Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-5407.
February 17, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
On February 2, 2004, this Court granted Defendant Angelo L. Cameron's motion for summary judgment after determining that Plaintiff Franklin Uzoma Igbonwa's legal malpractice claim was time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations. In addition, this Court noted its strong reservations concerning the legality of Ifedoo Noble Enigwe's attempt to represent Plaintiff "pro se" with Plaintiff's power of attorney. Mr. Enigwe, again acting "pro se" on Plaintiff's behalf, now moves this Court to: (1) vacate its February 3, 2004 Order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) due to mistake; and (2) recognize Mr. Enigwe as the real party in interest pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17, join him as a party pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, or substitute him as the plaintiff pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25. For the following reasons, the motions are denied.
A brief recitation of the history of this case is in order. On November 14, 2003, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the ground that Plaintiff's claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. On November 26, 2003, this Court ordered that Defendant's motion should be construed as a motion for summary judgment and directed Plaintiff to file a response by January 5, 2004. On December 2, 2004, Plaintiff filed a response to Defendant's motion that addressed the statute of limitations issue. Upon consideration of the parties' submissions, on February 2, 2004, this Court granted summary judgment for Defendant.
Plaintiff now moves this Court to vacate its February 2, 2004 Order due to mistake. This Court, however, is precluded from further engagement with this motion. Mr. Enigwe has been pursuing this action pro se on behalf of his cousin, Mr. Igbonwa, claiming authority to do so with Mr. Igbonwa's power of attorney. In the February 2, 2004 Order, this Court noted its concern regarding the legality of Mr. Enigwe's pro se representation of Plaintiff. Under federal law, parties may conduct their cases only personally or through counsel. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2003); Lutz v. Lavelle, 809 F. Supp. 323, 325 (M.D. Pa. 1991) ("It is a well established principle that while a layman may represent himself with respect to his individual claims, he is not entitled to act as an attorney for others in federal court."). Therefore, this Court cannot allow Mr. Enigwe's continued participation in this case as a legal representative because he is neither an attorney nor a party to this action.
According to Mr. Enigwe, he never received the November 26, 2003 Order and therefore never had the opportunity to supplement his response. Although this Court has no means of verifying Mr. Enigwe's contention, I find Mr. Enigwe's last minute attempt to gain a second chance to contest Defendant's motion for summary judgment dubious. Mr. Enigwe has successfully received other documents pertaining to this case and he offers no further explanation or detail regarding his failure to receive the November Order.
In response, Mr. Enigwe asks this Court to substitute him as the real party in interest or join him as an additional plaintiff claiming that he "has an interest" in the United States currency and Honda Accord that were seized from Mr. Igbonwa and forfeited to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. (Pl.'s Mot. at 1.) However, even if Mr. Enigwe were able to demonstrate an actual interest in the property, he could not pursue a claim against Mr. Igbonwa's attorney under a negligence or contract theory because a non-client has no cause of action against an attorney for negligent performance of legal work and Mr. Enigwe has neither alleged nor demonstrated a contractual relationship between Mr. Anderson and himself. Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744, 747 ( Pa. 1983) (declining to allow non-clients to pursue malpractice actions on theory of negligence and allowing actions on contract theory only for a "narrow class of third party beneficiaries . . . where the intent to benefit is clear and the promisee (testator) is unable to enforce the contract."); Smith v. Griffiths, 476 A.2d 22, 26 (Pa.Super. 1984) ("The general rule is that an attorney will be held liable for negligence only to his client. . . . to abandon the concept completely entails too vast a range of the lawyer's potential liability to third parties."). Therefore, this Court must deny Mr. Enigwe's request to become a party to this action because he has no individual cause of action to pursue.
Mr. Enigwe fails to specify his interest in the forfeited property or how it originated.
In conclusion, Plaintiff's motion to vacate this Court's February 2, 2004 Order and Mr. Enigwe's motion to be substituted or joined as a party in this case are denied. An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 17 th day of February, 2004, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 (Document No. 12) is DENIED.
2. Plaintiff's Motion to Substitute or Join Ifedoo Noble Enigwe as a Plaintiff (Document No. 11) is DENIED.