993), disc. review denied, 336 N.C. 315, 445 S.E.2d 394 (1994). The Commission's findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if they are supported by any competent evidence. Housecalls Nursing Servs., Inc. v. Lynch, 118 N.C. App.275, 278, 454 S.E.2d 836, 839 (1995); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 96-15(i) (2007).
Petitioner first challenges the Commission's finding of fact number seven:
In and around September, 2004, [Chief] Wolford accused [Petitioner] of two incidents of breaches of confidentiality regarding a ledger and allegations of spreading rumors about the employment status of an employee in another department of the employer's operations. [Petitioner] was placed on leave without pay.
Petitioner argues that this finding was not supported by competent evidence. We disagree. Petitioner testified before the appeals referee that Chief Wolford "falsely accused me of breach of confidentiality on two occasions[.]" According to Petitioner's testimony, the first accusation concerned "the drug ledger," and the second accusation concerned Plaintiff "spreading rumors" about whether another city employee had been fired. Petitioner was then placed on a three-week leave. Petitioner's own testimony, therefore, provides competent evidence to support this finding of fact.
The record does indicate that Petitioner was placed on leave with pay, contrary to the Commission's finding. However, whether Petitioner was placed on paid or unpaid leave does not constitute an ultimate fact necessary to prove that Petitioner was terminated from her position due to her own misconduct. Because this fact was not necessary to the Commission's ultimate determination, and because we find that the Commission's other findings of fact support its conclusions of law, this finding was unnecessary and need not be supported by competent evidence.
Petitioner next challenges the Commission's finding of fact number eight:
On October 22, 2004, after a grievance process regarding the breach of confidentiality allegations, the employer's city manager reinstated [Petitioner] in her position of administrative assistant. Her reinstatement took effect October 27, 2004.
Petitioner argues that this finding was not supported by competent evidence. We disagree. Petitioner confirmed in her testimony that she received her reinstatement letter from City Manager Marrow on 22 October 2004, and that she returned to work on 27 October 2004. City Manager Marrow's letter to Petitioner clearly referenced Petitioner's grievance appeal of her suspension, and stated that Petitioner "should be reinstated as Administrative Support Specialist to the Oxford Police Department[.]"
Petitioner contends that she initiated the grievance process after she was demoted. Further, Petitioner argues that she was demoted in response to the allegation that she had spread rumors concerning another city employee, and not in response to the allegation that she had breached confidentiality by discussing the drug ledger with persons outside the police department. Therefore, Petitioner argues, the Commission's finding is inaccurate because it suggests that her grievance process was related to both breach-of-confidentiality allegations. We disagree. While the specific reasons for Petitioner's demotion and suspension do not appear in the record, City Manager Marrow's letter instructs Petitioner to maintain confidentiality with regard to both personnel matters and drug investigations. Because Petitioner's reinstatement letter identifies both personnel confidentiality problems and drug ledger confidentiality problems as issues that must be remedied as a condition of Petitioner's reinstatement, we believe that competent evidence appears in the record to support the Commission's finding that Petitioner's grievance process was related to both breach-of-confidentiality allegations leveled against her.
Petitioner next challenges the Commission's finding of fact number nine:
In the letter of reinstatement of October 22, 2004, the city manager indicated that the letter also served as "a FINAL WARNING that [Petitioner]" was "not to discuss or disseminate, in any manner whatsoever, any confidential information that [she] obtain[ed] during the course and scope of [her] employment, unless the discussion or dissemination [was] relevant to the performance of [her] job duties." The letter went on to indicate that "it [was] critical that [Petitioner] abide by the need for the utmost confidentiality within the workplace. Any information that [Petitioner] receive[d] or overhear[d] regarding but not limited to criminal investigations, confidential internal inquiries, drug investigations, and/or any personnel matters involving City employees in any department [should] remain confidential and not passed on to other employees inside or outside the Police Department, or any persons outside the Department without a professional or legal interest in that information." Further, the letter indicated that [Petitioner] was "not to discuss personnel information with other city employees." If she was to find that she had "obtained information that [she] believe[d] warrant[ed] disclosure, [she was] only to disclose said information to [her] supervisor or to the Chief of Police, as appropriate, unless the information involve[d] the Chief of Police, in which case disclosure [should] be made to the City Manager."
