Opinion
B339201
11-20-2024
I.G., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Real Party in Interest.
Los Angeles Dependency Lawyers, Inc. and Law Office of Jolene Metzger, Dominika Campbell and Reshad R. Khan for Petitioner I.G. Office of the County Counsel, Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest. Children's Law Center, Taylor Lindsley, for Minor, D.F.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING. Petition for extraordinary writ. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.), Super. Ct. No. CK85208B, Tara Newman, Judge. Petition denied.
Los Angeles Dependency Lawyers, Inc. and Law Office of Jolene Metzger, Dominika Campbell and Reshad R. Khan for Petitioner I.G.
No appearance for Respondent.
Office of the County Counsel, Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
Children's Law Center, Taylor Lindsley, for Minor, D.F.
OPINION
ASHMANN-GERST, J.
Petitioner I.G. (guardian) is the maternal grandmother and legal guardian of D.F., now aged nine. For the second time, D.F. has been removed from the guardian's care on account of the guardian's failure to protect D.F. The guardian was not granted reunification services after the second removal. In this petition, the guardian challenges the juvenile court's order setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing to consider a new permanent plan without first allowing a discretionary reunification period. We deny the petition.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
D.F. first came to the attention of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) in 2015, shortly after she was born. DCFS filed a section 300 petition alleging that D.F. was neglected and endangered by her parents' domestic violence and substance abuse. The parents failed to reunify with D.F., and in early 2018 she was placed in a guardianship with her maternal grandmother.
In 2021, when she was six years old, D.F. was removed from the guardian's care. She was placed in foster care, and later with her maternal uncle and aunt. DCFS filed a petition pursuant to section 387, which governs removal of a child from the physical custody of a guardian and placement in a foster home or other more restrictive placement. (§ 387, subd. (a); Dora V. v. Superior Court (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 987, 1004 (Dora V.).) The petition alleged that the guardianship had not been effective at protecting D.F. due to the guardian's mental and emotional problems, including delusions and hallucinations regarding demonic possession. It was also alleged that the guardian physically abused another child in the guardian's care as a result of her delusions.
On January 19, 2022, the juvenile court sustained the section 387 petition. It ordered reunification services for the guardian. After more than 18 months of reunification efforts, the guardian managed to reunify with D.F. In July 2023, D.F. was returned to the guardian's care on the condition that the guardian participate in family preservation services, including counseling.
Less than a year later, DCFS again removed D.F. from the guardian's custody. Another section 387 petition was filed, alleging the continued guardianship was not effective because the guardian failed to comply with her case plan, failed to participate in family preservation services, and created a detrimental home environment that resulted in aggressive and assaultive behavior by the other child in the home toward D.F. The dependency court sustained the new section 387 petition, finding by clear and convincing evidence that remaining in the guardian's home posed a substantial danger to D.F. After permitting briefing on the issue, the court found that the guardian had exhausted available reunification and maintenance services as allowed under section 361.5, and so it set a section 366.26 hearing to consider a new permanent plan for D.F. In response to an argument by the guardian's counsel that the court had discretion to extend reunification services if in the best interests of the child, the dependency court further found that it was not in D.F.'s best interests to return to the guardian's care. No additional reunification services were ordered. Instead, the court found it was best for D.F. to remain in her current placement, which was back with the maternal uncle and aunt. The guardian filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition challenging the setting of a section 366.26 hearing, and later filed this petition.
DISCUSSION
The guardian argues that the juvenile court used the wrong procedural mechanism for reviewing D.F.'s placement and the guardian's request for additional reunification services. The guardian believes the dependency court should have reviewed the matter pursuant to section 388, governing changes in court orders and mandating a best interests inquiry, rather than under section 387, which governs removal of a child from a parent's or guardian's custody on account of facts demonstrating that a previous disposition is no longer effective. However, the guardian did not object to the procedure utilized by the dependency court at the time of its review, so she has forfeited any such claim. The guardian suggests the question of how the juvenile court should have proceeded goes to the court's jurisdiction to act, and so can be raised at any time. But section 366.4 provides that a child for whom a guardianship is established as part of a permanent plan remains within the jurisdiction of the dependency court. (§ 366.4, subd. (a); see also § 366.3, subd. (a)(3); Dora V., supra, 104 Cal.App.5th 987, 1003.) California Rules of Court, rule 5.740(a)(4), reiterates that after a legal guardianship is established and dependency jurisdiction is terminated, as is the case here, residual jurisdiction exists to manage the guardianship. In short, the dependency court already had jurisdiction to review the effectiveness of the guardianship. The method used to bring the matter back to the court's calendar had no fundamental jurisdictional effect. The guardian's claim is, in fact, forfeited.
The guardian's claim also fails on the merits. In In re N.B. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 1139, 1146 (N.B.), the court stated that a section 387 petition may be utilized to remove a child from a dependency guardian's custody and place the child in a more restrictive placement. (See also, Dora V., supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 1004; In re Carlos E. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1408, 1419 &fn. 5 (Carlos E.).) Should a section 387 petition be utilized to return the matter to the dependency court, the court will hold adjudication and disposition hearings to determine if the alleged facts are true and how to proceed with the placement. (N.B., at p. 1146.) However, unlike parents, or guardians who were appointed by the probate court prior to the initiation of dependency proceedings, dependency guardians are not thereafter entitled to reunification. (Dora V., at pp. 1004, 1009.) Instead, "a separate set of proceedings" is required to consider whether the guardianship itself should be terminated and a new permanent plan selected. (Id., at p. 1004.) Termination of a dependency guardianship proceeds as outlined in California Rules of Court, rule 5.740(d), employing a section 388 petition to seek a change of the order establishing the guardianship. (Dora V., at pp. 10041005; Carlos E., at pp. 1418-1419.) It is true the court may order informal services to aid in a possible continuation of the guardianship, but only if that would be in the child's best interests. (Carlos E., at p. 1419; Dora V., at p. 1006; see § 366.3, subd. (b)(2).)
Here, the guardian had already received 18 months of reunification services, afforded to her as though she had rights equal to those of a parent. Despite a brief period of reunification with D.F., those services, as supplemented by ongoing family preservation services, proved to be ineffective in ensuring a safe placement for D.F. The dependency court was not required to again offer reunification services after a second section 387 petition became necessary. To the contrary, the dependency court determined that D.F.'s best interests would not be served by any return to the guardian's custody. Her interests were best served by remaining in the stable placement she had found with the maternal uncle and aunt. That determination was sufficient to preclude any discretionary award of additional services to the guardian. Certainly, given the record before the court, the guardian cannot demonstrate prejudice from the dependency court's ruling or its manner of proceeding. (See B.B. v. Superior Court (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 563, 572-573 [harmless error to use section 300 petition and procedure to evaluate whether to terminate guardianship].)
DISPOSITION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for extraordinary relief is denied. This opinion shall become final immediately upon filing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).) The stay of proceedings issued by this court on October 8, 2024, is lifted.
We concur: LUI, P. J., CHAVEZ, J.