Summary
ordering further discovery to "uncover any disputed issues of fact" that may be relevant to class certification
Summary of this case from Hnot v. Willis Group Holdings Ltd.Opinion
06 Civ. 1756 (CM).
December 7, 2006
MEMORANDUM DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION WITHOUT PREJUDICE
The Second Circuit's decision in Miles v. Merrill Lynch, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 3499937 (2d Cir. 2006), clarifies the standards that govern a district court's certification of class actions under Rule 23. The Miles decision represents a watershed in this Circuit's jurisprudence and changes the rules for certifying classes. On the basis of that decision, and for the reasons set forth more fully below, I conclude that the plaintiffs' motion for class certification must be denied without prejudice as premature.
In Miles the Second Circuit resolved the vexing dilemma a district court confronts when it attempts to conduct a "rigorous analysis" to determine whether the requirements of Rule 23 have been met while avoiding any "preliminary inquiry into the merits" of the suit. General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982); Eisen v. Carlisle Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974)). The court rejected the implication from some of its earlier decisions such as Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 291-93 (2d Cir. 1999), that plaintiffs are required only to make "some showing" in support of class certification. Miles, 2006 WL 3499937, *13. The Miles court instructed that, "A district judge may certify a class only after making determinations that each of the Rule 23 requirements has been met," and clarified that, "Such determinations can be made only if the judge resolves factual disputes relevant to each Rule 23 requirement and finds that whatever underlying facts are relevant to a particular Rule 23 requirement have been established and is persuaded to rule, based on the relevant facts and the applicable legal standard, that the requirement is met." 2006 WL 3499937, *15. Aligning itself with the overwhelming majority of circuits to have ruled on the issue, the Miles court also made clear that a district court must resolve any factual dispute that bears on a Rule 23 certification requirement even if it overlaps with an aspect of the merits of the case. Id.
In holding that a district court may not certify a class without determining that each of the Rule 23 requirements has been met, the Miles court was influenced by the Civil Rules Advisory Committee's 2003 Amendments to Rule 23, which removed the provision that class certification "may be conditional" and replaced the provision requiring that a class certification decision be made "as soon as practicable" with one that calls for a decision "at an early practicable time." 2006 WL 3499937, *13. The court similarly invoked the Advisory Committee's statement that, "A court that is not satisfied that the requirements of Rule 23 have been met should refuse certification until they have been met." Id. (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(1)(C) Adv. Comm. Notes 2003).
In the present case, defendants' contentions that plaintiffs fail to satisfy the Rule 23(a) requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation are at their heart inextricably intertwined with their argument that the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act ("AWPA") does not apply to the putative class representatives themselves. The court is particularly concerned about the plaintiffs' ability adequately to represent a class of migrant workers when their own eligibility for relief under the statute is less than clear. In light of Miles, the court is persuaded that it must resolve the question of whether the named plaintiffs have claims under the AWPA before turning to class certification. I do not wish to resolve that issue without the benefit of a dispositive motion addressed to the claims of the putative class representatives. The parties are therefore directed to complete all discovery necessary to uncover any disputed issues of fact relevant to the class plaintiffs' claims and to brief fully issues surrounding the applicability of the AWPA to the named plaintiffs on a motion for summary judgment.
Payroll records documenting a large number of short-term employees and high turnover in defendants' workplace provide ample evidence from which the court could conclude that some of defendants' employees were transient "migrant workers" within the meaning of the AWPA and that the number of AWPA employees was sufficiently numerous to warrant class certification. The applicability of the statute to plaintiffs, who remained in defendants' employ continuously for nearly two years, is far from certain.
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification is denied without prejudice.
This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.