Petitioner argues that this finding was not supported by competent evidence. We disagree. Petitioner admits that the portions of the reinstatement letter contained in this finding were quoted nearly verbatim from the actual reinstatement letter. Since this finding only purports to set out the specific contents of the reinstatement letter, and because the finding sets out those contents accurately, we find that competent evidence existed to support this finding.
Petitioner argues that while the finding is factually correct regarding the contents of the reinstatement letter, it misrepresents the basis of Petitioner's demotion by suggesting, as in finding of fact number eight, that Petitioner was demoted because of the allegations that she had breached confidentiality regarding the drug ledger. Petitioner contends that the warnings in her reinstatement letter were forward-looking and did not actually address any of her past conduct, in that the letter simply warned her not to disseminate "any confidential information that you obtain during the course and scope of your employment." Petitioner notes that the Commission's finding changed the tense of the word "obtain" to "obtained," and argues that this improperly implies that the letter intended to address her past conduct. We disagree. A full reading of finding of fact number nine clearly reveals that the Commission's alteration of verb tense in its recitation of the reinstatement letter was merely a stylistic choice used by the Commission to reference events that had taken place in the past. Further, as stated above, we find that competent evidence existed to support the Commission's determination that Petitioner faced disciplinary action as a result of some combination of the allegations against her regarding both the drug fund ledger and her spreading of rumors regarding another city employee. Petitioner's argument is without merit.
Petitioner next challenges the Commission's finding of fact number six:
In May, 2004 and at other times before and around May, 2004, [Petitioner] discussed her suspicions about [Chief] Wolford's handling of the drug fund account with an outside auditor, Lieutenant Glen Boyd, the city manager, and the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation. In addition, [Petitioner] discussed her suspicions with various employees and individuals outside of any chain of command and/or without any authority to formally address her concerns.
Petitioner argues that this finding was not supported by competent evidence. We disagree. Petitioner testified that in May 2004, she reported her suspicions regarding the drug fund to the city auditor. The city auditor shared Petitioner's concerns with City Manager Marrow in May 2004. Further, Petitioner sent City Manager Marrow a letter detailing her suspicions, and also spoke with City Manager Marrow regarding the issue in October 2004. We find that October 2004 was sufficiently "around May, 2004" to support the Commission's finding, especially given the fact that City Manager Marrow knew of Petitioner's concerns as early as May 2004. Petitioner further testified that she spoke with Investigator West at the SBI regarding her suspicions in July 2004, and also spoke with Lieutenant Boyd regarding the drug fund on at least two occasions. It is not clear from the record exactly when Petitioner spoke with Lieutenant Boyd; however, there is evidence that these conversations took place sometime between February and May 2004.
Petitioner argues that the Commission's finding that she "discussed" her suspicions with City Manager Marrow and Lieutenant Boyd is erroneous because they refused to speak with her regarding her allegations. We disagree. Petitioner testified that she communicated her concerns to both City Manager Marrow and Lieutenant Boyd, and they communicated to Petitioner that they did not want to speak further about the issue at that time. We find this to be competent evidence to support the finding that Petitioner "discussed" her concerns with City Manager Marrow and Lieutenant Boyd, even if Petitioner did not believe those conversations were productive.
Petitioner also argues that there is no competent evidence to support the Commission's finding that she spoke with individuals "outside of any chain of command" and/or "without any authority" to " formally address" Petitioner's concerns. We disagree. Petitioner testified that between 2002 and May 2004, she discussed her concerns with many people, including a city records supervisor, a police sergeant, two police officers in the police drug unit, a police detective, a police dispatcher, and a county commissioner. Many of these individuals were clearly outside the "chain of command" and were not persons with formal authority to address Petitioner's concerns. Petitioner testified that she reported directly to Chief Wolford, and that her other direct supervisors included Lieutenant Boyd and the police captain. Based on this testimony, we find that competent evidence existed to support the Commission's finding that lower-ranking police officers, police dispatchers, and city records employees were outside Petitioner's "chain of command" and lacked formal authority to address her concerns.
Petitioner next challenges the Commission's finding of fact number ten:
After returning to her position in October, 2005, [Petitioner] continued to discuss her suspicions about [Chief] Wolford. She discussed them with the city manager and the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation a second time. In addition, [Petitioner] discussed her suspicions with employees and/or individuals outside of any chain of command and/or without any authority to formally address her concerns.
Petitioner argues that this finding was not supported by competent evidence. We disagree. While it is true that Petitioner was reinstated in October 2004 rather than October 2005, we find this to be a mere typographical error and not an ultimate fact necessary to prove that Petitioner was terminated from her position due to her own misconduct. In addition, Petitioner testified that she spoke with City Manager Marrow in May 2005 and with Investigator West in January 2006. Petitioner also testified that at various times after May 2004, she discussed her suspicions with a building maintenance employee, the Chief of Police at Meredith College, another county commissioner, and the news media. Petitioner also told the building maintenance employee to share her concerns with local ministers. Many of these individuals were clearly outside the "chain of command" established in Petitioner's reinstatement letter and had no authority to formally address her concerns. We therefore find that the Commission's finding was supported by competent evidence.
Petitioner next challenges the Commission's finding of fact number eleven:
In January, 2006, [Petitioner] took her suspicions directly to a local news media outlet.
Petitioner argues that this finding was not supported by competent evidence. We disagree. Petitioner testified that on 9 January and 27 January 2006, she was interviewed by a local news television station. During those interviews, Petitioner discussed her suspicions regarding Chief Wolford's misappropriation of drug funds, as well as her frustration concerning what she perceived to be a lack of a proper investigation into her allegations. We find that Petitioner's testimony provides competent evidence to support the Commission's finding.
Petitioner next challenges the Commission's finding of fact number twelve:
Because [Petitioner] had not been contacted for subsequent interviews by some of the entities to which she took her concerns about [Chief] Wolford, she believed that those entities had conducted no investigations into her claims. [Petitioner] had no formal verification that no investigations occurred by some or all of the entities involved.
Petitioner argues that this finding was not supported by competent evidence. We disagree. Petitioner testified that she was "certain" that Lieutenant Boyd did not investigate her allegations because "[Lieutenant Boyd] didn't speak to [her] about it." Petitioner also testified that the city auditor did not investigate her allegations because "he didn't come back to question me any further." Regarding her communications with City Manager Marrow, Petitioner testified that "[h]e never spoke to me so I can only assume there was no investigation." In addition, Petitioner testified that she assumed Investigator West never followed up on Petitioner's suspicions "because I didn't hear anything else." Petitioner never suggested that she received formal verification that any of these persons or entities either investigated or did not investigate her concerns. We find that Petitioner's testimony provides competent evidence to support the Commission's finding.
Petitioner next challenges the Commission's finding of fact number thirteen:
[Petitioner] was made aware of the employer's personal conduct policy. Section 36.35 of the policy addressed insubordination and indicated that "insubordination shall include conduct directed at a superior officer that is either disrespectful, mutinous, insolent, or abusive in language.["]
Petitioner argues that this finding was not supported by competent evidence. We disagree. The record indicates that the portion of the policy set out in the finding is a verbatim quote taken from the actual policy. In addition, there was competent evidence that Petitioner was aware of this policy. During her testimony before the appeals referee, Petitioner was handed a document and was asked: "Are you familiar with this document?" Petitioner responded, "[y]es, I am," and identified the document as the "City Personnel Policy Manual, Section 6, Pre-dismissal Conference." While this particular portion of the policy manual was not the portion referenced in the Commission's finding, Petitioner's testimony indicates that she was familiar with the City Personnel Policy Manual and could identify it as such. We also note that the actual portion of the policy quoted in the finding was introduced into evidence without objection from Petitioner, and Petitioner has never denied having knowledge of section 36.35 of the policy. We therefore find that there was competent evidence in the record to support a finding that Petitioner was aware of section 36.35 of the policy. Even if the evidence did not support the Commission's finding, we find that the Commission's conclusions of law were adequately supported by other findings of fact, as discussed below.
Petitioner next challenges the Commission's finding of fact number fourteen:
In a January 20, 2006 email, [Petitioner] responded to an email by her supervisor, Lieutenant Glen Boyd. In [Lieutenant] Boyd's email to [Petitioner], he discussed concerns about [Petitioner]'s handling of a task. [Petitioner] responded in her email to Boyd with language including but not limited to the following: "Before you start accusing others of being `sneaky' Glen [Boyd] maybe you should take a good look at your own behavior."
Petitioner argues that this finding was not supported by competent evidence. We disagree. The record contains an email sent by Lieutenant Boyd to Petitioner on 20 January 2006 expressing disapproval with Petitioner's handling of an issue concerning a time sheet. The record also contains an email sent by Petitioner on 20 January 2006 in response to Lieutenant Boyd's email. The language recited in the finding is quoted verbatim from Petitioner's email. Petitioner argues that the finding is inaccurate because there is no evidence that this email exchange contributed to Chief Wolford's decision to terminate Petitioner's employment. However, this finding of fact merely recites the facts of the email exchange, and contains no findings regarding whether the email exchange contributed to Chief Wolford's decision. We also note that Lieutenant Boyd testified that Petitioner's email "was the straw that broke the camel' [sic] back" regarding the decision to terminate Petitioner's employment, directly contradicting Petitioner's contention. We therefore find that competent evidence exists in the record to support the Commission's finding.
Petitioner next challenges the Commission's finding of fact number fifteen:
Prior to responding to [Lieutenant] Boyd's email of January 20, 2006, [Petitioner] did not take any concerns of its nature to other members of management or personnel.
Petitioner argues that this finding was not supported by competent evidence. We disagree. Petitioner first argues that this finding was erroneous because there was no evidence that the email exchange contributed to Chief Wolford's decision to terminate her employment. As with the above finding of fact, Petitioner's argument is contradicted by Lieutenant Boyd's testimony and is also irrelevant to our determination of whether this specific finding of fact was supported by competent evidence.
Petitioner also argues that there is no evidence in the record regarding what she either did or did not do prior to sending the email. We disagree. Lieutenant Boyd testified that after Petitioner discovered the time sheet discrepancy, she did not bring her concerns to either him or Chief Wolford. Rather, Petitioner contacted the police officer who had submitted the time sheet. The police officer then contacted Chief Wolford, and Chief Wolford resolved the situation with the officer and with Lieutenant Boyd. Likewise, Petitioner testified that when she discovered the time sheet discrepancy, "no one was at the department at the time I was working on this that I could speak to[.]" Petitioner then left a telephone message for the police officer who had submitted the time sheet, and also spoke with the officer a short time later. This occurred before Petitioner spoke with any management personnel about the issue. Petitioner argues that she did notify her supervisors about her concerns regarding the time sheet, in that when she emailed Lieutenant Boyd on 20 January 2006, she sent a copy of the email to all of the individuals in her supervisory chain of command. While this may be true, the finding specifically states that Petitioner did not address this issue to her superiors " prior to responding to [Lieutenant] Boyd's email" (emphasis added). We therefore find that competent evidence existed to support the Commission's finding.
Petitioner next challenges the Commission's finding of fact number sixteen:
On January 24, 2006, [Petitioner] was presented with a termination letter by [Chief] Wolford.
Petitioner argues that this finding was not supported by competent evidence. We disagree. Petitioner first argues that she received the termination letter on 25 January 2006, rather than on 24 January 2006. While there is a one-day discrepancy between the date on the termination letter and the date on which Petitioner claims to have received the letter, we find this to be a minor discrepancy and not an ultimate fact necessary to prove that Petitioner was terminated from her position due to her own misconduct.
Petitioner also argues that this finding is erroneous because the termination letter did not allege or reference any insubordinate conduct as a basis for Petitioner's discharge. Petitioner further claims that the finding is erroneous because it did not mention the fact that she was not given a pre-dismissal conference prior to receiving her termination letter. However, this finding merely states that Petitioner received a termination letter from Chief Wolford, and contains no findings regarding the contents of the letter. Therefore, Petitioner's argument is irrelevant to our determination of whether the finding is supported by competent evidence. We find that competent evidence appears in the record to support the Commission's finding.
Plaintiff next challenges the Commission's findings of fact numbers three and seventeen:
[Petitioner] was discharged from this job for disruptive conduct in the workplace.
. . . .
[Petitioner] was dismissed for disruptive behavior in the workplace.
Petitioner argues that these findings were not supported by competent evidence. We disagree. Petitioner did submit a supplemental statement of facts in which she claimed that she was terminated because "city officials (and others) [were] involved in a cover-up of crime committed by Chief John Wolford, also a conspiracy formed . . . against me to set me up to lose my job, and retaliation to include false accusations against me that resulted in my termination from employment." Despite Petitioner's allegations, we find that a significant amount of competent evidence existed to support a finding that Petitioner was terminated due to her own disruptive conduct. Lieutenant Boyd testified in detail regarding difficulties between Petitioner and other persons in the police department. According to Lieutenant Boyd, Petitioner became resentful toward her supervisors. Other police department employees found it difficult to work with Petitioner because she routinely attempted to speak with them about discrediting Chief Wolford. The other employees complained to Lieutenant Boyd that they did not want to be associated with Petitioner's activities. Petitioner's behavior became insubordinate and disruptive, and according to Lieutenant Boyd, Petitioner "would pretty much ignore anything that I asked or any conversations we had." Petitioner's insubordination culminated with her sending Lieutenant Boyd a disrespectful email on 20 January 2006. After her media interviews, Petitioner acted as if "she could do what she pleased and didn't have to answer to no one." Lieutenant Boyd also testified that due to Petitioner's disruptions, office morale and productivity had decreased, and the work environment was becoming increasingly hostile.
In addition to Lieutenant Boyd's testimony, the record reflects that two of Petitioner's supervisors, Lieutenant Floyd Griffin and Captain Robert Williamson, joined Lieutenant Boyd in sending a letter to City Manager Marrow discussing Petitioner's behavior. The officers asked City Manager Marrow to assist in terminating Petitioner's employment because she "CREAT[ED] A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT," "DAMAGE[D] THE DEPARTMENT[']S ABILITY TO WORK AS A UNIT," and "REPEATEDLY VIOLATED HER . . . FINAL WARNING REGARDING CONFIDENTIALITY." Further, Chief Wolford clearly stated in his termination letter that Petitioner was being terminated due to her "personal attacks and unfounded accusations," her "conduct which result[ed] in the disruption of the operations of the police department," her "behavior in the workplace [that] has been increasingly disruptive and disrespectful," her "open disdain and active disrespect," and her "negative attitude, comments, and statements." Based on the above, we find that the record contained competent evidence to support the Commission's findings that Petitioner was terminated from her employment because of disruptive behavior in the workplace.
II.
Petitioner next argues that the trial court erred by finding that the Commission's conclusions of law were supported by the Commission's findings of fact. "The scope of our review is to determine whether . . . the [Commission's] findings of fact support the conclusions of law." Fair, 113 N.C. App. at 161, 437 S.E.2d at 876. The Commission's "Memorandum of Law" stated, in pertinent part:
It is concluded from the competent evidence in the record that [Petitioner] may have had valid concerns about the actions of her supervisor, Chief John Wolford, and she may have had validly sought recourse with some of the individuals and entities contacted by her during the course of employment.
However, [Petitioner]'s conduct of repeatedly disclosing her assumptions, allegations, and suspicions about Wolford to employees and other individuals who had no authority to address them created disruption, discord, and dissension within the employer's business, and it caused the employer not to be able to conduct its business efficiently.
[Petitioner] assumed that no investigations had been conducted regarding her allegations. However, [Petitioner] never received formal verification of such. [Petitioner] was not privy to any investigations that may have been conducted by various entities including but not limited to an outside auditor, the city manager's office, and/or the state bureau of investigation. The response to a supervisor's email that addressed concerns about [Petitioner]'s conduct was in violation of the employer's policy regarding personal conduct.
Overall, [Petitioner]'s conduct was a substantial disregard of the employer's interests in that she failed to conduct herself in a professional manner with the allegations she had about a superior.
Based on its conclusions of law, the Commission determined that Petitioner was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits because she was terminated for misconduct connected with her work.
Petitioner argues that the Commission's findings of fact do not support its conclusion that Petitioner was discharged for work-related misconduct. Under N.C.G.S. § 96-14(2):
Misconduct connected with the work is defined as conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violations or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his employee, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree or recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to his employer.
Our Supreme Court has noted that misconduct may result from "a deliberate violation of the employer's rules[.]" Intercraft Industries Corp. v. Morrison, 305 N.C. 373, 375, 289 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1982). However, our Courts have also been clear that "violation of a work rule is not misconduct if the evidence shows that the employee's actions were reasonable and were taken with good cause, which is further defined as a reason which would be deemed by reasonable men and women valid and not indicative of an unwillingness to work." Williams v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 318 N.C. 441, 456, 349 S.E.2d 842, 851 (1986).
Petitioner argues that Respondents had no right to expect Petitioner to remain silent when she suspected the police chief of engaging in illegal conduct. We agree. The Commission also agreed and explicitly concluded that Petitioner "may have had valid concerns about the actions of her supervisor, Chief John Wolford, and she may have . . . validly sought recourse[.]"
However, we believe that the Commission's findings support its conclusion that Petitioner did not conduct herself in a professional manner in pursuing her concerns. Petitioner's "FINAL WARNING" letter instructed her to maintain confidentiality and established a clear chain of command for her to follow in the event she needed to discuss confidential matters with her superiors. Petitioner intentionally violated these instructions because she was unsatisfied with the investigation of her allegations, even though she had no direct knowledge of investigations that might have been performed by the city auditor, City Manager Marrow, the SBI, or other entities. We believe the Commission's findings of fact regarding Petitioner's breaches of confidentiality support its conclusion that Petitioner's violations of the terms of her reinstatement letter caused "disruption, discord, and dissension" that severely affected the Oxford Police Department work environment. We further agree that such actions constituted misconduct because they amounted to "deliberate violations or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his employee[.]" N.C.G.S. § 96-14(2). See, e.g., Douglas v. J.C. Penney Co., 67 N.C. App. 344, 346, 313 S.E.2d 176, 178 (1984) (where the claimant was employed as a department store security guard and violated the company's confidentiality rules, the Court held that "[b]y breaking confidentiality, [the] claimant violated a standard of behavior the company rightfully expected of its security employees"). Because of the disruptive manner in which Petitioner pursued her concerns, we find that Petitioner's violations of work rules were not "reasonable" or "taken with good cause," and would not "be deemed by reasonable men and women valid." Williams, 318 N.C. at 456, 349 S.E.2d at 851.
In addition, Petitioner was openly insolent towards one of her superiors when she accused him of being "sneaky" in an email. This behavior also supports the Commission's conclusion that Petitioner committed work-related misconduct. See, e.g., In re Hagan v. Peden Steel Co., 57 N.C. App. 363, 365, 291 S.E.2d 308, 309 (1982) (agreeing that an employee acted with "gross insolence" when he called his supervisor a "[expletive] liar," and that "such offensive and insulting behavior by the employee is properly characterized as a deliberate violation of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his employee"). Even if Petitioner was not familiar with section 36.35 of the police department policy manual, which addressed insubordinate behavior, Petitioner's email response may still constitute misconduct under N.C.G.S. § 96-14(2). See Williams, 318 N.C. at 455-56, 349 S.E.2d at 851 (stating that a finding of misconduct may be "based on conduct alone, without reference to a specific rule"). Based on the above, we find that the Commission's findings of fact supported its conclusions of law. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
Affirmed.
Judges HUNTER and BRYANT concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).